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Abstract
This thesis consists of three essays in financial economics. Specifically, it focuses
on financial market reactions to intangible information like employee satisfaction
and tangible information like corporate earnings news. It examines the effects of
factors including institutional contexts and quality of information environment on
how financial markets incorporate those information.
The second chapter examines the relationship between employee satisfaction
and abnormal stock returns around the world, using lists of the ”Best Companies to
Work For” in 14 countries. We show that employee satisfaction is associated with
positive abnormal returns in countries with high labor market flexibility, such as the
U.S. and U.K., but not in countries with low labor market flexibility, such as Ger-
many. These results are consistent with high employee satisfaction being a valuable
tool for recruitment, retention, and motivation in flexible labor markets, where firms
face fewer constraints on hiring and firing. In contrast, in regulated labor markets,
legislation already provides minimum standards for worker welfare and so additional
expenditure may exhibit diminishing returns. The results have implications for dif-
ferential profitability of socially responsible investing (SRI) strategies around the
world. In particular, they emphasize the importance of taking institutional features
into account when forming such strategies.
In the third chapter, we investigate the effect of ambiguity on return-earnings
relation. Positive firm-level earnings news is informative about a firm’s future cash
flows, thereby increases its contemporaneous stock price. However, this positive
relation does not translate into aggregate level. On the contrary, positive aggregate
xi
earnings surprises lead to negative contemporaneous market returns. This puzzling
finding could be explained by the diversification of firm-specific earnings surprises to-
gether with either high predictability of returns or high predictability of aggregate
earnings changes. Motivated by the differential implications of the two explana-
tions, this study constructs a theoretical model generating predictions in favour of
the return-predictability explanation and provides empirical evidence supporting all
the hypotheses. By interacting Knightian uncertainty with the return-earnings re-
lation on both firm- and aggregate-level, the study shows that individual response
coefficient increases with firm-level ambiguity. Firm-level ambiguity increases the
aggregate earnings response coefficient. This increase is more pronounced when the
degree of market-level ambiguity is high. The results conclude that the negative
aggregate return-earnings relation results from the diversification effect as well as
an amplifying effect of macroeconomic ambiguity on discount rate news and market-
wide cash flow news.
In the fourth chapter, I examine the stylized fact that market reacts much
more strongly to bad news than to good news. I show that the asymmetric reaction
is due to the finding that investors are more surprised by bad earnings news. This
stronger surprise can be explained by the interacting effects of two key elements in
investors’ decision making process: ambiguity and difference of opinion. Ambigu-
ity reduces investors’ reaction to good news while increases their reaction to bad
news. Difference of opinion similarly reduces reaction to good news, but it has no
discernible effect on bad news response. Combining both generates a ”yes” tick
shape for the earnings response coefficient. This asymmetry after controlling the
amount of news explains away all the negative returns generated by leaked quarterly
earnings news. To rationalize the findings, I build a simple model to capture the
dynamics of the earnings-return relation. Multiple-prior ambiguity and difference
of opinion regarding the center of priors range are incorporated and evaluated in a
maxmin framework.
xii
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Definitions of tangible and intangible information
In financial markets, investors make decisions based on value-relevant information.
Those information can be broadly categorised as being either tangible or intangible.
The Oxford English Dictionary defines tangible assets as ”physical and material
assets which can be precisely valued or measured” and intangibles as ”assets which
cannot easily or precisely be measured”. Consistent with this, I define tangible
information as tangible assets related performance information such as revenues,
earnings, and cash flow growth, which are recorded in a structured manner in firms’
financial statements. I define intangible information as other information relevant
for firms’ intangible assets such as goodwill, rights, employee satisfaction, etc.
This thesis studies financial market reactions to both tangible and intangible
information. The second chapter investigates the efficiency of the stock markets
across the world in terms of incorporating the value-relevant intangible information
like employee satisfaction. Country-level factors including institutions and regula-
tions are then examined for their impacts on the varied relation between employee
satisfaction and stock returns in different economies. The third and fourth chapters
move on to examine two puzzling empirical findings based on stock market reac-
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tions to tangible information like corporate earnings news. Specifically, the third
chapter focuses on the negative aggregate return-earnings relation and explores the
possibility whether Knightian uncertainty could shed some lights in explaining this
puzzle. Chapter four discusses the stylized fact that market react asymmetrically to
good versus bad earnings news and shows that both Knightian uncertainty and het-
erogeneous beliefs could explain the asymmetry. The following two sections present
detailed accounts for each task.
1.2 Stock market reaction to employee satisfaction news
There is significant evidence in finance literature that intangible assets are not fully
priced by the stock market. For instance, Chan, Lakonishok, and Sougiannis (2001)
show that firms with high R&D and advertising both measured by expenditures are
able to earn higher long-term returns. This positive relation with future returns
can also be found in other intangible information including patent quality by cita-
tions (Deng, Lev, and Narin, 1999) and software quality measured by investments
(Aboody and Lev, 1998). Consistently, Edmans (2011, 2012) shows that companies
with high employee satisfaction, as measured by inclusion in the list of the ”100
Best Companies to Work For in America”, outperform their peers by 2-3% per year.
These results suggest that satisfaction is positively correlated with firm value and
that these benefits are not immediately capitalized by the market. However, these
papers only study the U.S. - a country with particularly flexible labor markets -
and so the external validity of their results is limited. It is unclear whether these
results are generalizable to other countries, especially those with less flexible labor
markets. The second chapter addresses this open question.
Chapter two examines the relationship between employee satisfaction and
stock returns around the world. Existing theories yield conflicting predictions as to
whether employee satisfaction is beneficial or harmful to firm value. On the positive
2
side, employee welfare can be a valuable tool for recruitment, retention, and mo-
tivation. Modern human resources theory views a firm’s workers as its key assets.
Not only the senior management but also the rank-and-file employees are considered
essential due to the growing importance of knowledge-based industries such as soft-
ware, pharmaceuticals, and financial services. Non-managerial employees engage in
product development and innovation, and build relationships with customers and
suppliers, and mentor subordinates. Employee-friendly policies can attract high-
quality workers to a firm and ensure that they remain within the firm, to form a
source of sustainable competitive advantage.
In addition, the quantifiability of workers’ tasks renders employee satisfaction
a valuable motivational tool. The traditional manufacturing jobs can easily quantify
the output of a worker by using the monetary ”piece rates” (Taylor, 1911). In the
knowledge-based industries, it is increasingly difficult to quantify the workers’ tasks,
such as innovation or building client relationships. The reduced effectiveness of
extrinsic motivators increases the role for intrinsic motivators such as satisfaction.
The efficiency wage theory of Akerlof and Yellen (1986) argues that employees view
a positive working environment as a ”gift” from the firm and respond with a ”gift” of
increased effort (Akerlof, 1982). Sociological theories argue that satisfied employees
identify with the firm and internalize its objectives, thus inducing effort (McGregor,
1960).
On the negative side, employee satisfaction indicates unnecessary costs by
the management. Traditional management theory views a firm’s employees as part
of its physical capital (Taylor, 1911). Heavy manufacturing based economy demands
employees work in a rigid environment with tasks allocated mechanically. Employee
satisfaction implies either workers are overpaid or underworked, both of which reduce
the shareholders’ value. It is optimal for managers to extract workers’ maximum
productivity while minimising their costs. Relatedly, agency problems may lead
to managers tolerating insufficient effort and/or excessive pay, at shareholders’ ex-
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pense. The manager may enjoy more pleasant relationships with his subordinates
by not holding them down to their reservation utility (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).
Alternatively, high wages may constitute a takeover defense, as modeled by Pagano
and Volpin (2005a). Cronqvist, Heyman, Nilsson, Svaleryd, and Vlachos (2009)
find that salaries are higher when managers are more entrenched, which supports
the view that high worker pay is inefficient.
Institutional context like the labor market regulations determines the relative
importance of the above benefits and costs. In flexible labor market, firms are given
more autonomy on the specifications of work contracts. Firms face fewer restrictions
to recruit talents that they need and more easily dismiss underperforming workers
and replace them with superior ones. On the hiring front, the recruitment benefit
is clear. The retention benefits of employee satisfaction are also more important
since the competitors also face few hiring constraints. On the firing side, easier
dismissal of less productive employees makes the recruitment benefit even greater. In
addition, the greater risk of firing means that employees invest in general rather than
firm-specific skills, which also increases their ability to be recruited elsewhere (Hall
and Soskice, 1998; Thelen, 2001). Easier firing indicates that employee satisfaction
can also create motivational benefits. Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984)’s efficiency wage
theory suggests that workers exert more effort to prevent from being fired when
they are satisfied with their jobs. Comparing to senior managers who often hold
shares of the firms, rank-and-file employees are not incentivised with equity hence
the motivational benefits may be particularly stronger.
In regulated labor markets, strong regulations already impose a floor on
worker welfare. The balance of benefits and costs for employee-friendly policies may
shift over the optimal level. In other words, the marginal benefits of those policies
may not justify the costs. In addition, in those markets the restrictions on hiring
and firing are stronger. Thereby, following the logic of the above the recruitment,
retention, and motivational benefits are lower. In short, both effects reduce the
4
marginal benefit of employee satisfaction measures, rendering it potentially below
the marginal cost.
The empirical section of this chapter examines the relationship between em-
ployee satisfaction and stock returns in multiple countries around the world, and
investigate the effect of country-level labor market flexibility on the relationship.
14 countries are chosen due to data availability for Best Companies (”BC”) lists.
The lists are compiled by the Great Place to Work Institute in San Francisco and
cover more than 45 countries. We use two measures of country-level labor market
flexibility: the OECD Employment Protection Legislation (”EPL”) index (Pagano
and Volpin, 2005b; Simintzi, Vig, and Volpin, 2014) and the labor market flexibility
categories of the Fraser Institute’s Economic Freedom of the World (”EFW”) in-
dex (Bernal-Verdugo, Furceri, and Guillaume, 2012ab,a; Freeman, Kruse, and Blasi,
2008; Haltiwanger, Scarpetta, and Schweiger, 2008).
We find that the alpha for the US (e.g. 22 basis points) documented by
Edmans (2011, 2012) is merely the 10th highest out of the 14 countries that we
study. For example, the monthly alpha is 77 basis points in Japan from 2007-2013
and (an insignificant) 81 basis points in the U.K. from 2001-2013. (The different
time periods reflect the different years in which the BC list was initiated). On
the negative territory, Germany exhibits a negative alpha of 45 basis points, albeit
not significant due to the smaller sample size. These results indicate significant
heterogeneity across countries’ alpha.
Next, we show that labor market flexibility with either of the two measures
can explain the cross country heterogeneity. Namely, the abnormal returns for the
best companies are significantly increasing in their countries’ labor market flexibility.
Our main specification is a pooled panel regression controlling for firm-level char-
acteristics relevant for stock returns, such as size, book-to-market, dividend yield,
past returns, trading volume, and the stock price (Brennan, Chordia, and Subrah-
manyam, 1998). To ensure that our labor market flexibility measure is not simply
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proxying for other differences between countries, we control for other country-level
variables such as the rule of law, size of the capital market, and the existence of one-
share-one-vote (all from La Porta, Lopez-de Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997)),
GDP growth, and the anti-director rights index of Spamann (2010). We find that,
a one standard deviation decrease in the EPL measure is associated with a 0.49%
higher market-adjusted monthly return to being a BC. Similarly, a one standard
deviation increase in the EFW measure is associated with a 0.67% higher market-
adjusted monthly return to being a BC. The results are similar using a Fama and
MacBeth (1973) analysis. Overall, our results suggest that the association between
employee satisfaction and stock returns depends critically on the institutional con-
text.
This chapter is related to several areas of research. Firstly, it deepens the
understanding of the relationship between employee welfare and firms’ financial
performance. There are mixed messages regarding the link in the existing literature.
Edmans (2011, 2012) document a positive relationship between employee satisfaction
and future stock returns. In contrast, a negative link is established by Abowd
(1989) between the announcements of pay rises and firms’ market values in dollar
term. Relatedly, stock returns are found to be uncorrelated with KLD’s employee
relations variable (Dhrymes, 1998) and the Council of Economic Priorities minority
management and women in management variables, and negatively correlated with
family benefits (Diltz, 1995). It is worth noting that all those studies focus on the
US market and it is unclear whether those relationships either positive or negative
can generalise into a wider international context.
Secondly, this study contributes to the literature in socially responsible in-
vesting (”SRI”). Employee welfare is one of main variables in SRI and often used
by investors as an investment screening criteria (Renneboog, Ter Horst, and Zhang,
2008a, 2011). The SRI literature produces mixed results. A positive link between
SRI and investor returns has been documented by Moskowitz (1972), Luck and Pi-
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lotte (1993), Derwall, Guenster, Bauer, and Koedijk (2005), and Edmans (2011,
2012). A negative link is found by Geczy, Stambaugh, and Levin (2005), Brammer,
Brooks, and Pavelin (2006), Renneboog, Ter Horst, and Zhang (2008b), and Hong
and Kacperczyk (2009). Insignificant links are shown in Hamilton, Jo, and Statman
(1993), Kurtz and DiBartolomeo (1996), Gorton and Schmid (1997), Bauer, Koedijk,
and Otten (2005), Schrder (2007), and Statman and Glushkov (2008). Again, the
mentioned studies focus solely on the US and the generalisability of the documented
links across countries is not clear. Our study shows that the relationship between
employee satisfaction and future stock returns depends on the institutional context
of labor market regulations. To our knowledge, this is the first study to explore the
investing implications of a SRI variable in a global context. The results suggest that
the investment values of other indicators of Corporate Social Responsibility (”CSR”)
such as gender diversity, animal rights, environmental protection, and whether the
firm is in a ”sin” industry (such as tobacco, alcohol, and gambling) are likely to
depend on institutional context as well, such as regulations and cultural elements.
Lastly, this chapter adds value to the area of cross-country analysis of invest-
ment strategies. In Asness, Moskowitz, and Pedersen (2013), value premium inspired
strategies are compared and shown to be profitable in major economies including
the continental Europe, Japan, the U.K., and the U.S.. Momentum strategies in
multiple countries are investigated by Chui, Titman, and Wei (2010) who conclude
that the profitability discrepancy across countries can be explained by cultural ele-
ments, in particular individualism. That is, high level of individualism leads to more
profits on the momentum strategy. This chapter builds on Edmans (2011, 2012)’s
findings and shows that the profitability of employee satisfaction inspired strategies
crucially depends on one country’s labor market institution.
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1.3 Stock market reaction to corporate earnings news
Corporate earnings news is arguably the most studied tangible information in ac-
counting and finance literature. Theory suggests that earnings news is informative
about future cash flows. Positive earnings news is indicative of more future cash
flows resulting in high contemporaneous stock prices. Indeed, earlier studies like Ball
and Brown (1968) and Beaver (1968) establish the stylized fact that firm-level stock
returns are positively correlated with earnings surprises as measured by standard-
ized seasonally differenced quarterly earnings. This intuitive relation, however, does
not translate into aggregate level. Recent studies including Kothari, Lewellen, and
Warner (2006) and Sadka and Sadka (2009) document a statistically indistinguish-
able contemporaneous relationship between aggregate stock returns and earnings
surprises. This finding is puzzling since the current earnings on the aggregate level
is no longer an indication for future profitability. Even more counter-intuitively, the
contemporaneous relationship can be significantly negative under certain earnings
surprises measures.
To explain the striking aggregate relationship, Kothari, Lewellen, and Warner
(2006) and Sadka and Sadka (2009) employ the framework of return decomposition
by Campbell and Shiller (1988a) and Campbell (1991). The decomposition states
that the relationship between returns and earnings surprises is the relative domi-
nance of the covariances between earnings surprises and each of the three compo-
nents of returns, namely the current expected returns, the cash flow news compo-
nent, and the discount rate news (or the future expected returns) component.
More detailedly, Kothari, Lewellen, and Warner (2006) argue that firm-level
earnings surprises contains much more information about the future firm-specific
cash flows than about the discount rate news. The positive firm-level relationship
documented in the literature can be attributed to the dominance of the cash flow
news component over the other two in the return decomposition. In contrast, on
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aggregate level the earnings surprises contains only information about the future
aggregate cash flows and discount rate news due to diversification effect of the firm-
specific news. Consequently, the discount rate news component becomes dominant
and a possible negative correlation between earnings surprises and discount rates de-
termines the negativity of the return-earnings relation. In other words, the negative
aggregate relation requires the diversification argument and certain level of return
predictability. It is worth noting that in Kothari, Lewellen, and Warner (2006)’s
explanation, the earnings surprises are implicitly assumed to be independent of the
first component - the current expected returns. Sadka and Sadka (2009) present in
a simple and elegant derivation that this assumption might have ignored another
if not the source of the negativity. They show that the covariance between the
earnings surprises and current expected returns can be reduced to the negative co-
variance between the expected earnings surprises and the current expected returns
due to their evidence that the earnings surprises are highly predictable on the aggre-
gate level. The results of Sadka and Sadka (2009) compliment rather than contradict
Kothari, Lewellen, and Warner (2006)’s story and the return-earnings relation could
well be the outcomes of both the high predictability of earnings surprises and the
predictability of returns.
The diversification effect of firm-specific earnings surprise is the center argu-
ment for Kothari, Lewellen, and Warner (2006). However, it is not required in Sadka
and Sadka (2009)’s high predictability of earnings surprises argument. In fact, if the
earnings surprises are highly predictable, then the ”surprise” of the earnings changes
does not exist any longer. This renders the diversification effect irrelevant in the
context of aggregating firm-level earnings surprises. Thus, a clear identification of
diversification effect in aggregation is a useful channel to differentiate the favourable
explanation for the return-earnings relation puzzle.
A direct measure of diversification effect is not obvious. The idea behind this
study is thereby to use an intermediary which not only has a direct link with the
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diversification effect but also measurably affects the return-earnings relation. Uppal
and Wang (2003) shows that a high level of Knightian uncertainty regarding return
distribution could result in a portfolio that is significantly under-diversified relative
to the standard mean-variance portfolio. Epstein and Schneider (2008) and Kelsey,
Kozhan, and Pang (2011) argue that asymmetric reaction to good versus bad news
can arise due to the presence of Knightian uncertainty in the sense of Knight (1921)
and Ellsberg (1961). Investors who are ambiguity averse choose the worst case
scenario and consequently overvalue negative news and undervalue positive news.
It is intuitive to see that high asymmetry leads to lower effect of diversification.
Hereafter, I use terms Knightian uncertainty and ambiguity interchangeably.
Ambiguity refers to situations where objective probabilities are unknown or
imperfectly known. It can arise due to lack of information and/or poor quality of
information. Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) axiomatize investors’ acts of ambiguity
aversion. Facing ambiguity, an agent chooses the worst case scenario and acts in a
maxmin framework. That is, each possible course of action is evaluated with respect
to the least favorable probability distribution from a given set of priors. The chosen
action maximizes the minimum expected utility. Larger set of priors indicates higher
level of ambiguity as well as more extreme type of ambiguity-aversion. Consequently,
the agent tends to overweight the negative outcomes and underweight their positive
counterparts.
Chapter 3 investigates how ambiguity affects the return-earnings relation on
both firm- and aggregate-level. As argued above, high level of ambiguity leads to low
level of diversification effect due to asymmetric reaction to good versus bad news.
This will lead to relative dominance of cash flow news component over the discount
rate news component, which in turns leads to a positive relationship between aggre-
gate returns and earnings. For low level of ambiguity, however, the diversification
effect is much more pronounced. Discount rate news plays a more dominant role
resulting in a negative aggregate return-earnings relation. Therefore, if Kothari,
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Lewellen, and Warner (2006)’s argument is valid, the aggregate return-earnings re-
lation should be negative for low ambiguity portfolios and positive for portfolios of
high level of ambiguity. Alternatively, according to Sadka and Sadka (2009), the
negativity of aggregate return-earnings relation comes from high predictability of
earnings surprise. It is intuitive to state that earnings are less predictable when
the information environment is highly ambiguous. Similarly, high level of ambiguity
leads to less negative aggregate return-earnings relation. To understand the differ-
ence derived from both perspectives, we should be more specific about the type of
ambiguity being employed.
Consistent with the dichotomous characterization of the return-earnings re-
lation, this study categorises ambiguity into two levels: idiosyncratic or firm-level
ambiguity and common or macroeconomic ambiguity. The arguments above are in
fact based on the role of idiosyncratic ambiguity in diversification effect and the role
of macroeconomic ambiguity in the predictability of earnings surprises. Macroe-
conomic ambiguity which measures the market-level information environment and
affects only the discount rate news has little to do with the diversification effect. Its
effect on firm-level return-earnings relations is unclear. Idiosyncratic ambiguity, on
the other hand, has limited impact on the predictability of the aggregate earning
surprises. This is a contradicting point for Kothari, Lewellen, and Warner (2006)
and Sadka and Sadka (2009) theories when considering both firm-level and macroe-
conomic ambiguity altogether. If only the former is correct, then valid is that the
aggregate return-earnings relation turns from negative to positive when the firm-
level ambiguity increases. Since the market-level discount rate news has opposite
effect on the response coefficient than cash-flow news, macroeconomic ambiguity
amplifies its negative effect. Hence, for the portfolios of low firm-level ambiguity,
we expect to observe a strong negative aggregate response coefficient. On the other
hand for portfolios of highly ambiguous firms, the non-diversified effect of ambigu-
ous cash-flow news dominates the negative effect of the discount rate news and we
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obtain a significantly positive aggregate response coefficient. If only the latter is
correct, then the negativity of the aggregate response coefficient comes from purely
the high predictability of aggregate earnings. Macroeconomic ambiguity is likely to
decrease this predictability, while the firm-level ambiguity has little effect. Thereby,
we expect to observe no clear trend on the effect of firm-level ambiguity on portfolio-
level response coefficient. When adding the macroeconomic ambiguity, we expect
to see positive coefficients for portfolios with all levels of firm-level ambiguity. This
serves as our testable hypothesis.
To further develop our hypothesis in a rigorous manner, we build a simple
model to capture the dynamics of earnings-return relation based on the return de-
composition. There are one representative agent (i.e. the investor) and multiple
firms in the economy. Upon receiving noisy signals of each firm, the investor forms
her conditional expectations of the signals’ informativeness about future cash flow
and discount rate news. It is straightforward to generate a closed-form solution
for the earnings response coefficient based on the covariances between returns and
the two components. When the information environment becomes uncertain, the
ambiguity-averse investor lacks confidence on the distribution of true part of a signal
and hence consider a range of possible priors due to lack of information and/or poor
quality of information. More specifically, we consider the noisy signals contain both
firm-specific and market-wide cash flow components, which are orthogonal to each
other. The ambiguity regarding the distribution of firm-specific cash flow component
is purely idiosyncratic and we call it firm-level ambiguity. The ambiguity regarding
the market-wide cash flow component represents the overall ambiguity about the
market as whole and we name it macroeconomic ambiguity. We model both types
of ambiguity using the multiple prior model of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989). That
is, the investor does not observe the variances of both cash flow components and can
only provide their interval ranges, in a similar spirit to Epstein and Schneider (2008)
and Kelsey, Kozhan, and Pang (2011). The investor’s preferences are then described
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by the maxmin expected utility model of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989). The re-
sulting response coefficient is a function of return distribution parameters which in
turn are a function of randomly generated noisy signals of normal distribution.
In order to quantify the effect of ambiguity on the earnings response co-
efficient, we perform a comparative statics analysis. Since the earnings response
coefficients cannot be computed in the closed form with the presence of ambiguity,
we employ Monte Carlo simulations to estimate the coefficients for various values
of ambiguity parameters. To start with firm-level analysis, the model predicts that
individual response coefficients strictly monotonically increase with firm-level am-
biguity. This results also stands in the presence of market-level ambiguity. This
pattern can be intuitively explained by the asymmetric reaction to bad versus good
earnings news. Literature, such as Conrad, Cornell, and Landsman (2002) and
Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold, and Vega (2003), show that market reacts to nega-
tive news significantly more strongly than to positive news. Epstein and Schneider
(2008) and the third chapter of this thesis argue that ambiguity plays an important
role in explaining the asymmetry.
Moving to portfolio-level analysis, the aggregate responses increase with firm-
level ambiguity similarly to that for the individual response coefficients. The effect
of firm-specific cash flow news is diversified away during aggregation so that only
the market-wide cash flow news prevail. However, ambiguity effect is not diversified
away and always goes in the same direction. Positive cash flow effect remains in
the response coefficients for portfolios of high firm-level ambiguity firms. The effect
of macroeconomic ambiguity is similar to the case of individual firms because its
effect on discount rate news is not dampened by aggregation of firms’ signals. It
is worth reiterating that high degree of market-level ambiguity leads to a decrease
in the earnings response coefficient of low-ambiguity stocks and to an increase in
the earnings response coefficient of high-ambiguity stocks, which means that the
effect of market-level ambiguity is related to the degree of firm-level ambiguity. The
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overall firm-level ambiguity for the market portfolio is in between of the low and
high degree that we have quantified in the portfolios. Thus, it is no surprise to see
that the effect of market-wide ambiguity is less deterministic on the market level.
Using all firms on NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ from 1984 Q1 to 2013 Q4,
we find strong empirical evidence consistent with all of our model predictions. The
results are robust after controlling for size, different earnings surprise measures,
different measures of ambiguity, and sample periods with/out the recent financial
crisis. The results confirm that Kothari, Lewellen, and Warner (2006)’s explanation
of the puzzling firm- and aggregate-level return-earnings relations is a viable ap-
proach. The combination of return decomposition and diversification effect explains
the interacting behavior of earnings response coefficients with firm-level and macroe-
conomic ambiguity on firm-, portfolio-, and market-level analysis. The results also
show that the earnings predictability explanation of Sadka and Sadka (2009) cannot
stand alone.
Recent empirical literature employes the disagreement of professional fore-
casters to proxy the degree of ambiguity in firms and the market. Intuitively, if
forecasters produce conflicting projections about the fundamentals, investors are
likely to be uncertain about distributions of stock returns as they tend to condition
their beliefs on professionals’ forecasts. Thus, when dispersion among professionals’
forecasts regarding the future performance is large, ambiguity is also likely to be high
since investors might find it difficult to reduce their set of beliefs into a single prior.
At the same time, dispersion of professionals’ forecasts might not necessarily be the
idea proxy for gauging the degree of ambiguity. Barron, Kim, Lim, and Stevens
(1998) argue that the forecasts dispersion can be contaminated by the disagreement
component that comes from information asymmetry. this can be a serious issue es-
pecially when proxies the degree of ambiguity at individual firm level. They propose
a decomposition of the forecasts dispersion into uncertainty and disagreement. We
argue that the decomposed uncertainty captures the degree of ambiguity embedded
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in the dispersion of professionals’ forecasts. We construct the firm-level ambiguity
by using analysts’ forecasts of individual firm earnings and macroeconomic ambi-
guity by using individual analyst’s forecasts for macroeconomic variables, e.g. next
period real GDP growth or inflation growth.
Chapter 4 continues the examination of the return-earnings relation albeit
exclusively on firm-level. Recall that in the second chapter, the argument has been
used that firm-level ambiguity creates asymmetric market reaction to bad versus
good news thereby leading to lesser extent of diversification effect. This chapter
focuses on the asymmetry and investigates whether ambiguity can fully explain
the stronger reaction to bad than to good earnings surprises. Another important
element of decision making - difference of opinion - is also introduced to compliment
(or discount) the effect of ambiguity in the case that a full explanation cannot be
reached solely based on ambiguity.
Literature show that market reacts to firm-level news in an asymmetric fash-
ion (Conrad, Cornell, and Landsman, 2002; Skinner and Sloan, 2002; Andersen,
Bollerslev, Diebold, and Vega, 2003). That is, bad news has a greater impact than
good news. The average negative return to negative news is significantly larger in
magnitude than the average positive return to positive news. There are two pos-
sible explanations: 1) there is larger amount of negative news on the market; 2)
investors react more strongly to bad news per se. The former refers to the practice
that firms selectively release news to their own advantages. The latter states that
the information content per unit of news is greater for bad news. Recent theories,
such as Epstein and Schneider (2008) and Kelsey et al. (2011), argues that such
asymmetric reaction can arise due to the presence of ambiguity. They show that
investors who are ambiguity averse choose the worst case scenario and consequently
overvalue negative news and undervalue positive news.
The initial empirical results confirm the existence of asymmetric reaction,
even well before the actual news announcements due to information leakage. How-
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ever, the extent of asymmetry is not linear with ambiguity. As a matter of fact, when
the stock universe is divided into quintiles according to our measure of ambiguity,
the return difference for bad versus good earnings news exhibit a ”yes” tick shape
for the five groups. This shows that whatever the cause of the asymmetry is, its
impact has not been linearly reflected on the market. Thereby, another important
element of decision making - difference of opinion - is introduced with the aim to
fully explain this striking shape.
Studies in decision theory suggests that difference of opinion also creates re-
action asymmetry (Gajdos and Vergnaud, 2009; Cres, Gilboa, and Vieille, 2011).
Specifically, Cres, Gilboa, and Vieille (2011) consider a setting where experts are
asked to provide their advice in a situation of Knightian uncertainty. The deci-
sion maker exhibits expert uncertainty aversion (EUA) when aggregating divergent
opinions from the ambiguity-averse experts. They axiomatize that in face of differ-
ent opinions the decision maker selects the minimal weighted valuation of experts
valuations, which leads to consequential overvaluation of negative opinions and un-
dervaluation of positive views in a similar vein to the case of ambiguity-aversion.
Note that unlike ambiguity large difference of opinion not necessarily implies
high level of asymmetry. Baillon, Cabantous, and Wakker (2012) show in experi-
ments that ambiguity reduces insensitivity to extreme events defined by Abdellaoui,
Baillon, Placido, and Wakker (2011) and overweights the extreme events, hence
amplifying financial phenomena found under risk. However, difference of opinion
increases insensitivity and underweights the extremes. This underweighting gener-
ates consistent undervaluation of positive news due to EUA but not for negative
news. Furthermore, the differential amounts of ambiguity and difference of opinions
for any specific case could render their combined effect unclear. Together with risk,
ambiguity and difference of opinion are considered as the sources of uncertainty
(Baillon, Cabantous, and Wakker, 2012). Here, uncertainty is in the broadest sense
and refers to any variation that causes forecast errors. In a mode based on experts’
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forecasts, Barron, Kim, Lim, and Stevens (1998) show that overall uncertainty is a
linear combination of common uncertainty (for this matter ambiguity) shared by all
experts attributable to their reliance on imprecise common information and idiosyn-
cratic uncertainty (for this mater difference of opinion) that is due to information
asymmetry among experts. For certain level of uncertainty, more fraction of ambi-
guity means less degree of divergence in experts’ opinions. It is a matter of relative
dominance between the two to form a combined effect on market reactions to bad
versus good news.
Motivated by these questions, this study aims to model and test the com-
bined effect of ambiguity and difference of opinion on market asymmetric reactions
to bad versus good earnings news and propose justified measures for either. To
test, I focus on the association-study framework adopted by Kothari, Lewellen, and
Warner (2006) where the contemporaneous earnings-return relation is investigated
on a quarterly basis before the earnings announcements, which are typically a couple
of months after each fiscal quarter that the earnings cover1. This methodology is
based on the reality of information leakage (Brunnermeier, 2005) and enables me to
control for potentially differential amounts of news being leaked before the public
announcements.
The data sample includes all US firms between 1984-2014 with the same
screening criteria as Kothari, Lewellen, and Warner (2006). The empirical section
starts by showing that the stylized fact holds even well before the actual news
announcements due to information leakage. The average negative return to negative
earnings news is around −4.9% over 20 years period, significantly higher than the
3.1% return for positive earnings news at 1% level. When I divide the stock universe
1Most studies use event-study framework which typically focus on limited period around the
actual announcement dates. I do not adopt this framework due to 1) no apparent proxies for
measuring differential amounts of good versus bad earnings news 2) that the announcement data in
IBES is often effectively the date on which the information was recorded by IBES and, therefore,
systematically delayed. Hoechle, Schaub, and Schmid (2013) show that the announcement day
effect is underestimated in IBES while pre-announcement returns are overestimated as they often
include the effective announcement day.
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into quintiles according to our measure of ambiguity in ascending order, the return
difference for bad versus good earnings news exhibit a ”yes” tick shape for the five
groups.
Next, I include in the regressions the size of news and its interaction with a
directional dummy variable with two purposes: 1) to exclude the proposition that
the asymmetry is caused by differential amounts of information for good and bad
news; 2) to focus on the interaction term where the combined effect of ambiguity and
difference of opinion come into effect. The results show that the differential return
between bad versus good news, −1.8%, completely disappeared. The positivity and
high significance of the interaction term imply the asymmetry is entirely due to that
investors are more surprised by bad earnings news. When applying to the quintiles,
the coefficients of the interaction term exhibit a ”yes” tick shape matching that of
the average returns difference, indicating that this stronger surprise from bad news
could be explained by the combining effect of ambiguity and difference of opinion.
To ensure that the asymmetry is not due to the differential amounts of news
leakage, I further control for proxies for managers’ incentives to release bad news
such as Regulation Fair Disclosure (thereafter RegFD) (Dong, Li, Ramesh, and Shen,
2011), litigation risk modeled by Rogers and Stocken (2005), information asymmetry
following Kothari, Shu, and Wysocki (2009), and financial distress measured by
Zmijewski (1984)’s Z-score. Those proxies explain away the rest of the negative
returns by negative earnings news. Nevertheless, the ”yes” tick shape remains for
the stronger reactions to negative earnings news.
Overall, the results suggest that the higher average negative return to neg-
ative news versus that to positive news is solely determined by the larger informa-
tional content of negative news per se. These results have important implications
for understanding the roles of managers and investors in market reaction to financial
news. Starting with the former, even if Kothari, Shu, and Wysocki (2009) results
can be interpreted as causal, they do not suggest that managers should expect their
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”tactic” of selective release of news matters for the market on average. Moving to the
latter, it suggests that investors’ assessments of news under uncertainty determine
the market reaction to financial news.
Similar to Chapter 3, the empirical measures for ambiguity and difference of
opinion are drawn from decomposition proposed by Barron, Kim, Lim, and Stevens
(1998). Uncertainty can be divided into common uncertainty and idiosyncratic un-
certainty among experts. Common uncertainty is the average covariance between
the belief of one analyst and the beliefs of the rest of the experts, while idiosyncratic
uncertainty is the expected dispersion of experts’ beliefs. The notable difference is
that chapter two uses overall uncertainty as ambiguity, while this chapter employs
ρ as a measure for ambiguity and 1− ρ as a measure for difference of opinion. ρ is
the ratio of the average pair-wise covariance among experts’ beliefs to overall un-
certainty reflects the imprecision of common information shared by experts. 1 − ρ
is the ratio of expected dispersion of experts’ beliefs to overall uncertainty captures
the effect of two sources of information asymmetry on experts’ beliefs - namely,
the relative presence of private information and differential uncertainty. The new
measures present an advantageous channel to investigate the combined effect of
ambiguity and difference of opinion due to their perfectly negative correlation. Fur-
thermore, the decomposition recognizes the well-established theoretical proposition
that uncertainty consists of idiosyncratic and common components (Doukas, Kim,
and Pantzalis, 2006; Sheng and Thevenot, 2012).
To validate the findings, I build a theoretical model to capture the dynam-
ics of earnings-return relation based on one representative agent (i.e. the decision
maker), multiple firms, and multiple experts. Ambiguity-averse experts are asked
by the decision maker to provide advice on the informativeness of each firm’s earn-
ings signal and use the same utility function as the decision marker. Due to lack of
information and/or poor quality of information, the ambiguity-averse experts lack
confidence on the distribution of true part of a signal and hence consider a range of
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possible priors for the true signal, so does the decision marker. With the presence of
private information, the center of the range of possible priors varies among experts
resulting in their differential assessments of the signals even if the level of ambiguity
is the same. Working independently, the decision maker and the experts maximize
the minimal expected utility with respect to their own sets of priors. They act as
if a positive signal is unreliable and a negative signal is reliable. Consequently, the
price change of each firm triggered by a positive signal is less in magnitude than the
price change triggered by a negative signal. The decision marker is averse to the
uncertainty about the expert who ”has access to truth”, hence exhibits expert un-
certainty aversion in her aggregation of experts’ opinions. She chooses a weighting
function among a set of weight vectors over the experts’ priors such that it maxi-
mizes the minimal combination of experts minimal expected utility with their own
sets of priors, or in a ”maxminmin” way .
I firstly derive the return-earnings relation where the distribution of the sig-
nals is exactly known and there is consensus among all experts. Upon receiving a set
of noise signals, experts form conditional expectations of the signals’ informativeness
about stock returns’ cash flow news and discount rate news components (Campbell,
1991). By assuming zero-mean normal distributions for all the variables, I am able
to obtain a beta coefficient showing the return-earnings relation as a function of
the noisy signals’ distribution parameters. To incorporate ambiguity, I then assume
that experts do not observe the distribution of the true earnings (i.e. the variances)
and hence assign interval ranges for the distribution. Facing ambiguity, experts min-
imize the expected market return generating an array of variances selected within
the range. Using Bayesian updating with the chosen variances, I am able to obtain
a new beta as a function of the chosen variances. Finally, I consider the difference of
opinion by deviating the center of the distribution ranges across experts. After the
experts minimize the expected market return with their own set of priors, the deci-
sion maker obtains an aggregated beta by allocating weights to the experts’ betas
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such that 1) the decision maker’s set of priors is precisely the weighted average of
experts’; 2) the decision maker chooses the minimal weighted valuation of experts’
betas over all possible weights (Cres, Gilboa, and Vieille, 2011).
Monte Carlo simulation for the model shows that ambiguity and difference
of opinion have contrasted effects on investors’ reactions on earnings surprises mea-
sured by earnings response coefficient (or beta in the model). For positive surprises,
both ambiguity and difference of opinion reduce the beta. For negative news, am-
biguity amplify investors’ reaction while difference of opinion has a muted effect.
Without differentiating the nature of news, high ambiguity leads to more positive
beta, whereas high difference of opinion leads to less positive beta. By equating
high ambiguity to low difference of opinion, I combine both effects and produce
the differential reaction to negative versus positive news of a ”yes” tick shape that
matches the empirical finding.
The striking pattern for the effect of difference of opinion on good versus bad
news can be explained, mathematically speaking, by the functional form of experts’
betas to experts’ priors. For positive news, the betas are a concave function of
experts’ priors. The minimum aggregate valuation is to assign most weights to
experts with extreme priors. Hence the more dispersed experts’ priors are, the
lower is the aggregated beta for positive news. On the contrary for negative news,
the betas are a convex function of the experts’ priors due to the switching sign of
the news. The minimal valuation allocates most weights to experts with priors of
”centrality”. As a result, the dispersion of priors does not matter significantly for
the overall market reaction.
To conclude, Chapters 3 and 4 contribute to the literature of return-earnings
relation. They build on the firm-, portfolio-, and market-level relationship between
stock returns and earnings surprises and examine two existing anomalies, namely
the negative aggregate return-earnings relation and asymmetric market reactions
to bad versus good news. To start with the former, Ball and Brown (1968) and
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Beaver (1968) establish the stylized fact that firm-level stock returns are positively
correlated with earnings surprises. Kothari et al. (2006) and Cready and Gurun
(2010) document a negative contemporaneous relationship between aggregate stock
returns and earnings surprises. Chapter 3 reconciles this seemingly contradictory
findings by bringing in the role of ambiguity. Note that some literature like Subasi
(2011) finds that the magnitude of investors’ reactions to aggregate earnings news
decreases in macroeconomic ambiguity measured by cross-sectional dispersion in re-
alized firm-level earnings surprises. With less controversial measure of ambiguity,
we find the the relationship between ambiguity and aggregate return-earnings rela-
tion depends on the average level of firm-level ambiguity. For the second anomaly,
Conrad, Cornell, and Landsman (2002), Skinner and Sloan (2002), and Andersen,
Bollerslev, Diebold, and Vega (2003) show that market react to negative earnings
news far stronger than to positive ones. Using news measures drawn from Barron,
Kim, Lim, and Stevens (1998), Chapter 4 discovers that the differential firm-level
return-earnings relations of bad versus good earnings news exhibits a striking ”yes”
tick shape with respective to our ambiguity measure. Its results show that it is
the combining effects of both ambiguity and difference of opinion that explains this
striking ”yes” tick shape.
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Chapter 2
Employee Satisfaction, Labor
Market Flexibility, and Stock
Returns Around the World
2.1 Introduction
This chapter studies the relationship between employee satisfaction and stock re-
turns around the world. Theory provides conflicting predictions as to whether em-
ployee satisfaction is beneficial or harmful to firm value. On the one hand, employee
welfare can be a valuable tool for recruitment, retention, and motivation. For the
typical 20th-century firm, the bulk of its value stemmed from its physical capi-
tal. In contrast, most modern firms key assets are their workers - not only senior
management, but also rank-and-file employees. For example, in knowledge-based
industries such as software, pharmaceuticals, and financial services, non-managerial
employees engage in product development and innovation, and build relationships
with customers and suppliers, and mentor subordinates. Employee-friendly policies
can attract high-quality workers to a firm and ensure that they remain within the
firm, to form a source of sustainable competitive advantage.
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Relatedly, employee satisfaction can be a valuable motivational tool. In tra-
ditional manufacturing firms, motivation was simple because workers output could
be easily measured, allowing the use of monetary ”piece rates” (Taylor, 1911). In the
modern firm, workers tasks are increasingly difficult to quantify, such as innovation
or building client relationships. The reduced effectiveness of extrinsic motivators
increases the role for intrinsic motivators such as satisfaction. This role is micro-
founded in both economics and sociology. The efficiency wage theory of Akerlof and
Yellen (1986) argues that employees view a positive working environment as a ”gift”
from the firm and respond with a ”gift” of increased effort (Akerlof, 1982). Socio-
logical theories argue that satisfied employees identify with the firm and internalize
its objectives, thus inducing effort (McGregor, 1960).
On the other hand, employee satisfaction can represent wasteful expenditure
by management. Taylor (1911) argued that workers should be treated like any input
- managements goal is to extract maximum output from them while minimizing
their cost. Under this view, satisfaction is an indicator that employees are overpaid
or underworked, both of which reduce firm value. Indeed, agency problems may
lead to managers tolerating insufficient effort and/or excessive pay, at shareholders
expense. The manager may enjoy more pleasant relationships with his subordinates
by not holding them down to their reservation utility (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).
Alternatively, high wages may constitute a takeover defense, as modeled by Pagano
and Volpin (2005a). Cronqvist, Heyman, Nilsson, Svaleryd, and Vlachos (2009)
find that salaries are higher when managers are more entrenched, which supports
the view that high worker pay is inefficient.
The relative importance of the above costs and benefits will depend on the
institutional context. In flexible labor markets, firms face fewer restrictions on
the contracts they can offer. When hiring constraints are weaker, the recruitment
benefits of employee satisfaction are stronger. Since ones rivals also face few hiring
constraints, the retention benefits of employee satisfaction are also more important.
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Flexible labor markets also feature fewer firing constraints. Since it is easier for
firms to dismiss underperforming workers and replace them with superior ones,
the recruitment benefits of employee satisfaction are again greater. In addition, the
greater risk of firing means that employees invest in general rather than firm-specific
skills, which also increases their ability to be recruited elsewhere (Hall and Soskice,
1998; Thelen, 2001). Separately, the motivational benefits are also likely higher.
Under the efficiency wage theory of Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), workers exert effort
to avoid being fired from a satisfying job, and thus employee satisfaction has greater
motivational impact when the likelihood of firing is stronger. The motivational effect
of employee satisfaction may be particularly important for rank-and-file employees,
who are harder to incentivize with equity since they individually have a small effect
on firm value.
In regulated labor markets, hiring and firing are harder, and thus the recruit-
ment, retention, and motivational benefits are lower. In addition, expenditure on
employee satisfaction is likely to exhibit diminishing marginal returns. When labor
market regulations already ensure a minimum level of worker welfare, companies
with high satisfaction relative to their peers may be exceeding the optimal level:
the marginal benefit of their expenditure may not justify its cost.
Edmans (2011, 2012) shows that companies with high employee satisfaction,
as measured by inclusion in the list of the ”100 Best Companies to Work For in
America”, outperform their peers by 2-3% per year. The use of stock returns (rather
than, say, accounting performance or Tobins Q) as the dependent variable mitigates
concerns that causality runs from firm performance to employee satisfaction, since
any publicly-observed performance measure should already be incorporated into the
stock price at the start of the return compounding window. These results suggest
that satisfaction is positively correlated with firm value and that these benefits are
not immediately capitalized by the market. However, these papers only study the
U.S. - a country with particularly flexible labor markets - and so the external validity
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of their results is limited. It is unclear whether these results are generalizable to
other countries, especially those with less flexible labor markets.
This chapter addresses this open question. We study the link between em-
ployee satisfaction and stock returns in 14 countries around the world, and investi-
gate how this relationship depends on the countrys level of labor market flexibility.
The list of the ”100 Best Companies to Work For in America” is published by the
Great Place to Work Institute in San Francisco. The Institute produces similar
Best Companies (”BC”) lists in more than 45 countries, of which 15 have at least
10 publicly traded BCs. We use two measures of country-level labor market flexibil-
ity, which are available for 14 of these 15 countries. The first measure is the OECD
Employment Protection Legislation (”EPL”) index, also used by Pagano and Volpin
(2005b) and Simintzi, Vig, and Volpin (2014). The second is the labor market flexi-
bility categories of the Fraser Institutes Economic Freedom of the World index, also
used by Bernal-Verdugo, Furceri, and Guillaume (2012ab,a), Freeman, Kruse, and
Blasi (2008), and Haltiwanger, Scarpetta, and Schweiger (2008).
We find that the alphas documented by Edmans (2011, 2012) for the U.S.
are not anomalous in a global context. An equal-weighted BC portfolio generates a
Carhart (2001) 4-factor monthly alpha of 22 basis points in the U.S. from 1998-2013,
statistically significant at the 1% level. This alpha is only the 10th highest out of the
14 countries that we study. High returns to Best Companies are not limited to the
U.S., although the alphas for most other countries are not statistically significant
due to the smaller sample size. For example, the monthly alpha is 77 basis points in
Japan from 2007-2013 and (an insignificant) 81 basis points in the U.K. from 2001-
2013. (The different time periods reflect the different years in which the BC list was
initiated). However, we also document significant heterogeneity across countries.
For example, Germany exhibits an insignificantly negative alpha of 45 basis points.
Thus, while the previously-documented results generally hold out of sample, they
do not extend to every country.
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We next show that the abnormal returns to the BCs are significantly increas-
ing in their countrys labor market flexibility, using both measures. We conduct a
pooled panel regression controlling for other firm-level determinants of stock returns
identified by Brennan, Chordia, and Subrahmanyam (1998), such as size, book-to-
market, dividend yield, past returns, trading volume, and the stock price. To ensure
that our labor market flexibility measure is not simply proxying for other differences
between countries, we control for other country-level variables such as the rule of
law, size of the capital market, and the existence of one-share-one-vote (all from
La Porta, Lopez-de Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997)), GDP growth, and the
anti-director rights index of Spamann (2010). We find that, a one standard devia-
tion decrease in the EPL measure is associated with a 0.49% higher market-adjusted
monthly return to being a BC. Similarly, a one standard deviation increase in the
EFW measure is associated with a 0.67% higher market-adjusted monthly return to
being a BC. The results are similar using a Fama and MacBeth (1973) analysis.
Overall, our results suggest that the association between employee satisfac-
tion and stock returns depends critically on the institutional context. These results
have important implications for both managers and investors. Starting with the
former, even if the Edmans (2011, 2012) results can be interpreted as causal, they
do not suggest that managers should necessarily increase expenditure on employee-
friendly programs in countries with low labor market flexibility. Moving to the
latter, it suggests that investors can only expect to earn alpha from investing in
firms with high employee satisfaction in countries with high labor market flexibility.
This chapter contributes to a number of literature. First, it builds on the
literature linking various measures of employee welfare to various measures of firm
performance. Abowd (1989) shows that announcements of pay increases reduce
market valuations dollar-for-dollar, Diltz (1995) finds that stock returns are uncor-
related with the Council of Economic Priorities minority management and women in
management variables, and negatively correlated with family benefits, and Dhrymes
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(1998) find no relationship with KLDs employee relations variable. In contrast, Ed-
mans (2011, 2012) documents a positive relationship employee satisfaction and stock
returns. However, the above studies only analyze the U.S. Given the importance of
labor market institutions, it is unclear whether these relationships generalize more
widely.
Second, since employee welfare is frequently used as a screen by socially re-
sponsible investors (Renneboog, Ter Horst, and Zhang, 2008a, 2011), this chapter
contributes to research on the link between socially responsible investing (”SRI”)
and investor returns. This literature has mixed results. Hamilton, Jo, and Statman
(1993), Kurtz and DiBartolomeo (1996), Gorton and Schmid (1997), Bauer, Koedijk,
and Otten (2005), Schrder (2007), and Statman and Glushkov (2008) find no or
a mixed relationship between various SRI screens and investment returns; Geczy,
Stambaugh, and Levin (2005), Brammer, Brooks, and Pavelin (2006), Renneboog,
Ter Horst, and Zhang (2008b), and Hong and Kacperczyk (2009) find a negative
relationship; and Moskowitz (1972), Luck and Pilotte (1993), Derwall, Guenster,
Bauer, and Koedijk (2005), and Edmans (2011, 2012) find a positive link. All of
the above studies focus on U.S. data and their generalizability to other countries is
again unclear. In particular, the value of various forms of Corporate Social Respon-
sibility (”CSR”) - employee welfare, gender diversity, animal rights, environmental
protection, and whether the firm is in a ”sin” industry (such as tobacco, alcohol,
and gambling) - likely depends on the institutional context, such as regulations and
cultural norms. To our knowledge, this is the first study to study the investment
performance of a SRI screen in a global context.1
Finally, this chapter adds to the literature comparing the performance of
investment strategies across countries. Asness, Moskowitz, and Pedersen (2013)
find that value strategies are profitable not only in the U.S., but also in the U.K.,
1Ioannou and Serafeim (2012) and Cheng, Ioannou, and Serafeim (2014) study the determinants
and consequences of corporate social responsibility in a cross-country context, but do not investigate
stock returns.
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continental Europe, and Japan. Momentum strategies are profitable in the first
three regions, but not Japan. Chui, Titman, and Wei (2010) argue that cultural
factors explain the differential profitability of momentum strategies across countries:
in particular, countries with greater individualism exhibit higher momentum profits.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 develops our hypotheses
and Section 2.3 describes the data. Section 2.4 studies the abnormal returns to the
BCs across different countries. Section 2.5 presents the core results of our chapter,
relating these abnormal returns to measures of labor market flexibility. Section 2.6
concludes.
2.2 Hypothesis development
We first discuss whether we should expect to find any long-run abnormal returns to
the Best Companies lists at all, either positive or negative. Our return compounding
window starts at the beginning of the month after list publication. Thus, since
these lists are public, we should find no abnormal returns if the market is semi-
strong efficient. Regardless of the institutional context, and thus regardless of the
direction of the link (if any) between employee welfare and firm value, the positive
or negative value of list inclusion should be capitalized by the market before the
start of the return compounding window.
However, there is significant prior evidence that intangible assets are not
fully priced by the stock market. Firms with high R&D as measured by expenditure
(Chan, Lakonishok, and Sougiannis, 2001; Lev and Sougiannis, 1996), advertising as
measured by expenditure (Chan, Lakonishok, and Sougiannis, 2001), patent quality
as measured by citations (Deng, Lev, and Narin, 1999), and software quality as
measured by development costs Aboody and Lev (1998) all earn higher long-run
returns. Consistent with these findings, Edmans (2011, 2012) documents that Best
Companies in the U.S. outperform their peers by 2-3% per year, and that the value
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of list inclusion is not fully capitalized by the market until 4-5 years later. Indeed,
equity analysts systematically under-predict the earnings announcements of these
companies.
Thus, it is reasonable to hypothesize that the value of employee satisfaction
will not be fully capitalized by the stock market immediately upon list inclusion,
and thus that there will be long-horizon returns.2 We now discuss our hypothesis for
whether this value will be positive or negative, and why it may depend on a countrys
level of labor market flexibility. Employee satisfaction has both benefits and costs.
Starting with the benefits, worker welfare is likely to improve recruitment, retention,
and motivation. For the reasons discussed in the introduction, these benefits are
likely to be particularly strong in countries with flexible labor markets, in which
hiring and firing are easier. Thus, in such countries, we hypothesize that expenditure
on employee welfare is a value-creating investment that is underappreciated by the
market.
However, as with any investment, the returns are likely decreasing. In reg-
ulated labor markets, regulations already impose a floor on worker welfare, leading
to a downward movement along the marginal benefit curve. In addition, due to
the increased restrictions in hiring and firing, labor mobility is less frequent and
so the recruitment, retention, and motivational benefits are likely smaller, caus-
ing a downward shift in the marginal benefit curve. Both of these forces reduce
the marginal benefit of further expenditure on worker welfare, potentially below its
marginal cost. Indeed, firms may spend excessively on employee satisfaction due to
an agency problem. The theory of Pagano and Volpin (2005a) argues that employee
benefits such as high wages can be used as a takeover defense. Simintzi, Vig, and
Volpin (2014) find employment protection increases labor costs and reduces firms
profitability. Cronqvist, Heyman, Nilsson, Svaleryd, and Vlachos (2009) show that
2An alternative channel through which list inclusion can lead to long-run stock returns is through
attracting demand from socially responsible investors. Edmans (2011) estimates this effect for the
U.S. and found it to be very small compared to the magnitude of the abnormal returns.
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entrenched managers pay their employees more. Similarly, countries with regulated
labor markets tend to have more powerful labor unions (see, e.g., Nickell (1997)) - in-
deed, centralized collective bargaining is a component of the labor market flexibility
categories of the Economic Freedom of the World database. Thus, high employee
satisfaction may result from the influence of labor unions, rather being in share-
holders interest. Gorton and Schmid (2004) find that, when labor has a voice in
corporate governance, profitability and valuation are lower. Chen, Kacperczyk, and
Ortiz-Molina (2011) hypothesize that labor unions protect wages in a downturn, and
find that they increase a firms operating leverage and cost of equity. Unions also
protect underperforming managers and reduce a firms value (Atanassov and Kim,
2009; Lee and Mas, 2012).
As a result, we predict that the BCs generate positive abnormal returns in
countries with high labor market flexibility, and that the returns to list inclusion
decrease with labor market rigidity.
2.3 Data and summary statistics
2.3.1 Measures of employee satisfaction
Our main data source is the Best Companies lists compiled by the Great Place to
Work Institute. The first list focused on U.S. companies and was published in a 1984
book entitled the ”The 100 Best Companies to Work for in America”, which was
later updated in 1993; from 1998 onwards it has been published every January in
Fortune magazine. Two-thirds of the score comes from a 57-question survey that the
Institute administers to 250 employees randomly selected in each firm. The remain-
ing one-third comes from the Institutes evaluation of factors such as a companys
demographic makeup, pay and benefits programs, and culture. The companies are
scored in four areas: credibility (communication to employees), respect (opportuni-
ties and benefits), fairness (compensation, diversity), and pride/camaraderie (team-
31
work, philanthropy, celebrations), and the top 100 firms are publicly announced in
rank order. According to the Institute, a Great Place to Work is a place in which
”you can trust people you work for, have pride in what you do, and enjoy the people
you work with”. The list is highly regarded as a thorough measure of employee sat-
isfaction, receiving significant attention from shareholders, management, employees
and the media, and has since been extended to more than 45 countries around the
world.
We include countries with more than five years history of BC listings, and
exclude those where firm-level stock return and accounting data are unavailable, e.g.
Colombia, Ecuador, Uruguay, and Venezuela. For each country, we only include BCs
that are both headquartered and publicly listed in that country. Table 2.1 describes
the 14 countries that have data on labor market flexibility (which we will describe
in Section 2.2) and where at least 10 BCs are headquartered and publicly listed.
Column (1) shows the start year of BC listings for each country. The numbers of
public BCs per country are reported in column (3). Since the earliest start year for
a non-U.S. country is 1998 (for Brazil), our sample period is from February 1998
to December 2013, although we will also study the U.S. from February 1984 to
December 2013 to verify comparability with Edmans (2011, 2012).
To form BC portfolios, we use the beginning of the month immediately after
the latest publication date of lists for each country as our portfolio formation date.
For example, the U.S. list is typically published in mid-January, and so we use
February 1 as the portfolio formation date. Thus, our analyses are joint tests of
the value of employee satisfaction and the extent to which this value is immediately
capitalized by the market. The constituents of BC portfolios are rebalanced once
a year on the same day. Column (2) reports the portfolio formation dates for each
country.
For the U.K. and U.S., the number of firms in the list has remained constant
over time. For the other countries, this number has increased over time - for example,
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the first list in Germany (in 2003) contains 50 firms, while in 2013 it contains 100.
Column (6) of Table 2.1 indicates the number of BCs selected in the initial list and
the 2013 list for each country.
2.3.2 Measures of labor market flexibility
We use two measures of labor market flexibility. The first is the OECDs Employ-
ment Protection Legislation (”EPL”) index, which is available for 34 OECD and 9
emerging countries. The index measures the procedures involved in hiring workers
on either fixed-term or temporary contracts, and the procedures and costs involved
in dismissing individuals and groups of workers. The index is based on statutory
laws, collective bargaining agreements, case law, contributions from OECD member
countries, and experts advice from each country. It has three components:
Individual dismissal of workers with regular contracts (category EPR) mea-
sures three aspects of dismissal protection: (i) procedural inconveniences of the
dismissal process faced by employers, such as notification and consultation require-
ments; (ii) length of notice periods and conditions of severance pay; and (iii) diffi-
culty of dismissal, such as the circumstances under which a dismissal can be made
possible, and repercussions for the employer if an unfair dismissal is discovered. Ad-
ditional costs for collective dismissals (category EPC) measures the extra costs faced
by employers when they dismiss several workers simultaneously, over and above the
costs applicable for individual dismissals.
Regulation of temporary contracts (category EPT) measures regulations for
fixed-term and temporary work contracts in terms of job type and duration, require-
ments for such workers to receive equal pay and working conditions to permanent
employees, and regulations for the setup and operations of work agencies.
The first two measures capture the ease of dismissal. As mentioned in the
introduction, fewer constraints on firing increase the motivational benefits of em-
ployee satisfaction (as workers will exert greater effort to avoid being fired from a
33
satisfying job), and also its recruitment benefits (since the ease of firing raises the
number of vacancies the firm can create). The third measure captures constraints on
hiring, which reduce the recruitment benefits of employee satisfaction. Separately,
regulations on hiring and firing impose a minimum level of employee welfare, lead-
ing to a downward movement along the marginal benefit curve for expenditure on
employee satisfaction. Thus, in regulated labor markets, firms with high satisfaction
relative to their peers may be operating in the region in which the marginal benefit
does not justify the cost.
The EPL index has been used in Pagano and Volpin (2005b) and Simintzi,
Vig, and Volpin (2014). Following both papers, we calculate EPL as the average
of the three sub-indicators scores; high EPL implies low labor market flexibility.3
Column (1) of Table 2.1, Panel B reports the time series mean of EPL for each
country from 1998-2013, and columns (2)-(4) of report the time series mean of
each index. As a rough check that our EPL measure is linked to labor mobility,
and thus the retention and recruitment benefits of employee satisfaction, we were
able to collect data on labor turnover rates for seven countries in our sample from
the OECD. Their correlation with our employment protection legislation index is
-0.73. Similarly, the labor economics literature shows that employment protection is
negatively associated with labor turnover (Bertola, 1999; Autor, Kerr, and Kugler,
2007; Messina and Vallanti, 2007; OECD, 2013).
Our second measure of labor market flexibility is calculated based on data
from the Fraser Institutes Economic Freedom of the World (”EFW”) database. The
database contains indices on labor market flexibility, which are also used by labor
economics studies such as Bernal-Verdugo, Furceri, and Guillaume (2012ab,a), Free-
man, Kruse, and Blasi (2008), and Haltiwanger, Scarpetta, and Schweiger (2008).
The indices have been referred as a comprehensive measure of the ”de facto strict-
3The OECD reports EPL as a weighted average of the three broad categories, where the weights
depend on the number of sub-indicators in each group. Our results are robust to this weighted
measure of EPL.
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ness of labor regulations” (Feldmann, 2009). We use the EFW indices across six
policy categories. All indices are standardized on a 0-10 scale, with higher values
indicating more flexible labor markets:
Hiring regulations and minimum wage (category 5Bi) is based on the World
Banks Doing Business Difficulty of Hiring Index. The index measures three areas: (i)
whether fixed-term contracts are prohibited for permanent tasks; (ii) the maximum
cumulative duration of fixed-term contracts; and (iii) the ratio of the minimum wage
for a trainee or first-time employee to the average value added per worker.
Hiring and firing regulations (category 5Bii) is derived from the World Eco-
nomic Forums Global Competitiveness Reports survey question ”’How would you
characterize the hiring and firing of workers in your country?” Respondents assign a
score from 1 (”impeded by regulations”) to 7 (”flexibly determined by employers”)
which are then standardized onto a 0-10 scale.
Centralized collective bargaining (category 5Biii) is based on the World Eco-
nomic Forums Global Competitiveness Reports survey question ”How are wages
generally set in your country?”. Respondents assign a score from 1 (”by a central-
ized bargaining process by regulations”) to 7 (”up to each individual company”)
which are then standardized onto a 0-10 scale.
Hours regulations (category 5Biv, previously called ”mandated cost of hiring
a worker”) is based on the World Banks Doing Business Rigidity of Hours Index,
which measures (i) whether there are restrictions on night work; (ii) whether there
are restrictions on weekly holiday work; (iii) whether the work-week can consist of
5.5 days; (iv) whether the work-week can extend to 50 hours or more (including
overtime) for 2 months a year to respond to a seasonal increase in production; and
(v) whether paid annual vacation is 21 working days or fewer.
Mandated cost of worker dismissal (category 5Bv) is based on the World
Banks Doing Business data. It includes the cost of the advance notice requirements,
severance payments, and penalties due when dismissing a redundant worker.
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Conscription (category 5Bvi) is based on the use and duration of military
conscription. Lower ratings of labor market flexibility are assigned to countries with
longer conscription periods. Columns (6)-(11) of Table 2.1, Panel B report the time
series mean of each index across the sample period.
Categories 5Bi, 5Bii and 5Biv capture the ease of hiring (similar to category
EPT in the EPL index, although the latter focuses on temporary contracts), and
category 5Bv captures the ease of firing (similar to categories EPR and EPC in
the EPL index). Category 5Biii measures the power of labor unions. Labor unions
impose restrictions on contracts which hinder both hiring and firing, and may press
for higher employee satisfaction even if not in shareholders interest. Category 5Bvi
captures a regulatory intervention to the supply-side. Where conscription is greater,
the recruitment benefits of employee satisfaction are smaller since individuals have
less freedom to join firms.
The current form of the EFW data is available annually from 2002 to 2013.4
We construct a composite measure of labor market flexibility (EFW) that equals
the average of the six indices in each country-year. Column (5) of Table 2.1, Panel
B reports the mean of the composite indicator for each country.
2.4 Empirical results
2.4.1 Country-level alphas
We first calculate the Carhart (2001) four-factor alphas to the BC portfolios in each
country:
Rct = α+βMKTMKTct+βHMLHMLct+βSMBSMBct+βMOMMOMct+ct (2.1)
4The EFW also provided labor market flexibility data in 2000 and 2001 but on different com-
ponents, which are not comparable to the data from 2002 onwards.
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where Rct is the U.S. dollar returns to a BC portfolio (either equal-weighted or value-
weighted) in month t for country c in excess of the U.S. one-month treasury rate.
Stock returns are taken from the Center for Research in Security Prices (”CRSP”)
for U.S. firms and Datastream for other firms. Both active and inactive firms are
included to avoid survivorship bias. We winsorize stock returns at the 0.5% and
99.5% level in each country. Results are very similar without winsorization.
α is an intercept that captures the abnormal risk-adjusted return. MKTct,
HMLct, SMBct, and MOMct, are, respectively, the Fama and French (2012) re-
gional factors on market, value, size, and momentum, collected from Kenneth Frenchs
website. We use the Europe factors for all European countries, the North American
factors for Brazil, Chile, Canada and the U.S., the Japan factors for Japan, and the
Asia-Pacific Excluding Japan factors for Korea and India.
ct is an error term. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity and
autocorrelation using Newey and West (1987) estimator with four lags.
Table 2.2 reports results for equal-weighted portfolios. Three of the 14 coun-
tries (Denmark, Germany, and Greece) have insignificantly negative alphas. The
remaining 11 countries have positive alphas, which are significant at the 10% level
or better for Chile, Japan, Sweden, and the U.S. In terms of economic significance,
the U.S. has the tenth highest alpha out of the fourteen countries, suggesting that it
is not an outlier. Table 2.3 reports results for value-weighted portfolios. Denmark,
France, Germany, and Greece have negative alphas, with Denmarks being signifi-
cant at the 10% level. The alphas for Chile, the U.K., and the U.S., are significantly
positive at the 10% level or better.
It should be noted that the joint-hypothesis problem applies here: to test
whether the market is efficient in conjunction with the soundness of the asset pric-
ing model. Thus, the above (and the following) results depend on the maintained
specification for the economic risk premium. Relevant asset pricing models that
have recently appeared in the literature subsequent to this research include Fama
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and French (2015a), Fama and French (2015b), Hou et al. (2014a), and Hou et al.
(2014b).
2.4.2 Characteristics controls
While above section controls for the BCs covariance with risk factors, this section
controls for firm characteristics that may also affect stock returns. We first run the
following pooled panel regression across all firms (both BCs and non-BCs) within a
country, at the firm-month level:
Rit = α0 + α1BCit + α2FirmControlsit + α3FEt + it (2.2)
Rit is the return on stock i in month t. BCit is a dummy variable that equals
one if firm i was included in the most recent BC list prior to month t, and zero
otherwise. FirmControlsit include the control variables used in Brennan, Chordia,
and Subrahmanyam (1998), calculated using CRSP and Compustat for U.S. firms
and Datastream and Worldscope for non-U.S. firms. SIZE is the log of firm is
market capitalization at the end of month t-2. BM is the log of firm is book-to-
market ratio at the end of month t-2. YLD is firm is dividend yield as measured by
the sum of all dividends paid over the previous 12 months prior to month t, divided
by the share price at the end of month t-2. RET2 − 3 is the log of one plus firm
is cumulative return over months t-3 through t-2. RET4 − 6 and RET7 − 12 are
defined similarly. V OL is the log of firm is dollar trading volume in month t-2.
PRC is the log of firm is price at the end of month t-2. FEt are month fixed effects
to control for macroeconomic cycles. Standard errors are clustered by firm.
Results for each country are reported in Table 2.4. The coefficient on the
BC dummy is significantly positive for Canada, Chile, Greece, India, Japan, Korea,
and the U.S. For example, in the U.S., being a BC is associated with an additional
monthly return of 28 basis points. Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, and Sweden
38
have insignificantly negative coefficients on the BC dummy. We next run Fama and
MacBeth (1973) cross-sectional regressions for each country in a given month t:
Ri = α0 + α1BCi + α2FirmControlsi + i (2.3)
where Ri is the return on stock i. BCi is a dummy variable that equals one if firm
i has been included in the most recent BC list, and zero otherwise. FirmControlsi
include the control variables used in Brennan, Chordia, and Subrahmanyam (1998).
Standard errors are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation using Newey
and West (1987) estimator with four lags. We then take the time-series average of the
monthly coefficients for each country. While the pooled panel regression weights each
firm-month observation equally, the Fama and MacBeth (1973) approach weights
each month equally.
Results for each country are reported in Table 2.5. Consistent with prior
results, the BC coefficient is significantly positive at the 5% level or better in Canada,
India, Japan, Korea, and the U.K. The coefficients are negative and insignificant
for Denmark, Finland, Germany, and Greece. Overall, the results suggest that the
positive returns to Best Companies in the U.S. do extend to other countries, but
there is significant heterogeneity between countries. In the next section, we study
how this heterogeneity is related to labor market flexibility.
2.5 The role of labor market flexibility
This section examines how the relationship between employee satisfaction and stock
returns depends on the degree of labor market flexibility. Holderness (2014a,b)
argues that international empirical analyses should be conducted at the firm level,
rather than at the country level, as the latter approach ignores between-firm, within-
country variation. In our context, using country averages (e.g. regressing country-
level alpha on labor market flexibility) will ignore other firm-specific determinants of
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stock returns. We thus study the impact of labor market flexibility using firm-level
analyses that take into account firm characteristics.
We start by enhancing the pooled panel regression in equation 2.2 with mea-
sures of labor market flexibility and country-level controls, and estimating it across
the full sample of all countries:
Returncit = β0 + β1BCcit + β2BCcitEPLct(EFWct) + β3BCcitCountryControlsct (2.4)
+ δ1EPLct(EFWct) + δ2CountryControlsct + δ3FirmControlscit−2
+ δ4FEt + cit
where Returncit is either the raw return (Rcit) or the market-adjusted return (i.e.
the raw return in excess of the local country market return) for firm i in country c
in month t.5 The local market return is measured using the MSCI market index for
each country, collected from Datastream. EPLct is the employment protection leg-
islation indicator for country c in month t and EFWct is the labor market flexibility
indicator. To ensure that our EPL and EFW variables are not simply proxying
for other country-level differences, we include CountryControlsct, a vector of other
country-level control variables: RuleofLawc measures the rule of law from La Porta,
Lopez-de Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997); Gdpgct measures GDP growth for
country c in month t taken from the World Bank; SoCMc measures the size of
capital market, specifically the number of listed domestic firms per (million) capita
from La Porta, Lopez-de Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997); ADRIc measures
the anti-director rights index corrected by Spamann (2010); and OSOVc measures
the presence of one-share one-vote from La Porta, Lopez-de Silanes, Shleifer, and
Vishny (1997). In particular, the returns to Best Companies capture not only the
value of employee satisfaction, but the extent to which this value is not immediately
capitalized by the market. Thus, we include a control for the size of the capital
market as a proxy for market efficiency. Standard errors are clustered by firm.
5We also use the abnormal return (ARcit) for firm i in country c at month t as the dependent
variable. ARcit is calculated as the CAPM-adjusted abnormal return using either a 5- or 3-year
rolling-window beta. Results are similar.
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Panel A of Table 2.6 presents the results using EPL as the measure of labor
market flexibility. Columns (1) − (3) use raw returns as the dependent variable.
In column (1), which contains no measures of labor market flexibility or country
controls, BC has a positive coefficient of 0.760, which is significant at the 1% level.
However, in column (3) when interactions with EPL and the country controls are
added, the coefficient on BC is no longer significant. Instead, the coefficient on
BC*EPL is a significantly negative -0.693. Thus, BCs are associated with signif-
icantly higher returns in countries with weak employment protection legislation.
Columns (4) - (6) use the market-adjusted return (i.e. the raw return minus the
market return) as the dependent variable. The results are slightly stronger, with
the coefficient on BC*EPL falling to -0.790. A one standard deviation decrease in
EPL is associated with a 0.49% increase in the monthly market-adjusted return to
being a BC.
Panel B presents the results using EFW as the measure of labor market
flexibility, which are similar to Panel A. For both raw returns and market-adjusted
returns in columns (3) and (6), the coefficient on BC is insignificant, but the co-
efficient on BC*EFW is positive and significant at the 1% level. For example, the
coefficient of 0.394 in column (6) indicates that a one standard deviation increase
in EFW is associated with a 0.67% increase in the monthly market-adjusted return
to being a BC.
Table 2.7 presents the results of Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional regressions
for the full sample, which includes country-level controls and measures of labor
market flexibility. The results are very similar to Table 2.6, with the coefficients
on BC*EPL being significantly negative and those on BC*EFW being significantly
positive.
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2.6 Conclusions
This chapter studies how the relationship between employee satisfaction and stock
returns depends critically on the level of a countrys labor market flexibility. The
alphas documented by Edmans (2011, 2012) for the U.S. are not anomalous in a
global context, in terms of economic significance, and do extend to several other
countries. However, they do not automatically generalize to every country - being
listed as a Best Company to Work For is associated with superior returns only in
countries with high labor market flexibility. These results are consistent with the
idea that the recruitment, retention, and motivational benefits of employee satisfac-
tion are most valuable in countries in which firms face fewer constraints on hiring
and firing. These benefits are lower in countries with inflexible labor markets, lead-
ing to a downward shift in the marginal benefit of expenditure on employee welfare.
Moreover, in such countries, regulations already provide a floor for worker welfare,
leading to a movement down the marginal benefit curve. Both forces reduce the
marginal benefit of investing in worker satisfaction, and thus being listed as a Best
Company may reflect an agency problem.
The results emphasize the importance of the institutional context for both
managers and investors. Edmans (2011, 2012) uses long-run stock returns as the
dependent variable to mitigate concerns about reverse causality from firm perfor-
mance to employee satisfaction - any publicly-available performance measure should
be incorporated into the stock price at the start of the return compounding win-
dow. However, these papers do not make strong claims about causality, as it may be
that a third, unobservable variable (e.g. management quality) drives both employee
satisfaction and stock returns. Even if their results are interpreted as causal, it is
not the case that managers can hope to increase stock returns by investing in em-
ployee satisfaction, as a positive link only exists in countries with high labor market
flexibility. Turning to investors, a strategy of investing in firms with high employee
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satisfaction will only generate superior returns in countries with high labor mar-
ket flexibility. Given that the vast majority of empirical asset pricing studies that
uncover alpha are based on U.S. data, the results emphasize caution in applying
these strategies overseas. This caution is especially warranted for strategies that are
likely to be dependent on the institutional or cultural environment, such as socially
responsible investing strategies. Just as the value of employee satisfaction depends
on the flexibility of labor markets and existing regulations on worker welfare, the
value of other SRI screens such as gender diversity, animal rights, environmental
protection, and operating in an ethical industry also likely depend on the context.
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Table 2.1: Summary statistics
Panel A reports the list of countries in which at least ten publicly-listed Best Companies (BCs) are head-
quartered and publicly listed. Column (1) presents the years of BC lists that we use for each country.
Column (2) reports our portfolio formation date for each country. Column (3) gives the number of listed BC
per country. Column (4) presents the total number of listed firms in each country including BCs. Column
(5) records the total number of firm-month observations for each country. Column (6) indicates for each
country the number of BCs in the year the list was initiated and also in 2013. The last row summarizes
data of all countries except the US(84-). Our sample period is from February 1998 to December 2013. For
the US we also extend the sample period from February 1984 to December 2013.
Panel A: Publicly-listed Best Companies to Work For
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Listing Formation Total No. of Total no. Total no. Size of BC lists
years date Public BCs of firms of Obs. Initial 2013
Brazil 1998− 2013 01− Sep 70 652 30, 883 50 100
Canada 2006− 2013 01−May 15 4, 405 172, 724 30 50
Chile 2001− 2013 01−Dec 11 304 22, 050 25 50
Denmark 2001− 2013 01−Dec 23 461 26, 960 50 75
Finland 2003− 2013 01−Mar 14 241 19, 448 20 50
France 2002− 2013 01−Apr 18 1, 765 92, 813 25 49
Germany 2003− 2013 01−Mar 24 1, 646 84, 252 50 100
Greece 2003− 2013 01−May 12 443 39, 570 10 25
India 2003− 2013 01− Jun 46 2, 578 131, 432 25 100
Japan 2007− 2013 01−Apr 38 4, 981 510, 977 20 40
Korea 2002− 2013 01−Nov 49 2, 019 128, 687 20 100
Sweden 2003− 2013 01−May 11 823 44, 418 25 38
UK 2001− 2013 01−May 33 4, 943 199, 276 50 50
US(98-) 1998− 2013 01− Feb 188 11, 478 1, 209, 671 100 100
US(84-) 1984− 2013 01− Feb 259 100 100
All 552 39, 239 2, 713, 161 500 840
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Table 2.2: Risk-adjusted returns of equal-weighted BC portfolios
This table reports regression results of monthly returns of equal-weighted portfolios of Best Companies using
Carhart (2001) four-factor model:
Rct = α+ βMKTMKTct + βHMLHMLct + βSMBSMBct + βMOMMOMct + ct,
where Rct is the return on equal-weighted portfolio of listed BCs in month t for country c in excess of
the risk-free rate. α is the intercept that captures the abnormal risk-adjusted return. MKTct, HMLct,
SMBct, and MOMct, are, respectively, the Fama and French (2012)s regional factors on market, value, and
size, and momentum. Coefficient estimates standard errors are displayed in parentheses below, adjusted for
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation (Newey and West, 1987). ***, **, and * indicate significance at the
1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. The sample period is from February 1998 to December 2013. For the
US we also extend the sample period from February 1984 to December 2013.
α βMKT βHML βSMB βMOM Adj.R
2 Obs. No.
Brazil 0.942 0.969∗∗∗ 0.349∗∗ 0.535∗∗ −0.057 0.312 183
(0.606) (0.135) (0.147) (0.211) (0.142)
Canada 0.091 1.280∗∗∗ −0.209 −0.320 −0.113 0.648 90
(0.485) (0.113) (0.217) (0.277) (0.142)
Chile 0.971∗ 0.716∗∗∗ −0.264 0.464∗∗ 0.003 0.280 143
(0.503) (0.146) (0.211) (0.216) (0.109)
Denmark −0.629 0.934∗∗∗ 0.074 0.788∗∗∗ 0.095 0.685 143
(0.403) (0.076) (0.160) (0.154) (0.077)
Finland 0.957 0.947∗∗∗ 0.295 0.501 −0.232 0.471 92
(0.715) (0.165) (0.390) (0.359) (0.156)
France 0.346 0.891∗∗∗ −0.415∗ −0.366 −0.240 0.592 127
(0.453) (0.093) (0.242) (0.252) (0.101)
Germany −0.445 1.028∗∗∗ 0.310 −0.167 −0.193∗∗ 0.642 128
(0.437) (0.092) (0.301) (0.189) (0.096)
Greece −0.584 1.143∗∗∗ −0.275 0.282 −0.462 0.488 96
(0.791) (0.227) (0.630) (0.461) (0.180)
India 1.076 1.029∗∗∗ 0.274 0.089 −0.413∗∗∗ 0.533 113
(0.670) (0.099) (0.269) (0.224) (0.141)
Japan 0.768∗∗ 0.985∗∗∗ −0.083 0.623∗∗∗ 0.008 0.701 79
(0.332) (0.076) (0.156) (0.156) (0.096)
Korea 0.602 1.037∗∗∗ 0.000 −0.194 −0.159 0.552 132
(0.570) (0.082) (0.209) (0.229) (0.200)
Sweden 0.870∗ 1.136∗∗∗ −0.623∗∗ 0.377 0.129 0.497 127
(0.497) (0.106) (0.262) (0.328) (0.159)
UK 0.812 0.835∗∗∗ −0.617∗∗∗ 0.405∗ −0.279∗∗ 0.446 150
(0.569) (0.081) (0.195) (0.216) (0.126)
US(98-) 0.222∗∗∗ 1.028∗∗∗ 0.134∗∗∗ 0.117∗∗∗ 0.008 0.895 280
(0.080) (0.028) (0.036) (0.040) (0.008)
US(84-) 0.262∗∗∗ 1.076∗∗∗ 0.030 0.192∗∗∗ −0.148∗∗∗ 0.927 359
(0.080) (0.022) (0.033) (0.043) (0.020)
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Table 2.3: Risk-adjusted returns of value-weighted BC portfolios
This table reports regression results of monthly returns of equal-weighted portfolios of Best Companies using
Carhart (2001) four-factor model:
Rct = α+ βMKTMKTct + βHMLHMLct + βSMBSMBct + βMOMMOMct + ct,
where Rct is the return on value-weighted portfolio of listed BCs in month t for country c in excess of
the risk-free rate. α is the intercept that captures the abnormal risk-adjusted return. MKTct, HMLct,
SMBct, and MOMct, are, respectively, the Fama and French (2012)s regional factors on market, value, and
size, and momentum. Coefficient estimates standard errors are displayed in parentheses below, adjusted for
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation (Newey and West, 1987). ***, **, and * indicate significance at the
1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. The sample period is from February 1998 to December 2013. For the
US we also extend the sample period from February 1984 to December 2013.
α βMKT βHML βSMB βMOM Adj.R
2 Obs. No.
Brazil 0.591 0.944∗∗∗ 0.228 0.420∗∗ −0.119 0.306 183
(0.580) (0.134) (0.168) (0.204) (0.123)
Canada 0.203 1.148∗∗∗ 0.093 −0.227 −0.137 0.757 90
(0.326) (0.089) (0.197) (0.162) (0.092)
Chile 1.039∗ 0.762∗∗∗ −0.288 0.580∗ 0.070 0.240 143
(0.563) (0.144) (0.230) (0.337) (0.148)
Denmark −1.020∗ 1.045∗∗∗ −0.220 0.442∗ 0.151 0.490 143
(0.572) (0.105) (0.288) (0.230) (0.136)
Finland 0.739 0.960∗∗∗ 0.135 0.325 −0.298∗∗ 0.455 92
(0.717) (0.169) (0.395) (0.374) (0.149)
France −0.200 0.891∗∗∗ −0.129 0.161 0.083 0.478 127
(0.424) (0.081) (0.257) (0.212) (0.100)
Germany −0.453 0.957∗∗∗ 0.338 −0.285 −0.106 0.509 128
(0.549) (0.092) (0.289) (0.205) (0.101)
Greece −0.582 1.216∗∗∗ −0.050 −0.219 −0.734∗∗ 0.542 96
(0.843) (0.229) (0.685) (0.503) (0.243)
India 0.861 1.022∗∗∗ −0.085 0.172 −0.264∗ 0.559 113
(0.608) (0.097) (0.222) (0.200) (0.149)
Japan 0.365 0.938∗∗∗ −0.276∗∗ −0.011 −0.015 0.721 79
(0.308) (0.074) (0.130) (0.155) (0.103)
Korea 0.135 1.121∗∗∗ 0.107 −0.384 −0.158 0.527 132
(0.623) (0.092) (0.262) (0.284) (0.247)
Sweden 0.212 1.165∗∗∗ −0.761∗∗∗ 0.313 0.140 0.475 127
(0.517) (0.127) (0.280) (0.358) (0.138)
UK 0.988∗∗ 0.727∗∗∗ −0.400∗∗ −0.243 −0.010 0.360 150
(0.475) (0.081) (0.156) (0.202) (0.096)
US(98-) 0.194∗ 1.032∗∗∗ −0.302∗∗∗ −0.237∗∗∗ 0.007 0.834 280
(0.106) (0.031) (0.060) (0.051) (0.007)
US(84-) 0.191∗ 1.019∗∗∗ −0.334∗∗∗ −0.153∗∗∗ −0.063∗ 0.862 359
(0.107) (0.028) (0.049) (0.046) (0.033)
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Table 2.4: Pooled panel regressions by country
This table reports results of monthly firm-level pooled panel regressions:
Rit = α0 + α1BCit + α2FirmControlsit + α3FEt + it,
where Rit is the raw return for firm i in month t. BCit is a dummy variable that equals one if firm i has
been included in the most recent BC list prior to month t, and zero otherwise. The firm characteristics
control variables, FirmControlsit−2, include the following variables: SIZE is the log of firm is market
capitalization at the end of month t-2. BM is the log of firm is book-to-market ratio at the end of month
t-2. YLD is firm is dividend yield as measured by the sum of all dividends paid over the previous 12 months
prior to month t, divided by the share price at the end of month t-2. RET2− 3 is the log of one plus firm
is cumulative return over months t-3 through t-2. RET4− 6 and RET7− 12 are defined similarly. V OL is
the log of firm is dollar trading volume in month t-2. PRC is the log of firm is price at the end of month
t-2. FEt refers to month fixed effect. Coefficient estimates standard errors are clustered by firm and are
given in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. The
sample period is from January 1998 to December 2013.
BC SIZE BM Y IELD RET2− 3 RET4− 6
Brazil 0.159 −0.110 0.531∗∗∗ −0.009∗∗∗ −0.693 0.791∗
(0.530) (0.068) (0.106) (0.002) (0.568) (0.450)
Canada 2.724∗∗∗ −0.272∗∗∗ 1.172∗∗∗ −0.010 0.182 −0.113
(0.339) (0.060) (0.061) (0.033) (0.225) (0.178)
Chile 0.352∗ 0.019 0.373∗∗∗ 0.029 0.887 1.565∗∗∗
(0.207) (0.059) (0.088) (0.020) (0.538) (0.437)
Denmark −0.547 −0.048 0.871∗∗∗ 0.095 1.907∗∗∗ 1.842∗∗∗
(0.344) (0.063) (0.131) (0.063) (0.682) (0.474)
Finland −0.454 −0.241∗∗∗ 0.925∗∗∗ 0.008 1.180∗ 1.773∗∗∗
(0.489) (0.075) (0.116) (0.009) (0.678) (0.411)
France −0.332 −0.100∗∗ 0.790∗∗∗ 0.064∗∗∗ 0.834∗∗ 1.533∗∗∗
(0.426) (0.040) (0.069) (0.017) (0.347) (0.229)
Germany −0.365 0.110∗∗∗ 0.974∗∗∗ 0.000 1.596∗∗∗ 1.851∗∗∗
(0.350) (0.032) (0.069) (0.007) (0.306) (0.232)
Greece 1.518∗∗∗ −0.187∗∗ 0.854∗∗∗ −0.008 0.808∗ 0.181
(0.547) (0.083) (0.115) (0.010) (0.449) (0.380)
India 1.434∗∗ −0.110∗∗∗ 0.688∗∗∗ 0.151∗ 0.596∗∗ 0.841∗∗∗
(0.589) (0.041) (0.054) (0.083) (0.240) (0.177)
Japan 1.075∗∗∗ −0.134∗∗∗ 0.882∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.480∗∗∗ −0.688∗∗∗
(0.269) (0.017) (0.031) 0.000 (0.135) (0.104)
Korea 1.407∗∗∗ −0.004 1.430∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗ −1.341∗∗∗ 0.490∗∗
(0.443) (0.045) (0.077) (0.001) (0.297) (0.216)
Sweden −0.039 −0.199∗∗∗ 0.851∗∗∗ −0.003 1.282∗∗∗ 1.927∗∗∗
(0.473) (0.066) (0.082) (0.006) (0.435) (0.327)
UK 0.432 −0.311∗∗∗ 0.847∗∗∗ 0.000 0.626∗∗∗ 1.452∗∗∗
(0.319) (0.035) (0.041) (0.001) (0.201) (0.154)
US(98-) 0.284∗∗∗ 0.055∗∗∗ −0.178∗∗∗ 0.207∗∗∗ 0.493∗∗∗ 0.669∗∗∗
(0.099) (0.015) (0.019) (0.062) (0.099) (0.080)
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Table 2.4 continued.
RET7− 12 V OL PRC Constant R2 Obs. No.
Brazil −0.356 0.065∗ 0.000 2.200∗∗∗ 0.00 30, 883.00
(0.301) (0.034) (0.049) (0.170)
Canada 0.764∗∗∗ 0.195∗∗∗ 0.000 1.526∗∗∗ 0.01 172, 724.00
(0.131) (0.033) (0.061) (0.194)
Chile 0.610∗∗ 0.029 −0.104∗∗ 1.382∗∗∗ 0.00 22, 050.00
(0.306) (0.027) (0.042) (0.087)
Denmark 1.598∗∗∗ 0.198∗∗∗ −0.307∗∗∗ 0.300 0.01 26, 960.00
(0.340) (0.037) (0.068) (0.252)
Finland 0.932∗∗∗ 0.230∗∗∗ −0.442∗∗∗ 0.210 0.01 19, 448.00
(0.349) (0.046) (0.085) (0.260)
France 0.786∗∗∗ 0.098∗∗∗ 0.000 1.050∗∗∗ 0.01 92, 813.00
(0.166) (0.023) (0.051) (0.184)
Germany 0.483∗∗∗ −0.026 0.000 1.032∗∗∗ 0.07 84, 252.00
(0.166) (0.026) (0.050) (0.144)
Greece −0.179 0.001 −0.316∗∗∗ (0.03) 0.01 39, 570.00
(0.257) (0.051) (0.112) (0.314)
India 0.620∗∗∗ 0.064∗∗ −0.259∗∗∗ 1.365∗∗∗ 0.00 131, 432.00
(0.128) (0.027) (0.045) (0.139)
Japan −0.047 0.164∗∗∗ −0.110∗∗∗ 0.351∗∗∗ 0.05 510, 977.00
(−0.077) (0.011) (0.018) (0.050)
Korea 0.361∗∗ 0.097∗∗∗ 0.131∗∗ 1.879∗∗∗ 0.01 128, 687.00
(0.161) (0.029) (0.053) (0.214)
Sweden 0.226 0.165∗∗∗ −0.367∗∗∗ 0.586∗∗∗ 0.01 44, 418.00
(0.243) (0.043) (0.071) (0.220)
UK 0.831∗∗∗ 0.280∗∗∗ −0.387∗∗ −0.387∗∗∗ 0.01 199, 276.00
(0.116) (0.021) (0.033) (0.033)
US(98-) 1.161∗∗∗ −0.069∗∗∗ 0.188∗∗∗ 0.279∗∗∗ 0.00 1, 209, 671.00
(0.104) (0.012) (0.017) (0.094)
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Table 2.5: Fama-MacBeth regressions by country
This table reports results of firm-level cross-sectional regressions based on Fama and MacBeth (1973) method
in a given month t:
Ri = α0 + α1BCi + α2FirmControlsi + i,
where Ri is the raw return for firm i in the given month t. BCi is a dummy variable that equals one if firm
i has been included in the most recent BC list prior to the given month t, and zero otherwise. The firm
characteristics control variables, FirmControlsi, include the following variables: SIZE is the log of firm is
market capitalization at the end of month t-2. BM is the log of firm is book-to-market ratio at the end of
month t-2. YLD is firm is dividend yield as measured by the sum of all dividends paid over the previous 12
months prior to month t, divided by the share price at the end of month t-2. RET2 − 3 is the log of one
plus firm is cumulative return over months t-3 through t-2. RET4− 6 and RET7− 12 are defined similarly.
V OL is the log of firm is dollar trading volume in month t-2. PRC is the log of firm is price at the end
of month t-2. Coefficient estimates are calculated as the time-series average of the monthly coefficients for
each country and shown in bold, and their standard errors are displayed in parentheses below, adjusted for
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation (Newey and West, 1987). ***, **, and * indicate significance at the
1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. The sample period is from January 1998 to December 2013.
BC SIZE BM Y IELD RET2− 3 RET4− 6
Brazil 0.196 −0.090 0.465∗∗∗ −0.179∗ 0.047 0.611
(0.386) (0.096) (0.111) (0.098) (0.621) (0.668)
Canada 0.895∗∗∗ −0.380∗∗∗ 1.095∗∗∗ −0.027 0.521 0.117
(0.250) (0.102) (0.128) (0.115) (0.443) (0.420)
Chile 0.101 −0.012 0.494∗∗∗ 0.453∗∗∗ 2.132∗∗∗ 2.601∗∗∗
(0.215) (0.064) (0.137) (0.150) (0.750) (0.585)
Denmark −0.313 −0.100 0.807∗∗∗ 0.276 3.061∗∗∗ 1.371∗∗
(0.278) (0.089) (0.141) (0.173) (0.799) (0.536)
Finland −0.088 −0.322∗∗∗ 0.768∗∗∗ 0.016 3.375∗∗∗ 1.547∗∗
(0.113) (0.093) (0.187) (0.181) (0.748) (0.691)
France 0.231 −0.133∗ 0.650∗∗∗ 0.068 1.630∗∗ 2.020∗∗∗
(0.257) (0.071) (0.118) (0.114) (0.651) (0.445)
Germany −0.425 −0.016 0.734∗∗∗ −0.334 1.457∗∗∗ 1.107∗∗∗
(0.292) (0.072) (0.134) (0.245) (0.539) (0.406)
Greece −0.078 −0.269 1.159∗∗∗ −0.078 −0.341 −0.323
(0.352) (0.231) (0.239) (0.099) (0.798) (0.587)
India 0.742∗∗ −0.173 0.799∗∗∗ 0.163 1.446∗∗ 1.724∗∗∗
(0.332) (0.111) (0.152) (0.120) (0.620) (0.455)
Japan 0.526∗∗∗ −0.234∗∗ 0.847∗∗∗ −0.388∗∗∗ −0.330 −0.168
(0.193) (0.116) (0.080) (0.144) (0.434) (0.357)
Korea 0.844∗∗∗ −0.181 1.402∗∗∗ −0.006 −1.193∗∗∗ 0.668
(0.280) (0.133) (0.170) (0.070) (0.419) (0.468)
Sweden 0.222 −0.309∗∗∗ 0.709∗∗∗ 0.077 1.757∗∗∗ 2.400∗∗∗
(0.281) (0.096) (0.170) (0.171) (0.621) (0.560)
UK 0.769∗∗∗ −0.250∗∗∗ 0.707∗∗∗ 0.098 1.261∗∗∗ 1.797∗∗∗
(0.261) (0.095) (0.122) (0.087) (0.477) (0.364)
US(98-) 0.193 0.048 −0.263∗∗∗ 0.369 1.047∗∗∗ 0.851∗∗
(0.147) (0.087) (0.096) (0.294) (0.382) (0.341)
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Table 2.5 continued.
RET7− 12 V OL PRC Constant R2 Obs. No.
Brazil −0.184 0.044 0.070 1.755∗∗ 0.124 30, 883
(0.528) (0.045) (0.095) (0.776)
Canada 0.565∗ 0.243∗∗∗ 0.470∗∗ 1.487∗ 0.058 172, 724
(0.312) (0.072) (0.189) (0.804)
Chile 0.344 0.042 −0.027 1.046∗∗ 0.160 22, 050
(0.465) (0.038) (0.041) (0.482)
Denmark 1.635∗∗∗ 0.205∗∗∗ 0.003 0.517 0.146 26, 960
(0.493) (0.045) (0.064) (0.611)
Finland 1.431∗∗∗ 0.238∗∗∗ −0.087 0.069 0.179 19, 448
(0.505) (0.068) (0.092) (0.499)
France 1.072∗∗∗ 0.070 0.153∗∗ 1.425∗∗ 0.092 92, 813
(0.384) (0.054) (0.076) (0.562)
Germany 0.534 0.049 0.047 1.216∗ 0.092 84, 252
(0.332) (0.069) (0.087) (0.652)
Greece 0.152 −0.018 −0.226 0.337 0.148 39, 570
(0.439) (0.092) (0.204) (1.173)
India 0.920∗ 0.023 −0.058 1.535∗ 0.103 131, 432
(0.518) (0.061) (0.108) (0.804)
Japan −0.198 0.179∗∗ −0.025 0.118 0.079 510, 977
(0.334) (0.074) (0.096) (0.292)
Korea 0.626∗∗ 0.137∗∗ 0.133 0.819 0.062 128, 687
(0.279) (0.058) (0.129) (1.077)
Sweden 0.704 0.229∗∗∗ 0.057 0.690 0.112 44, 418
(0.512) (0.067) (0.107) (0.562)
UK 1.154∗∗∗ 0.230∗∗∗ 0.111∗ 0.281 0.057 199, 276
(0.310) (0.053) (0.065) (0.441)
US(98-) 1.591∗∗∗ −0.086 0.144 −0.357 0.060 1, 209, 671
(0.509) (0.088) (0.173) (0.949)
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Table 2.6: Pooled panel regressions across countries
Panel A: Measuring labor market flexibility with EPL
This table reports the results of pooled panel regressions across countries:
Returncit = β0 + β1BCcit + β2BCcitEPLct + β3BCcitCountryControlsct + δ1EPLct +
δ2CountryControlsct + δ3FirmControlscit + δ4FEt + cit,
where Returncit is either the raw return (Rcit) or the market-adjusted return (i.e. the raw return in excess
of the local country market return) for firm i in country c in month t. BCcit is a dummy variable that
equals one if firm i has been included in the most recent BC list in country c prior to month t, and zero
otherwise. EPLct is the Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) indicator from OECD for country c
at time t and is based on the legislation in three broad categories: individual dismissal of workers with
regular contracts, collective dismissals, and temporary contracts. CountryControlsct indicate the following
country-level control variables for country c at time t: RuleofLawc measures the law and order tradition
from LLSV(1997); Gdpgct measures the GDP growth taken from the World Bank; SoCMc measures the size
of capital market, specifically the number of listed domestic firms per (million) capita from LLSV(1997);
ADRIc measures anti-director rights index corrected by Spamann (2010); OSOVc measures one-share one-
vote from LLSV (1997). FirmControlscit include the following variables: SIZE is the log of firm is market
capitalization at the end of month t-2. BM is the log of firm is book-to-market ratio at the end of month
t-2. YLD is firm is dividend yield as measured by the sum of all dividends paid over the previous 12 months
prior to month t, divided by the share price at the end of month t-2. RET2− 3 is the log of one plus firm
is cumulative return over months t-3 through t-2. RET4− 6 and RET7− 12 are defined similarly. V OL is
the log of firm is dollar trading volume in month t-2. PRC is the log of firm is price at the end of month
t-2. FEt refers to month fixed effect. Standard errors are clustered by firm and are given in parentheses.
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. The sample is from January
1998 to December 2013.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variables Raw returns Market-adjusted returns
BCcit 0.760
∗∗∗ 0.964∗∗∗ 0.814 0.719∗∗∗ 1.167∗∗∗ 0.30
(0.086) (0.218) (0.913) (0.107) (0.245) (0.915)
BCcit ∗ EPLct −0.171 −0.693∗∗∗ −0.302∗ −0.790∗∗∗
(0.140) (0.155) (0.160) (0.177)
BCcit ∗RuleofLawc 0.081 0.059
(0.115) (0.140)
BCcit ∗Gdpgct 0.138∗∗∗ 0.123∗∗
(0.045) (0.048)
BCcit ∗ SoCMc −0.026∗∗ −0.020
(0.011) (0.012)
BCcit ∗ADRIc 0.077 0.225
(0.203) (0.245)
BCcit ∗OSOVc 0.906∗∗ 1.353∗∗∗
(0.359) (0.396)
EPLct −0.067∗∗∗ 0.236∗∗∗ −0.014 −0.008
(0.025) (0.037) (0.036) (0.060)
RuleofLawc −0.049∗∗∗ −0.121∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.020)
Gdpgct 0.066
∗∗∗ −0.066∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.010)
SoCMc 0.018
∗∗∗ 0.005∗
(0.002) (0.003)
ADRIc 0.355
∗∗∗ 0.342∗∗∗
(0.031) (0.041)
OSOVc −0.554∗∗∗ −0.517∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.041)
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SIZE −0.092∗∗∗ −0.080∗∗∗ −0.110∗∗∗ −0.055∗∗∗ −0.061∗∗∗ −0.091∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011)
BM 0.562∗∗∗ 0.528∗∗∗ 0.569∗∗∗ 0.545∗∗∗ 0.515∗∗∗ 0.531∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.027) (0.029) (0.033)
Y IELD 0.000 0.000 0.000 −0.002 −0.001 −0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
RET2− 3 0.414∗∗∗ 0.329∗∗∗ 0.320∗∗∗ 0.020 0.006 −0.009
(0.066) (0.068) (0.069) (0.101) (0.105) (0.107)
RET4− 6 0.311∗∗∗ 0.207∗∗∗ 0.183∗∗∗ −0.195∗∗∗ −0.263∗∗∗ −0.288∗∗∗
(0.052) (0.054) (0.055) (0.070) (0.073) (0.074)
RET7− 12 0.772∗∗∗ 0.677∗∗∗ 0.573∗∗∗ 0.803∗∗∗ 0.835∗∗∗ 0.780∗∗∗
(0.039) (0.042) (0.043) (0.069) (0.061) (0.063)
V OL 0.081∗∗∗ 0.073∗∗∗ 0.091∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗ 0.065∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011)
PRC 0.174∗∗∗ 0.145∗∗∗ 0.150∗∗∗ 0.300∗∗∗ 0.292∗∗∗ 0.305∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.021) (0.023) (0.024)
Constant 1.296∗∗∗ 1.291∗∗∗ −0.845∗∗∗ 1.096∗∗∗ 1.086∗∗∗ 0.818∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.045) (0.213) (0.063) (0.078) (0.256)
Month fixed ef-
fects
Y Y Y Y Y Y
R2 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002
Number of obs.
(in million)
2.713 2.607 2.532 2.635 2.544 2.474
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Panel B: Measuring labor market flexibility with EFW
This table reports the results of pooled panel regressions across countries:
Returncit = β0 + β1BCcit + β2BCcitEFWct + β3BCcitCountryControlsct + δ1EFWct +
δ2CountryControlsct + δ3FirmControlscit + δ4FEt + cit,
where Returncit is either the raw return (Rcit) or the market-adjusted return (i.e. the raw return in excess
of the local country market return) for firm i in country c in month t. BCcit is a dummy variable that equals
one if firm i has been included in the most recent BC list in country c prior to month t, and zero otherwise.
EFWct is the labor market flexibility indicator for country c at time t and is calculated as the average score
of six indicators on hiring regulations and mini wage, hiring and firing regulations, centralized collective
bargaining, hours regulations, mandated cost of worker dismissal and military conscription obtained from
the Fraser Institutes Economic Freedom of the World database. CountryControlsct indicate the following
country-level control variables for country c at time t: RuleofLawc measures the law and order tradition
from LLSV(1997); Gdpgct measures the GDP growth taken from the World Bank; SoCMc measures the size
of capital market, specifically the number of listed domestic firms per (million) capita from LLSV(1997);
ADRIc measures anti-director rights index corrected by Spamann (2010); OSOVc measures one-share one-
vote from LLSV (1997). FirmControlscit include the following variables: SIZE is the log of firm is market
capitalization at the end of month t-2. BM is the log of firm is book-to-market ratio at the end of month
t-2. YLD is firm is dividend yield as measured by the sum of all dividends paid over the previous 12 months
prior to month t, divided by the share price at the end of month t-2. RET2− 3 is the log of one plus firm
is cumulative return over months t-3 through t-2. RET4− 6 and RET7− 12 are defined similarly. V OL is
the log of firm is dollar trading volume in month t-2. PRC is the log of firm is price at the end of month
t-2. FEt refers to month fixed effect. Standard errors are clustered by firm and are given in parentheses.
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. The sample is from January
1998 to December 2013.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variables Raw returns Market-adjusted returns
BCcit 0.629
∗∗∗ −0.157 −0.890 0.620∗∗∗ −0.543 −0.546
(0.096) (0.434) (0.799) (0.121) (0.531) (0.727)
BCcit ∗ EFWct 0.088∗ 0.232∗∗∗ 0.140∗∗ 0.394∗∗∗
(0.053) (0.084) (0.063) (0.097)
BCcit ∗RuleofLawc −0.187 −0.144
(0.114) (0.140)
BCcit ∗Gdpgct −0.050 −0.051
(0.040) (0.043)
BCcit ∗ SoCMc −0.016 −0.021
(0.012) (0.014)
BCcit ∗ADRIc 0.358∗ −0.043
(0.213) (0.260)
BCcit ∗OSOVc 0.262 0.861∗∗
(0.370) (0.413)
EFWct −0.147∗∗∗ −0.153∗∗∗ −0.066∗∗∗ −0.075∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.012) (0.011) (0.022)
RuleofLawc 0.152
∗∗∗ −0.035
(0.016) (0.025)
Gdpgct 0.296
∗∗∗ 0.020∗
(0.008) (0.011)
SoCMc 0.006
∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗
(0.002) (0.003)
ADRIc 0.113
∗∗∗ 0.399∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.043)
OSOVc −0.284∗∗∗ −0.400∗∗∗
(0.046) (0.064)
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SIZE −0.123∗∗∗ −0.086∗∗∗ −0.132∗∗∗ −0.071∗∗∗ −0.055∗∗∗ −0.098∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.011) (0.012) (0.013)
BM 0.591∗∗∗ 0.593∗∗∗ 0.672∗∗∗ 0.629∗∗∗ 0.632∗∗∗ 0.662∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.036) (0.036) (0.040)
Y IELD −0.002 −0.002 −0.002 −0.002 −0.002 −0.003
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
RET2− 3 0.367∗∗∗ 0.371∗∗∗ 0.231∗∗∗ 0.092 0.094 0.056
(0.078) (0.078) (0.079) (0.105) (0.105) (0.107)
RET4− 6 −0.512∗∗∗ −0.510∗∗∗ −0.657∗∗∗ −0.780∗∗∗ −0.779∗∗∗ −0.821∗∗∗
(0.061) (0.061) (0.062) (0.079) (0.079) (0.081)
RET7− 12 0.845∗∗∗ 0.895∗∗∗ 0.645∗∗∗ 0.806∗∗∗ 0.830∗∗∗ 0.737∗∗∗
(0.045) (0.045) (0.047) (0.065) (0.065) (0.068)
V OL 0.083∗∗∗ 0.074∗∗∗ 0.093∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗ 0.053∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013)
PRC 0.145∗∗∗ 0.182∗∗∗ 0.137∗∗∗ 0.241∗∗∗ 0.259∗∗∗ 0.273∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.025) (0.026) (0.027)
Constant 1.388∗∗∗ 2.598∗∗∗ 0.115 1.049∗∗∗ 1.596∗∗∗ 0.160
(0.024) (0.073) (0.159) (0.078) (0.130) (0.188)
Month fixed ef-
fects
Y Y Y Y Y Y
R2 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.002 0.002
Number of obs.
(in million)
2.058 2.058 1.977 2.007 2.007 1.931
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Table 2.7: Fama-MacBeth regressions across countries
Panel A: Measuring labor market flexibility with EPL
This table reports the results of pooled panel regressions across countries:
Returnci = β0 + β1BCci + β2BCciEPLc + β3BCciCountryControlsc + δ1EPLc + δ2CountryControlsc +
δ3FirmControlsci + ci,
where Returnci is either the raw return (Rci) or the market-adjusted return (i.e. the raw return in excess
of the local country market return) for firm i in country c in the given month t. BCci is a dummy variable
that equals one if firm i has been included in the most recent BC list in country c prior to month t, and
zero otherwise. EPLc is the Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) indicator from OECD for country
c at time t and is based on the legislation in three broad categories: individual dismissal of workers with
regular contracts, collective dismissals, and temporary contracts. CountryControlsc indicate the following
country-level control variables for country c at time t: RuleofLawc measures the law and order tradition
from LLSV(1997); Gdpgc measures the GDP growth taken from the World Bank; SoCMc measures the size
of capital market, specifically the number of listed domestic firms per (million) capita from LLSV(1997);
ADRIc measures anti-director rights index corrected by Spamann (2010); OSOVc measures one-share one-
vote from LLSV (1997). FirmControlsci include the following variables: SIZE is the log of firm is market
capitalization at the end of month t-2. BM is the log of firm is book-to-market ratio at the end of month
t-2. YLD is firm is dividend yield as measured by the sum of all dividends paid over the previous 12 months
prior to month t, divided by the share price at the end of month t-2. RET2− 3 is the log of one plus firm
is cumulative return over months t-3 through t-2. RET4− 6 and RET7− 12 are defined similarly. V OL is
the log of firm is dollar trading volume in month t-2. PRC is the log of firm is price at the end of month
t-2. FEt refers to month fixed effect. Standard errors are clustered by firm and are given in parentheses.
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. The sample is from January
1998 to December 2013.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variables Raw returns Market-adjusted returns
BCcit 0.679
∗∗∗ 0.513 −0.239 0.676∗∗∗ 0.818∗∗ 1.553
(0.123) (0.387) (1.730) (0.147) (0.382) (6.173)
BCcit*EPLct 0.157 −0.522∗∗ −0.041 −0.754∗∗
(0.312) (0.213) (0.295) (0.371)
BCcit ∗RuleofLawc 0.279 0.428
(0.296) (1.234)
BCcit ∗Gdpgct 0.038 0.037
(0.169) (0.265)
BCcit ∗ SoCMc −0.001 0.003
(0.014) (0.016)
BCcit ∗ADRIc −0.227 −0.859
(0.394) (1.516)
BCcit ∗OSOVc 2.259 1.596∗
(1.477) (0.961)
EPLct −0.036 0.245 0.040 0.008
(0.196) (0.241) (0.140) (0.204)
RuleofLawc 0.269
∗ 0.033
(0.146) (0.288)
Gdpgct 0.321
∗∗ 0.184
(0.149) (0.165)
SoCMc 0.014 0.004
(0.010) (0.010)
ADRIc 0.339 0.611
∗∗
(0.216) (0.309)
OSOVc −0.058 0.184
(0.447) (0.455)
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SIZE −0.087∗ −0.086∗ −0.112∗∗ −0.070 −0.080∗ −0.109∗
(0.047) (0.044) (0.049) (0.049) (0.047) (0.056)
BM 0.438∗∗∗ 0.365∗∗∗ 0.359∗∗∗ 0.422∗∗∗ 0.366∗∗∗ 0.352∗∗∗
(0.088) (0.093) (0.090) (0.101) (0.106) (0.108)
Y IELD 0.248 0.146 0.144 0.261 0.151 0.155
(0.161) (0.117) (0.125) (0.168) (0.126) (0.134)
RET2− 3 0.842∗∗ 0.817∗∗ 0.701∗ 0.559 0.610 0.410
(0.398) (0.385) (0.373) (0.448) (0.451) (0.453)
RET4− 6 0.812∗∗ 0.691∗ 0.592∗ 0.396 0.305 0.253
(0.399) (0.379) (0.348) (0.394) (0.389) (0.387)
RET7− 12 0.939∗∗∗ 0.963∗∗∗ 0.819∗∗∗ 0.787∗∗∗ 0.909∗∗∗ 0.746∗∗
(0.269) (0.273) (0.269) (0.249) (0.257) (0.295)
V OL 0.046 0.046 0.065 0.024 0.033 0.046
(0.042) (0.042) (0.045) (0.044) (0.045) (0.050)
PRC 0.114 0.107 0.107 0.251∗∗ 0.267∗∗ 0.273∗∗
(0.082) (0.090) (0.096) (0.110) (0.113) (0.126)
Constant 0.806 0.795 −4.609∗∗∗ 0.595∗ 0.502 −3.020
(0.541) (0.604) (1.764) (0.325) (0.441) (2.400)
Month fixed ef-
fects
Y Y Y Y Y Y
Avg. R2 0.048 0.051 0.084 0.039 0.041 0.060
Number of obs.
(in million)
2.713 2.607 2.532 2.635 2.544 2.474
57
Panel B: Measuring labor market flexibility with EFW
This table reports the results of pooled panel regressions across countries:
Returnci = β0 +β1BCci+β2BCciEFWc+β3BCciCountryControlsc+δ1EFWc+δ2CountryControlsc+
δ3FirmControlsci + ci,
where Returnci is either the raw return (Rci) or the market-adjusted return (i.e. the raw return in excess
of the local country market return) for firm i in country c in the given month t. BCci is a dummy variable
that equals one if firm i has been included in the most recent BC list in country c prior to month t, and zero
otherwise. EFWc is the labor market flexibility indicator for country c at time t and is calculated as the
average score of six indicators on hiring regulations and mini wage, hiring and firing regulations, central-
ized collective bargaining, hours regulations, mandated cost of worker dismissal and military conscription
obtained from the Fraser Institutes Economic Freedom of the World database. CountryControlsc indicate
the following country-level control variables for country c at time t: RuleofLawc measures the law and
order tradition from LLSV(1997); Gdpgct measures the GDP growth taken from the World Bank; SoCMc
measures the size of capital market, specifically the number of listed domestic firms per (million) capita from
LLSV(1997); ADRIc measures anti-director rights index corrected by Spamann (2010); OSOVc measures
one-share one-vote from LLSV (1997). FirmControlsci include the following variables: SIZE is the log
of firm is market capitalization at the end of month t-2. BM is the log of firm is book-to-market ratio at
the end of month t-2. YLD is firm is dividend yield as measured by the sum of all dividends paid over the
previous 12 months prior to month t, divided by the share price at the end of month t-2. RET2− 3 is the
log of one plus firm is cumulative return over months t-3 through t-2. RET4−6 and RET7−12 are defined
similarly. V OL is the log of firm is dollar trading volume in month t-2. PRC is the log of firm is price at
the end of month t-2. FEt refers to month fixed effect. Standard errors are clustered by firm and are given
in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. The sample
is from January 1998 to December 2013.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variables Raw returns Market-adjusted returns
BCcit 0.647
∗∗∗ −0.548 −0.788 0.627∗∗∗ −0.595 −0.539
(0.105) (0.467) (0.628) (0.145) (0.595) (0.685)
BCcit ∗ EFWct 0.137∗∗ 0.338∗∗ 0.148∗∗ 0.760∗∗∗
(0.061) (0.147) (0.074) (0.222)
BCcit ∗RuleofLawc −0.324 −0.399
(0.254) (0.325)
BCcit ∗Gdpgct −0.116 −0.417∗∗
(0.155) (0.200)
BCcit ∗ SoCMc −0.013 −0.036∗∗
(0.018) (0.018)
BCcit ∗ADRIc 0.436 0.119
(0.395) (0.412)
BCcit ∗OSOVc 0.150 1.607∗
(0.763) (0.866)
EFWct −0.090 −0.131 −0.040 −0.025
(0.089) (0.116) (0.060) (0.116)
RuleofLawc 0.224 0.159
(0.145) (0.144)
Gdpgct 0.249
∗∗ 0.061
(0.120) (0.118)
SoCMc 0.005 −0.003
(0.015) (0.015)
ADRIc 0.128 0.312
(0.187) (0.292)
OSOVc −0.056 0.055
(0.414) (0.339)
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SIZE −0.118∗∗∗ −0.095∗∗ −0.119∗∗∗ −0.088∗∗ −0.076∗ −0.079∗
(0.045) (0.048) (0.043) (0.044) (0.043) (0.042)
BM 0.509∗∗∗ 0.499∗∗∗ 0.505∗∗∗ 0.551∗∗∗ 0.544∗∗∗ 0.544∗∗∗
(0.069) (0.067) (0.058) (0.072) (0.071) (0.073)
Y IELD 0.030 0.026 0.022 0.012 0.008 0.000
(0.021) (0.020) (0.016) (0.021) (0.018) (0.014)
RET2− 3 0.670 0.642 0.562 0.443 0.410 0.303
(0.426) (0.404) (0.382) (0.452) (0.446) (0.453)
RET4− 6 0.291 0.331 0.271 0.040 0.057 −0.041
(0.397) (0.379) (0.350) (0.406) (0.405) (0.416)
RET7− 12 0.953∗∗∗ 0.964∗∗∗ 0.705∗∗ 0.762∗∗∗ 0.777∗∗∗ 0.616∗∗
(0.322) (0.314) (0.287) (0.264) (0.271) (0.302)
V OL 0.054∗ 0.048∗ 0.057∗ 0.028 0.024 0.016
(0.030) (0.029) (0.033) (0.035) (0.034) (0.033)
PRC 0.085 0.106 0.077 0.190∗ 0.196∗ 0.202∗
(0.086) (0.096) (0.091) (0.110) (0.110) (0.115)
Constant 0.950 1.708 −1.197 0.578∗ 0.920∗ −2.091
(0.612) (1.098) (1.672) (0.302) (0.529) (1.492)
Month fixed ef-
fects
Y Y Y Y Y Y
Avg. R2 0.048 0.051 0.084 0.039 0.041 0.060
Number of obs.
(in million)
2.058 2.058 1.977 2.007 2.007 1.931
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Chapter 3
Ambiguity, Earnings Surprises,
and Asset Prices
3.1 Introduction
The price of an asset is equal to its expected discounted cash flows. Positive earnings
news is informative about future cash flows, which in turn elevates the concurrent
stock price, and vice versa for negative earnings news. Earlier studies like Ball and
Brown (1968) and Beaver (1968) establish the stylized fact that firm-level stock
returns are positively correlated with earnings surprises. This intuitive relation,
however, does not translate into aggregate level. Recent studies including Kothari,
Lewellen, and Warner (2006) and Sadka and Sadka (2009) document a negative
contemporaneous relationship between aggregate stock returns and earnings sur-
prises. This finding is puzzling since the current earnings on the aggregate level is
no longer an indication for future profitability. Even more counter-intuitively, the
contemporaneous relationship can be negative under certain earnings surprises mea-
sures. To explain the striking relationship, the two studies employ the framework of
return decomposition by Campbell and Shiller (1988a) and Campbell (1991) so that
the relationship between returns and earnings surprises is the relative dominance
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of the relationships between earnings surprises and each of the three components
of returns, namely the current expected returns, the cash flow news component,
and the discount rate news (or the future expected returns) component. This chap-
ter attempts to shed some lights on the puzzle by interacting ambiguity with the
return-earnings relation on both firm- and aggregate-level.
Specifically, Kothari, Lewellen, and Warner (2006) argue that firm-level earn-
ings news contains much more information about the future firm-specific cash flows
than about the discount rate. Therefore, the firm-level relationship between re-
turns and earning news is positive due to the dominance of the cash flow news
component in the return decomposition. However, on aggregate level, the earnings
news contains only information about the future aggregate cash flows and discount
rate news due to diversification effect of the firm-specific news. As a result, the
discount rate news component becomes dominant and a possible negative correla-
tion between earnings surprises and discount rates determines the negativity of the
return-earnings relation. This negative correlation is based on certain level of return
predictability. It is worth noting that in Kothari, Lewellen, and Warner (2006), the
earnings surprises are implicitly assumed to be independent of the first component
- the current expected returns. Sadka and Sadka (2009) present in a simple and el-
egant derivation that this assumption might have ignored another if not the source
of the negativity. They show that the covariance between the earnings surprises
and current expected returns can be reduced to the negative covariance between
the expected earnings surprises and the current expected returns due to that the
earnings surprises are highly predictable on the aggregate level. The results of Sadka
and Sadka (2009) compliment rather than contradict Kothari, Lewellen, and Warner
(2006) story and the return-earnings relation could well be the outcomes of both
the high predictability of earnings surprises and the predictability of returns.
The diversification effect of firm-specific earnings surprise is the center ar-
gument for Kothari, Lewellen, and Warner (2006). However, it is not required in
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Sadka and Sadka (2009) high predictability of earnings surprises argument. In fact,
if the earnings surprises are highly predictable, then the ”surprise” of the earnings
changes does not exist any longer. This renders the diversification effect irrelevant
in the context of aggregating firm-level earnings surprises. Thus, a clear identifi-
cation of diversification effect in aggregation is a useful channel to differentiate the
favorable explanation for the return-earnings relation puzzle.
The diversification effect could be distorted by the asymmetry between good
and bad news reactions (Grier, Henry, Olekalns, and Shields, 2004). Recent studies,
such as Epstein and Schneider (2008) and Kelsey, Kozhan, and Pang (2011), argue
that asymmetric reaction can arise due to the presence of Knightian uncertainty in
the sense of Knight (1921) and Ellsberg (1961). They show that investors who are
ambiguity averse choose the worst case scenario and consequently overvalue negative
news and undervalue positive news. Hereafter, I use terms Knightian uncertainty
and ambiguity interchangeably. Ambiguity refers to situations where objective prob-
abilities are unknown or imperfectly known. It can arise due to lack of information
and/or poor quality of information. Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) axiomatize in-
vestors’ acts of ambiguity aversion. Facing ambiguity, an agent chooses the worst
case scenario and acts in a maxmin framework. That is, each possible course of
action is evaluated with respect to the least favorable probability distribution from
a given set of priors. The chosen action maximizes the minimum expected utility.
Larger set of priors indicates higher level of ambiguity as well as more extreme type
of ambiguity-aversion. Consequently, the agent tends to overweight the negative
outcomes and underweight their positive counterparts.
This chapter investigates how ambiguity affects the return-earnings relation
on both firm- and aggregate-level. As argued above, high level of ambiguity leads
to low level of diversification effect due to asymmetric reaction to good versus bad
news. This will lead to relative dominance of cash flow news component over the
discount rate news component, which in turns leads to a positive relationship be-
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tween aggregate returns and earnings. For low level of ambiguity, however, the
diversification effect is much more pronounced. Discount rate news plays a more
dominant role resulting in a negative aggregate return-earnings relation. Therefore,
if the argument of Kothari, Lewellen, and Warner (2006) is valid, the aggregate
return-earnings relation should be negative for low ambiguity portfolios and posi-
tive for portfolios of high level of ambiguity. Alternatively, according to Sadka and
Sadka (2009), the negativity of aggregate return-earnings relation comes from high
predictability of earnings surprise. It is intuitive to state that earnings are less
predictable when the information environment is highly ambiguous. Similarly, high
level of ambiguity leads to less negative aggregate return-earnings relation. From
both perspectives, we could preliminarily conclude that the return-earnings relation
turns from negative to positive when the level of ambiguity increases.
There are two level of ambiguity: idiosyncratic or firm-level ambiguity and
common or macroeconomic ambiguity. To be precise, the above conclusion is based
on the role of idiosyncratic ambiguity in diversification effect and the role of macroe-
conomic ambiguity in the predictability of earnings surprises. Macroeconomic am-
biguity which measures the market-level information environment and affects only
the discount rate news has little to do with the diversification effect. Its effect on
firm-level return-earnings relations is unclear. Idiosyncratic ambiguity, on the other
hand, has limited impact on the predictability of the aggregate earning surprises.
This is a contradicting point for Kothari, Lewellen, and Warner (2006) and Sadka
and Sadka (2009) theories when considering both firm-level and macroeconomic
ambiguity altogether. If only the former is correct, then valid is that the aggregate
return-earnings relation turns from negative to positive when the firm-level ambi-
guity increases. Since the market-level discount rate news has opposite effect on
the response coefficient than cash-flow news, macroeconomic ambiguity amplifies
its negative effect. Hence, for the portfolios of low firm-level ambiguity, we expect
to observe a strong negative aggregate response coefficient. On the other hand for
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portfolios of highly ambiguous firms, the non-diversified effect of ambiguous cash-
flow news dominates the negative effect of the discount rate news and we obtain
a significantly positive aggregate response coefficient. If only the latter is correct,
then the negativity of the aggregate response coefficient comes from purely the high
predictability of aggregate earnings. Macroeconomic ambiguity is likely to decrease
this predictability, while the firm-level ambiguity has little effect. Thereby, we ex-
pect to observe no clear trend on the effect of firm-level ambiguity on portfolio-level
response coefficient. When adding the macroeconomic ambiguity however, we ex-
pect to see negative response coefficient for low level of macroeconomic ambiguity
but a positive coefficient for the high level counterpart.1
To further develop our hypotheses in a rigorous manner, we build a simple
model to capture the dynamics of earnings-return relation based on the return de-
composition. There are one representative agent (i.e. the investor) and multiple
firms. Upon receiving noisy signals of each firm, the investor forms her conditional
expectations of the signals’ informativeness about future cash flow and discount
rate news. It is straightforward to generate a closed-form solution for the earnings
response coefficient based on the covariances between returns and the two compo-
nents. When the information environment becomes uncertain, the ambiguity-averse
investor lacks confidence on the distribution of true part of a signal and hence con-
sider a range of possible priors due to lack of information and/or poor quality of
information. More specifically, we consider the noisy signals contain both firm-
specific and market-wide cash flow components, which are orthogonal to each other.
The ambiguity regarding the distribution of firm-specific cash flow component is
purely idiosyncratic and we call it firm-level ambiguity. The ambiguity regarding
the market-wide cash flow component represents the overall ambiguity about the
1If both theories are correct, we should observe the same pattern consistent with Kothari,
Lewellen, and Warner (2006) theory. That is, the portfolio-level response coefficient is strictly
increase as the firm-level ambiguity increase. And this increasing trend is further enhanced by the
effect of macroeconomic ambiguity on the predictability of aggregate earnings as well as on the
discount rate news.
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market as whole and we name it macroeconomic ambiguity. We model both types
of ambiguity using the multiple prior model of (Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1989). That
is, the investor does not observe the variances of both cash flow components and
can only present their interval ranges, in a similar spirit to Epstein and Schneider
(2008) and Kelsey, Kozhan, and Pang (2011). The investor’s preferences are then
described by the maxmin expected utility model of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989).
The resulting response coefficient is a function of distribution parameters which in
turn are a function of randomly generated noisy signals.
In order to quantify the effect of ambiguity on the earnings response co-
efficient, we perform a comparative statics analysis. Since the earnings response
coefficients cannot be computed in the closed form with the presence of ambiguity,
we employ Monte Carlo simulations to estimate the coefficients for various values
of ambiguity parameters. To start with firm-level analysis, the model predicts that
individual response coefficients strictly monotonically increase with firm-level am-
biguity. This results also stands in the presence of market-level ambiguity. This
pattern can be intuitively explained by the asymmetric reaction to bad versus good
earnings news. Literature, such as Conrad, Cornell, and Landsman (2002) and
Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold, and Vega (2003), show that market reacts to nega-
tive news significantly more strongly than to positive news. Epstein and Schneider
(2008) argue that ambiguity plays an important role in explaining the asymmetry.
When the firm-level ambiguity is high, the response to negative news is particularly
amplified due to investor’s aversion to ambiguity. This leads to an overall larger
reaction to earnings news. Market-wide ambiguity amplifies the negative contribu-
tion of the discount rate news. Hence, for earnings response coefficient with low
firm-level ambiguity, we observe that high macroeconomic ambiguity decrease the
coefficients, and vice versa for coefficient with high firm-level ambiguity.
Moving to portfolio-level analysis, the aggregate responses increase with firm-
level ambiguity similarly to that for the individual response coefficients. The effect
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of firm-specific cash flow news is diversified away during aggregation so that only
the market-wide cash flow news prevail. However, ambiguity effect is not diversified
away and always goes in the same direction. Positive cash flow effect remains in
the response coefficients for portfolios of high firm-level ambiguity firms. The effect
of macroeconomic ambiguity is similar to the case of individual firms because its
effect on discount rate news is not dampened by aggregation of firms’ signals. It
is worth reiterating that high degree of market-level ambiguity leads to a decrease
in the earnings response coefficient of low-ambiguity stocks and to an increase in
the earnings response coefficient of high-ambiguity stocks, which means that the
effect of market-level ambiguity is related to the degree of firm-level ambiguity. The
overall firm-level ambiguity for the market portfolio is in between of the low and
high degree that we have quantified in the portfolios. Thus, it is no surprise to see
that the effect of market-wide ambiguity is less deterministic on the market level.
A more structured version of our hypotheses is presented at the end of the model
section.
Using all firms on NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ from 1984 Q1 to 2013 Q4,
we find strong empirical evidence consistent with all of our hypotheses. The results
are robust after controlling for size, different earnings surprise measures, different
measures of ambiguity, and sample periods with/out the recent financial crisis. The
results confirm that Kothari, Lewellen, and Warner (2006) explanation of the puz-
zling firm- and aggregate-level return-earnings relations is a viable approach. The
combination of return decomposition and diversification effect explains the inter-
acting behavior of earnings response coefficients with firm-level and macroeconomic
ambiguity on firm-, portfolio-, and market-level analysis. These also show that the
earnings predictability explanation of Sadka and Sadka (2009) can not stand alone.
New measures of ambiguity are proposed. Recent empirical literature em-
ployes the disagreement of professional forecasters to proxy the degree of ambiguity
in firms and the market. Intuitively, if forecasters produce conflicting projections
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about the fundamentals, investors are likely to be uncertain about distributions of
stock returns as they tend to condition their beliefs on professionals’ forecasts. Thus,
when dispersion among professionals’ forecasts regarding the future performance is
large, ambiguity is also likely to be high since investors might find it difficult to
reduce their set of beliefs into a single prior. At the same time, dispersion of profes-
sionals’ forecasts might not necessarily be the idea proxy for gauging the degree of
ambiguity. Barron, Kim, Lim, and Stevens (1998) argue that the forecasts dispersion
can be contaminated by the disagreement component that comes from information
asymmetry. this can be a serious issue especially when proxies the degree of ambigu-
ity at individual firm level. They propose a decomposition of the forecasts dispersion
into uncertainty and disagreement. We argue that the decomposed uncertainty cap-
tures the degree of ambiguity embedded in the dispersion of professionals’ forecasts.
We construct the firm-level ambiguity by using analysts’ forecasts of individual firm
earnings and macroeconomic ambiguity by using individual analyst’s forecasts for
macroeconomic variables, e.g. next period real GDP growth or inflation growth.
This chapter contributes to a number of literature. First, it builds on the
literature on the firm-, portfolio-, and market-level relationship between stock re-
turns and earnings surprises. Ball and Brown (1968) and Beaver (1968) establish
the stylized fact that firm-level stock returns are positively correlated with earnings
surprises. Kothari, Lewellen, and Warner (2006) and Cready and Gurun (2010) doc-
ument a negative contemporaneous relationship between aggregate stock returns and
earnings surprises. Our chapter reconciles this seemingly contradictory findings by
bringing in the role of ambiguity. Second, it adds values to the literature of the role
of ambiguity in explaining investors’ asymmetric reaction on good versus bad news.
Epstein and Schneider (2008), Hansen and Sargent (2008) and Williams (2009) state
that facing ambiguity investors always choose the worst-case scenario. This ambi-
guity averse behaviour induce stronger reaction to bad news than to good news
on the firm-level. Subasi (2011) finds that macroeconomic ambiguity reduces the
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magnitude of investors’ reactions to aggregate earnings news. Our study is different
from Subasi (2011) in a couple of ways. Firstly, our uses of uncertainty measure
are different. He uses the cross-sectional dispersion in realized firm-level earnings
surprises to measure uncertainty. This measure is questionable because it is ex post
dispersion based on realized earnings surprise. Secondly, we consider the separate
effects of micro- and macro-uncertainty. The two impact on different components
of return-earnings relation. Subasi (2011) uses cross-sectional uncertainty and does
not differentiate the level of ambiguity.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 develop our model and
present the model predictions as our testable hypotheses. Section 3.3 describes the
data and present our measures for both firm-level and macroeconomic ambiguity.
Section 3.4 present the core empirical results of our chapter, relating the earnings
response coefficients in three levels to measures of firm-level and market-wide am-
biguity. Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 The model
In this section we construct a simple model which captures the main intuition on how
ambiguous information affects the responses of returns to earnings announcements.
Assume there are n firms that together make up the market portfolio. For simplicity,
we assume all firms are equal in size. At the end of period t, investors observe
earnings announcements eit of each of the firm i. Firm’s earnings consist of two
components: eit = cit + mt, where cit is a firm-specific “cash-flow” component of
the earnings and mt is a market-wide component common for all firms. We assume
that cov[cit, cjt] = 0 for i 6= j, cov[cit,mt] = 0 for any i. In addition, at the end of
period t, investors can observe the realization of some market wide shock to returns
(“discount rate news”) dt which is common for all stocks. We assume that the
discount rate news correlates with the market-wide component of earnings news:
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dt = mt + ηt with cov[cit, ηt] = 0 for any i.
At the end of period t−1, investors observe noisy signals sit about the future
cash flow and discount news
sit = eit + uit,
where uit is idiosyncratic noise with cov[uit, cjt] = 0 and cov[uit, ηjt] = 0 for all
i, j and t. Denote by st = {s1t, ..., snt}, et = {e1t, ..., ent}, Σse = cov[s, s] and
Σs = var[s].
Firm i’s period t return is given by
Rit = Et−1[Rit] + εit − ωt,
where εit is the revision to expected earnings of firm i and ωt is an additional shock
to firm i’s return associated with common for each firm discount rate news.
3.2.1 Case of no ambiguity
In order to establish benchmark, we start by considering the case with no ambiguity
in information and signals. This implies that investors know exactly the probabilistic
distributions of all the variables in the model. Hence, cit ∼ N(0, σ2c ) for any i and
t, mt ∼ N(0, σ2m), ηit ∼ N(0, σ2η) and uit ∼ N(0, σ2u).
We are interested in computing the responses of individual firms’ returns
to earnings announcements as well as the response of the market return to the
aggregate announcement. We start with the former one.
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Individual firms responses
Given the set of signals sit, the investors’ expectation about the realization of vari-
ables eit and dt are:
Et−1[eit|s] = γist =
n∑
j=1
γji sjt
Et−1[dt|s] = δs¯t,
where γi = {γ1i , ..., γni } = ΣseΣ−1s and δ = cov[dt,s¯t]var[dt] =
nσ2m
σ2c+nσ
2
m+σ
2
u
(see Appendix A.1
for detailed derivation). Hence, the announcement surprises εit and ωt are
εit = eit − Et−1[eit|s] = eit −
n∑
j=1
γji sjt, (3.1)
ωt = dt − Et−1[dt|s] = dt − γds¯t. (3.2)
The earnings response coefficient of firm i’s return to its earnings surprise is
equal to the beta coefficient:
βi =
cov[Rit,∆eit]
var[∆eit]
, (3.3)
where the covariance between the returns of the stock and the changes in the earnings
announcements,
cov[Rit,∆eit] = cov[εit, eit]− cov[ωt, eit].
Given that
cov[εit, eit] = var[eit]−
n∑
j=1
γji cov[sjt, eit] = (σ
2
c + σ
2
m)(1− γii)− (n− 1)γji σ2m,
cov[ωt, eit] = cov[dt, eit]− δcov[s¯t, eit] = σ2m −
δ
n
(σ2c + nσ
2
m)
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we get
cov[Rit,∆eit] = (σ
2
c + σ
2
m)
(
1− γii +
δ
n
)
− σ2m
(
1 + (n− 1)γji − δ +
δ
n
)
.
Aggregate responses
In order to look at the reaction of the market portfolio returns to the aggregate
earnings, we define the aggregate market return as
Rmt =
1
n
n∑
i=1
Rit = Et−1[Rmt] + ε¯t − ωt
where Et−1[Rmt] = 1n
n∑
i=1
Et−1[Rit] and ε¯t = 1n
n∑
i=1
εit = e¯t − 1n
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
γji sjt with the
aggregate earning being defined as e¯t =
1
n
n∑
i=1
eit =
1
n
n∑
i=1
cit +mt.
The earnings response coefficient of the portfolio returns to the aggregate
earnings is given by
βm =
cov[Rmt,∆e¯t]
var[∆e¯t]
, (3.4)
where the covariance between the aggregate returns of the the changes in aggregate
earnings is
cov[Rmt,∆e¯t] = cov[ε¯t, e¯t]− cov[ωt, e¯t].
Since cov[sjt, e¯t] = σ
2
m +
σ2c
n we have
cov[ε¯t, e¯t] = var[e¯t]− 1
n
n∑
i=1
 n∑
j=1
γji cov[sjt, e¯t]
 = var[e¯t]− 1
n
n∑
i=1
 n∑
j=1
γji
(
σ2m +
σ2c
n
)(3.5)
=
(σ2c + nσ
2
m)
n
(
1− γii − (n− 1)γji
)
. (3.6)
It is also straightforward to compute
cov[ωt, e¯t] = cov[dt, e¯t]− δcov[s¯t, e¯t] = σ2m −
δ(σ2c + nσ
2
m)
n
. (3.7)
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Hence, taking into account the fact that var[∆e¯t] =
σ2c+nσ
2
m
n , the covariance
cov[Rmt,∆e¯t] =
σ2c + nσ
2
m
n
(
1− γii − (n− 1)γji ) + δ −
nσ2m
σ2c + nσ
2
m
)
. (3.8)
3.2.2 Case of ambiguous information
Let us consider now an extension of the model where the investors face ambiguity
regarding the variance of firm-specific and market-wide cash flow components. The
ambiguity of the firm specific component is purely idiosyncratic and represents the
quality of information environment around firm-specific cash flows news. We will
call it firm-specific ambiguity hereafter. The ambiguity about the market-wide rep-
resents the overall ambiguity about the market as whole. It refers to the quality
of information environment around market-level cash flow news as well as discount
rate news. We will call it market-wide ambiguity.
We model both types of ambiguity using the multiple prior model of Gilboa
and Schmeidler (1989). More specifically, the investors do not observe the variances
of cit and mt and know only their interval ranges: σ
2
ci ∈ [σ2c , σ2c ] and σ2m ∈ [σ2m, σ2m].
Similar approach has been adopted by Epstein and Schneider (2008) and Kelsey,
Kozhan, and Pang (2011).
Investor’s preferences exhibit ambiguity aversion and are described by the
max-min expected utility model (see Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989)) for the prefer-
ence specification of the model). We assume that the investor chooses parameters
σ2ci and σ
2
m through the minimization problem
min
σ2ci ∈ [σ2c , σ2c ]
σ2m ∈ [σ2m, σ2m]
E
[
Rmt(σ
2
c1, ..., σ
2
cn, σ
2
m)|s
]
, (3.9)
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where
E
[
Rmt(σ
2
c1, ..., σ
2
cn, σ
2
m)|s
]
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
n∑
i=1
γji (s)sjt + δ(s)¯st
where γji ≡ γji
(
σ2c1, ..., σ
2
cn, σm
)
and δ ≡ δ (σ2c1, ..., σ2cn, σm) (see Appendix A.2 for
detailed representations).
Denote by σ2∗ = argmin
σ2ci ∈ [σ2c , σ2c ]
σ2m ∈ [σ2m, σ2m]
E
[
Rmt(σ
2
c1, ..., σ
2
cn, σ
2
m)|s
]
Similarly to the case with no ambiguity, we compute two response coeffi-
cients: individual firms’ returns responses to earnings surprises and the market
return response to the aggregate earnings. We start with the former one.
Individual firms responses
Given the realizations of signals s and the choice of parameters determined by the
representative investor preferences, the return if asset i is given by
Rit = Et−1[Rit] + εit + ωt = Et−1[Rit] + (eit −
n∑
j=1
γji
(
σ2∗
)
sit)− (dt − δ
(
σ2∗
)
s¯t).
The beta coefficient is βi =
cov[Rit,∆eit]
var[∆eit]
. The covariance between the returns of the
stock and the changes in the earnings announcements is
cov[Rit,∆eit] = cov[εit, eit]− cov[ωt, eit],
where
cov[εit, eit] = var[eit]−
n∑
j=1
cov[γji (σs)sjt, eit] = σ
2
c + σ
2
m −
n∑
j=1
E[γji (σc)sjteit]
= σ2c + σ
2
m −
n∑
j=1
E[γji (σc)sjtE[eit|s]] = σ2c + σ2m −
n∑
j=1
n∑
ι=1
γιiE[γ
j
i (σc) sjtsιt]
73
and
cov[ωt, eit] = cov[dt, eit]− cov[δ (s) s¯t, eit] = σ2m − E[δ (s) s¯teit]
= σ2m − E[δ (σc) s¯tE[eit|s]] = σ2m −
n∑
j=1
γjiE[δ (σc) s¯tsjt].
Aggregate responses
As before, we compute the response coefficient of the market returns to the aggregate
change in earnings as βm =
cov[Rmt,∆emt]
var[∆emt]
. The covariance between the market
return response and the aggregate change in earnings is given by cov[Rmt,∆e¯t] =
cov[ε¯t, e¯t]− cov[ωt, e¯t], where ε¯t = e¯t − 1n
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
γji (σc)sjt as the response coefficients
γi(σ
∗) are not constant across firms any more and are functions of the variances σ∗.
Thus,
cov[ε¯t, e¯t] = var[e¯t]− 1
n
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
cov[γji (s)sjt, e¯t] = var[e¯t]−
1
n
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
E[γji (s)sjte¯t]
= var[e¯t]− 1
n
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
E[γji (s)sjtE[e¯t|s]] =
σ2c + nσ
2
m
n
− 1
n2
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
n∑
ι=1
n∑
k=1
γkι E[γ
j
i (s)sjtskt]
and
cov[ωt, e¯t] = cov[dt, e¯t]− cov[δ(s)s¯t, e¯t] = σ2m − E[δ(s)s¯te¯t] = σ2m −
1
n
n∑
i=1
E[δ(s)s¯tE[eit|s]]
= σ2m −
1
n
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
γjiE [δ(s)s¯tsjt] .
3.2.3 Simulations and hypotheses development
In order to quantify the effect of ambiguity on the earnings response coefficients we
perform a comparative statics analysis. However, the earnings response coefficients
cannot be computed in the closed form. To circumvent this difficulty we fix the
values of σ2v , σ
2
u, σ
2
c , σ
2
d and n and use Monte Carlo simulations to estimate the
earnings response coefficients for different values of the ambiguity parameters ∆c =
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σ¯2c − σ2c and ∆d = σ¯2d − σ2d. To do this we simulate 100,000 repetitions of variables
c, m, v and u for each of n firms with n = 50, 100, 500.
We assume the actual parameters are as follows: σ2v = 4.0×10−4, σ2u = 5.3×
10−4, σ2c = 2.94×10−4 and σ2d = 1.22×10−5. Those coefficients are computed using
back-envelope method using actual response coefficients.2 We consider six different
degrees of firm-level ambiguity: ∆c = 0, 0.2σ
2
c , 0.4σ
2
c , 0.6σ
2
c , 0.8σ
2
c , 0.99σ
2
c and six dif-
ferent degrees of market-level ambiguity: ∆d = 0, 0.2σ
2
d, 0.4σ
2
d, 0.6σ
2
d, 0.8σ
2
d, 0.99σ
2
d.
Figure 3.1 plots individual response coefficients for different degrees of firm-
level and market-level ambiguity. Three different panels exhibit cases for different
number of cross-section. The earnings response coefficient clearly increases with
firm-level ambiguity. This is true for each degree of market-level ambiguity. The
intuition is as follows. Investors react asymmetrically to good versus bad news
under firm-level ambiguity. The higher the ambiguity, the stronger the reaction is
to bad than to good news. As a result, the average reaction to firm-specific news is
stronger with high level of firm-level ambiguity. Similarly, market reacts stronger to
market-wide bad than to good news under macroeconomic ambiguity. At the same
time, market-wide ambiguity amplifies the effect of discount rate news. Under low
macroeconomic ambiguity, discount rate news effect seems to exceed that of market-
wide cash flows news. Under high macroeconomic ambiguity, the overreaction to
common cash flows news seems to dominate. Hence, we observe macroeconomic
ambiguity decreases the earnings response coefficient under low firm-level ambiguity
while increases the coefficient under high firm-level ambiguity.
Figure 3.2 contains plots of the aggregate responses of the market returns
to the aggregate earnings. Similarly to the individual response coefficients, the ag-
gregate responses increase with firm-level ambiguity. When forming portfolios firm-
specific cash-flow news and their effects diversify away so that only market-wide
news prevails (see Campbell and Shiller (1988b), Kothari, Lewellen, and Warner
2See the following section how we estimate the earnings response coefficients empirically.
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(2006)). However, ambiguity effect is not diversified away and always goes in the
same direction (see Epstein and Schneider (2008)). Therefore, positive cash-flow
effect remains in the response coefficient for portfolios of high firm-level ambiguity
firms. However, the market-level ambiguity has different effects on the aggregate
response coefficient depending on the degree of the firm-level ambiguity. Specifically,
the market-level ambiguity increases the aggregate response coefficient for portfo-
lios of highly ambiguous firms while it decreases the aggregate response coefficient
for portfolios of low-ambiguity firms. Since market-level discount news has oppo-
site effect on the response coefficient than cash-flow news, market-wide ambiguity
amplifies its negative effect. Hence, for the portfolios of low firm-level ambiguity
cash-flow news are diversified while the discount rate news effect is amplified, we
expect to observe a strong negative aggregate response coefficient. However, for
portfolios of highly ambiguous firms, the non-diversified effect of ambiguous cash-
flow news dominates the negative effect of the discount rate news and we obtain a
positive aggregate response coefficient.
When forming market portfolio, the effect of market-wide ambiguity is deter-
mined by three factors: the undiversified firm-specific cash flow news, the market-
wide cash flows news, and the discount rate news. Macroeconomic ambiguity affects
the latter two with opposite signs. It increases the effect of market-side cash flow
news while amplifying that of discount rate news. Depending on the average firm-
level ambiguity level, the market wide effect of macroeconomic ambiguity could vary
in nature.
Hence, based on the theoretical predictions we formulate our empirical hy-
potheses.
H 1. Individual response coefficient increases with firm-level ambiguity.
H 2. Firm-level ambiguity increases the aggregate earnings response coefficient.
Moreover, this increase is more pronounced when the degree of market-level am-
biguity is high.
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H 3. High degree of market-level ambiguity leads to an increase in the earnings re-
sponse coefficient of high-ambiguity stocks and to a decrease in the earnings response
coefficient of the low-ambiguity stocks.
3.3 Data and variable definition
Our sample selection starts from all firms with March, June, September, or De-
cember fiscal year-end from 1984 to 2013, with available accounting data in the
Compustat quarterly database. We use earnings per share (basic) excluding extraor-
dinary items (Compustat item EPSPXQ) adjusted by stock splits (Compustat item
AJEXQ). In case this data is not available, we use earnings per share (diluted) ex-
cluding extraordinary items (Compustat item EPSFXQ) adjusted. Following Daniel
and Titman (2006), we define book value as book equity to be shareholders’ equity
numbers (Compustat item SEQQ) minus total preferred/preference stock (Compus-
tat item PSTKQ) plus the deferred taxes and investment tax credit (Compustat item
TXDITCQ) and divided by common shares outstanding (Compustat item CSHOQ)
adjusted. If book equity is missing, we use total common/ordinary equity (Compus-
tat CEQQ) or total assets (Compustat item ATQ) minus total liabilities (Compustat
item LTQ).
Following literature (e.g., Kothari, Lewellen, and Warner (2006), Sadka and
Sadka (2009)), earnings surprise dESit of firm i in quarter t is defined as
dESit =
Ei,t − Ei,t−4
Si,t−4
,
where Ei,t − Ei,t−4 is seasonally differenced quarterly earnings and Sit is either
market price (Sit = Pit), book equity (Sit = Bit), or earnings (Sit = Eit).
For market- and portfolio-level estimates of earnings surprises, we use value-
weighted cross-sectional averages of individual stock earnings surprises where value
weights are calculated as the beginning-of-period market capitalization. Stock re-
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turns Rit are calculated using adjusted prices (Compustat items PRCCQ / AJEXQ).
In each period we exclude firms with beginning-of-quarter price below $1. Also, we
exclude the top and bottom 0.5% ranked on the distribution of the corresponding
measures of earnings surprise each quarter.
We calculate earnings surprises for portfolios as well as the overall market
using aggregate data. The aggregate series is simply the cross-sectional sum of
earnings changes multiplied by the number of shares outstanding for all firms in the
sample, subsequently scaled by the sum of lagged market equity, lagged book equity,
or lagged multiplication of earnings and the number of shares outstanding for the
same group of firms.3
Analysts’ earnings forecasts data are from the Institutional Brokers Estimate
System (IBES) U.S. Summary History dataset via WRDS. The data is available on
a monthly basis; the forecasts are provided on Thursday before the third Friday of
the month. We only consider forecasts that we within the fiscal quarter. We also
use individual forecasts from the IBES U.S. Detail History dataset to mitigate the
problematic rounding procedure and the results are similar. We exclude firms that
in the current quarter has less than two analysts’ earnings per share forecasts.
3.3.1 Measures of the degree of ambiguity
Recent empirical literature uses the disagreement of professional forecasters to proxy
the degree of ambiguity in the market (see Anderson, Ghysels, and Juergens (2009)
and Drechsler (2013)). Intuitively, if forecasters produce very different and conflict-
ing forecasts about the fundamentals (either of a firm or the economy in general),
investors are likely to be unsure about the distributions of stock returns as they
tend to condition their beliefs on the analysts’ forecasts. Thus, when dispersion
among analysts’ opinion regarding the future performance of stock markets is high,
3We also use the value-weighted data based on per share numbers, where the per share earnings
surprises dEit/Si,t−4 are weighted using the number of shares outstanding of quarter t. Results are
qualitatively similar and can be available upon the request.
78
ambiguity is also likely to be high since investors cannot confidently narrow down
the set of their beliefs to a single prior.
At the same time, dispersion of analysts’ forecasts might not necessarily be
the ideal proxy for measuring the degree of ambiguity. Barron, Kim, Lim, and
Stevens (1998) argue that the ambiguity component of the dispersion of analysts
forecasts can be contaminated by the disagreement component that comes from
the asymmetric information. This can be a serious issue especially when proxies
the degree of ambiguity at individual firm level. Barron, Kim, Lim, and Stevens
(1998) propose a decomposition of the forecasts dispersion into uncertainty and
disagreement in the following way. Define the consensus measure ρ as
ρ =
C
V
, (3.10)
where V is overall uncertainty defined as a simple average of individual uncertainty
(i.e. variance of forecast errors) over N analysts. C is common uncertainty defined
as the average pair-wise covariance among analysts’ beliefs. Thus, ρ measures the
degree to which analysts’ beliefs covary relative to the overall uncertainty, in other
words, the ratio of common uncertainty to the overall uncertainty.
To compute the consensus among the analysts, we use a special case of above
formula where the private information is of equal precision4:
ρ =
H
H + Z
, (3.11)
where H =
(SE− V
N
)
(SE− V
N
+V )2
measures the precision of common information and Z =
V
(SE− V
N
+V )2
measures the precision of idiosyncratic information. Here, SE is the
mean squared error of forecasts scaled by the absolute value of the actual forecasted
variable, V is the variance of forecasts scaled by the absolute value of the actual
4Please refer to Barron, Kim, Lim, and Stevens (1998) for detailed explanation regarding the
relation with common and private information
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forecasted variable, and N is the number of forecasts. Thus, the variable ρ measures
the uncertainty attributable to experts’ reliance on imprecise common information.
We argue that this measure captures the degree of ambiguity embedded in the
dispersion of analysts’ forecasts: that is, the more information uncertainty is, the
more likely that investors form multiple beliefs about fundamentals of stocks and
the economy as a whole. The results using dispersion of analyst forecasts as an
alternative measure of ambiguity are similar.
We construct firm-level ambiguity by using analysts’ forecasts of individual
firm earnings. They reflect news about individual firms’ news on cash flows. The
higher is the uncertainty component in the dispersion of analysts’ earnings forecasts,
the more ambiguous is signals about the firm’s cash flow news. Thus, we denote
by FUi the uncertainly measure ρ constructed on the basis of analysts’ earnings
forecasts for firm i from IBES data. Specifically, SE will correspond to the mean
squared earnings forecasts error and V corresponds to the variance of earnings fore-
casts. Hence, we argue that FUi is a good measure for the degree of ambiguity in
the market for two reasons. First, because it is based on the dispersion of experts’
forecasts about the fundamentals, it nicely measures the set of reasonable models
considered by the representative investor. Secondly, it is free of the impact of asym-
metric information component that can possibly contaminate the effect of ambiguity.
In fact, Doukas, Kim, and Pantzalis (2006) has demonstrated that uncertainty and
asymmetric information component have indeed opposite effects on stock returns.
In order to examine the cross-sectional effect of firm-level ambiguity on the
earnings response coefficient we categorize stocks into five different groups based
on the degree of firm-level ambiguity. Specifically, every quarter we group stocks
into quintiles of firm-level ambiguity variable FUi. We define dummy variable D
j
it,
j = 1, ..., 5 to be equal to 1 if stock i falls into firm-level ambiguity quintile j in
quarter t. In this way, dummy variable D1 corresponds to the stocks with the least
ambiguous cash-flow information and D5 correspond to the most ambiguous stocks.
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In order to proxy the degree of market-level ambiguity we use individual
analyst’s forecasts for macroeconomic variables, e.g. real GDP growth or inflation
growth, that comes from the Survey of Professional Forecasters managed by the
Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. Similar to the firm-level ambiguity measure,
we obtained the decomposed uncertainty from the dispersion of analysts’ forecasts
for the next period real GDP growth rate5. That is, we denote by MU the uncer-
tainly measure ρ constructed on the basis of experts’ forecasts of the GDP growth.
Specifically, SE corresponds now to the mean squared GDP forecasts’ error and V
corresponds to the variance of GDP growth forecasts. Finally, in order to estimate
the differential effect of market-level ambiguity on the earnings response coefficient,
we define a dummy variable DMt that is equal to 1 if the market-level ambiguity
MUt is above its historical mean value, and zero otherwise.
The choice of the realized value, needed for calculating the mean squared
forecasts’ error, depends on the version of data that professional forecasters are
trying to predict. Survey of Professional Forecasters database offers five vintages
of the realized value, ranging from the initial-release numbers to the values that we
understand today. The reliability of the historical values increases in time while the
availability decreases in time. We use the latter four vintages on the ground that
they suffer less measurement error yet are close enough to what the professionals
are try to forecast6. The results are similar for each of the four.
3.3.2 Summary statistics
Table 3.1 reports summary statistics for stock returns, earnings surprises and ambi-
guity measures. Panel A shows the mean, standard deviation, and quintile values for
firm and market level variable. The average number of stocks per quarter is 1498.
The average return across firms is around 3.3% per quarter, with a standard devi-
5Other studies, for instance Anderson, Ghysels, and Juergens (2009) and Drechsler (2013), have
used the raw dispersion of next period RGDP growth rate to gauge macroeconomic uncertainty.
6The middle three measures of historical numbers are, respectively, the revised values as they
appear one, five, and nine quarters after the initial release.
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ation 25.4%. The mean for earnings surprise measure dEP is 0.2%. The mean for
dEB and dEE are 0.3% and 8.7% respectively. The average firm-level uncertainty is
around 0.141 with standard deviation 0.603. The average market-level uncertainty
is around 3.069 with standard deviation 4.675. The total number of observation
stands at 179,913. Panel B presents the mean and standard deviation for portfolio
level variables.
Table 3.2 describe the correlation between our main variables, namely return,
earnings surprises measures, and ambiguity. Firm-level returns and earnings sur-
prises are highly significantly correlated at 10% (indicated in bold). It is interesting
to observe that aggregate earnings surprises at portfolio level is highly significantly
correlated with firm-level ambiguity at 10%. For all three level of analysis, our three
earnings surprises measures are all highly significantly correlated with each other.
Figure 3.3 plots the time-series of the market-level ambiguity measure for
our sample period. The series has several big spikes, particularly in 1985-1986,
1990-1991, 1994-1995, 1999-2001, the recent crisis and the second half of 2010.
3.4 Empirical analysis
Our main tests explore how firm- and market-level ambiguity affect the stocks reac-
tion to earnings surprises. We start our analysis with the individual firms responses.
3.4.1 Firm-level analysis
We test our hypothesis 1 by estimating the following pooled panel regression:
Rit = α0 +
5∑
j=2
αjD
j
it + α6D
M
t + β1dESit +
5∑
j=2
βjdESit ×Djit (3.12)
+ γ1dESit ×DMt +
5∑
j=2
γjdESit ×Djit ×DMt + α7MVit + it,
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MVit denotes the log market capitalization for firm i at the beginning of quarter t.
The estimation results are given in Table 3.3.
The results are consistent with our theoretical predictions. The individual
stock prices react positively to earnings surprises dEP . The earnings response coeffi-
cient β1 is 0.841 and is statistically significant at 1% level when we do not control for
ambiguity. The earnings response coefficient is also positive and highly significant
when earnings sunrises are proxied by dEB and dEE.
When firm-level ambiguity variables included in the regression, the earnings
response coefficient for the least ambiguous firms is 0.455 and remains statistically
significant at 1% level. The coefficient increases monotonically with the degree of
firm-level ambiguity. The earnings response coefficient for the most ambiguous firms
β1 + γ5 is 0.861 (i.e. 0.455+0.406) and is statistically larger than the one for the
least ambiguous firms β1. This pattern remains unchanged for the other two proxies
of earnings surprise dEB and dEE.
Finally, the earnings response coefficient is significantly positive and increases
with firm-level ambiguity even when we control for market-level ambiguity. Overall,
the results show that investors respond to corporate earnings news more strongly
when the information environment around the firm is highly ambiguous. This con-
firms our hypothesis 1.
3.4.2 Portfolio-level analysis
In order to test Hypotheses 2 and 3 and estimate the effect ambiguity on the aggre-
gate response coefficient we form portfolio of stocks ranked on the degree of firm-level
ambiguity. That is, each quarter we group stocks into five quintiles based on FUi
and form value-weighted portfolios. For each portfolio we compute the aggregated
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earnings surprises. To perform our tests we estimate the following panel regression:
Rpt = α0 +
5∑
j=2
αjD
j
pt + α6D
M
t + β1dESpt +
5∑
j=2
βjdESpt ×Djpt (3.13)
+ γ1dESpt ×DMt +
5∑
j=2
γjdESpt ×Djpt ×DMt + α7MVpt + pt,
where p denotes the corresponding quintile portfolio, Rpt is the value-weighted return
on portfolio p, dESpt is the aggregate earnings surprise of portfolio p in quarter t
and MVpt is the log of aggregate market capitalization of portfolio p. The results
are provided in Table 3.4.
Similarly to the firm-level case, the earnings response coefficient increases
with the degree of firm-level ambiguity. In the case when earnings surprise are
measured by dEP , the coefficients β4 and β5 are positive and statistically significant
at 5% and 10% levels respectively. This means that the earnings response coefficient
for the portfolio of the most ambiguous firms is significantly higher than for the least
ambiguous portfolio. This result is weaker, however, when dEB and dEE variables
are used as proxies for earnings surprise – only β4 is statistically significant at
10% in the case of S = B (see columns (2), (5) and (8) of Table 3.4). When we
control for market-level ambiguity (columns (3), (6) and (9)), the coefficients β2
to β5 are statistically insignificant. That is, the increase of the earnings response
coefficient is insignificant for the period of low market-level ambiguity. However, the
earnings response coefficient increases dramatically with firm-level ambiguity when
the market-level ambiguity is high. Indeed, coefficient γ5 is positive and statistically
significant at 5% level when dEP is used as the proxy of earnings surprises (the
significance levels of γ5 is 5% for dEE respectively). This is consistent with our
theoretical results and confirms our Hypothesis 2. Indeed, the pale grey line on
Figure 3.2 is almost flat suggesting that earnings response coefficient increases with
firm-level ambiguity very slowly when the degree of market-level ambiguity is low.
At the same time, the black line is steep suggesting that when the information
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about discount rates is very ambiguous the earnings response coefficient increases
with firm-level ambiguity at much higher rate.
The estimation results of Equation 3.13 provide evidence in favour of Hy-
pothesis 3. The coefficient of dEPpt × DMt term, γ1, is negative and statistically
significant at the 5% level. This means that an increase in market-level ambiguity
significantly decreases the earnings response coefficient of the portfolio of low am-
biguity firms as suggested by our theoretical prediction. In contrast, we observe
increases in the earnings response coefficient for high ambiguity portfolios. For ex-
ample, high market-level ambiguity increases the response coefficient for the second-
to-last highest ambiguity portfolios (the sum of the coefficients of dEPpt×DMt and
dEPpt × D4pt × DMt is equal to -0.788 (e.g. -4.556+3.768), although the increase
measured by γ4 is statistically insignificant at the 10% level (the corresponding t-
statistics is around 1.40). For the last quintile of the highest firm-level ambiguity
portfolio, the increase is significant at the 5% level measured by γ5. The results are
similar when dEB and dEE are used as the proxies of earnings surprises.
Lastly, the coefficient for dEPpt of Equation 3.13 is small and statistically
insignificant at the 10% level (column (1) of Table 3.4). This is what the most of the
existing literature finds: an insignificant aggregate earnings response coefficient. Out
results show that the insignificance is due to the interacting effects of firm-level and
market-level ambiguities on earnings surprises. High market ambiguity decreases
the response coefficients for low ambiguity firms (i.e. γ1) and increases the response
coefficients for high ambiguity counterparts (i.e. γ5). Those two contrasting forces
cancel each other on average and consequently produce an insignificant aggregate
earnings response coefficient.
3.4.3 Aggregate-level analysis
Our theoretical model implies that the sign of the aggregate earnings response coef-
ficient depends on the overall level of ambiguity about cash flow news on the market.
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That is, if low ambiguity firms prevail in the market we can expect a negative price
responses to the aggregate earnings. On the other hand if the overall level of chase
flow ambiguity is high, the earnings response coefficient is expected to be positive.
Finally, if the market is populated by firms with both high and low degree of firm-
level ambiguity then both effects would cancel each other and we expect to see small
and insignificant market reaction. In this section we verify empirically which of those
statements is true. To do this we estimate the following time series regression:
RMt = β0 + β1dESt + β2D
M
t + β3dESt ×DMt + t, (3.14)
where RMt is the market return at time t, dESt is the aggregate earnings surprises
at time t. Table 3.5 show the estimation results.
When market-level ambiguity is not included in the regression, the results are
similar that is found in the existing literature (see Kothari, Lewellen, and Warner
(2006), Sadka and Sadka (2009)). The aggregate earnings response coefficient is
insignificant regardless of which proxy of earnings surprises is used (see columns
(1), (4) and (7) of Table 3.5). When we control for market-level ambiguity, the
coefficient β1 remains insignificant. Furthermore, coefficient β3 is positive but also
statistically insignificant. Thus, the results are in line with the third statement.
Aggregate earnings response coefficient is insignificant both for low and high level
of market-level ambiguity. This again confirms our previous point that taking into
account both firm- and market-level ambiguity is important for correct and unbiased
estimation of the earnings response coefficient.
To check the robustness of our results, we employ different measures of am-
biguity. Firstly, we try using higher criterion for creating high ambiguity dummy
variable. The value of the dummy variable is set to one if the macroeconomic uncer-
tainty is above it’s 80% value. The results are consistent and present in Tables 3.6,
3.7, and 3.8. Secondly, we try the uncertainty measured constructed by Anderson,
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Ghysels, and Juergens (2009). The results are consistent and present in Tables 3.9,
3.10, and 3.11.
3.5 Conclusions
In this chapter we investigate how ambiguity affects return-earnings relation on both
firm- and aggregate-level. Literature shows that positive firm-level earnings news is
informative about a firm’s future cash flows, thereby increases its contemporaneous
stock price. However, this positive return-earnings relation does not translate into
aggregate level. In fact, a negative contemporaneous relationship between market
returns and aggregate earnings surprises has been documented in recent literature
(Kothari, Lewellen, and Warner, 2006; Sadka and Sadka, 2009). The puzzling finding
could be explained by the diversification of firm-specific earnings surprises together
with either high predictability of returns or high predictability of aggregate earn-
ings changes. On firm-level, distortion of diversification effect (of firm-specific cash
flows news) by firm-level ambiguity implies that portfolio-level ERC is expected to
increase in firm-level ambiguity. On aggregate-level, the effect of microeconomic
ambiguity depends on which of the above two explanations is favoured. If expected
returns are highly predictable, then for the lowest firm-level ambiguity portfolio,
high macroeconomic ambiguity should decreases the response coefficient thanks for
the dominance of discount rate news. For the highest firm-level ambiguity port-
folio where cash flows news dominates, high macroeconomic ambiguity amplifies
the distorting diversification effect thereby increases the response coefficient. If ag-
gregate earnings are highly predictable, then for both the lowest and the highest
firm-level ambiguity portfolios, high macroeconomic ambiguity intuitively resulting
in low predictability is expected to increase the response coefficients. Motivated
by the differential implications of the two explanations, this chapter constructs a
theoretical model generating predictions in favour of the former explanation and
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provides empirical evidence supporting all the hypotheses.
Our results show that individual response coefficient increases with firm-
level ambiguity. Firm-level ambiguity increases the aggregate earnings response
coefficient. Moreover, this increase is more pronounced when the degree of market-
level ambiguity is high. High degree of market-level ambiguity leads to an increase
in the earnings response coefficient of high-ambiguity stocks and to a decrease in
the earnings response coefficient of the low-ambiguity stocks. We conclude that
the negative aggregate relation comes from the diversification effect as well as an
amplifying effect of macroeconomic ambiguity on discount rate news and market-
wide cash flow news.
This chapter indicates several directions for future research. Firstly, the
results assume high predictability of future expected returns and a negative correla-
tion between earnings surprises and future expected returns. Empirical evidence on
these points is weak due to the difficulty of finding appropriate discount rate proxies
and lack of consistent methodologies to test them. It will be a good contribution to
provide further robust evidence to support this assumption. Secondly, the results
preclude the explanation based on high predictability of aggregate earnings changes.
In particular, the study assumes high level macroeconomic ambiguity reduces the
predictability of aggregate earnings changes. Although this is intuitive, the rigour
of this subject requires a thorough investigation in this matter.
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Figure 3.1: Individual responses
This figure plots individual response coefficients for different degrees of firm-level and market-level ambiguity.
Three different panels exhibit cases for different number of cross-section: 50, 200, and 500. The horizontal
axis refers to the degree of firm-level ambiguity. The vertical axis refers to the earnings response coefficient.
The legend refers to each degree of market-level ambiguity. We consider six different degrees of firm- as well
as market-level ambiguity, starting with no ambiguity, to 20%, 40%, 60%, 80%, and 99% each side.
Panel A: N=50
Panel B: N=200
Panel C: N=500
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Figure 3.2: Aggregate responses
This figure illustrates earnings response coefficients of portfolio for different degrees of firm-level and market-
level ambiguity. Three different panels exhibit cases for different number of cross-section: 50, 200, and 500.
The horizontal axis refers to the degree of firm-level ambiguity. The vertical axis refers to the earnings
response coefficient. The legend refers to each degree of market-level ambiguity. We consider six different
degrees of firm- as well as market-level ambiguity, starting with no ambiguity, to 20%, 40%, 60%, 80%, and
99% each side.
Panel A: N=50
Panel B: N=200
Panel C: N=500
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Figure 3.3: Market-level ambiguity
This figure plots the time series of the market-level ambiguity MUt (black line) for the period from 1984
to 2012. MUt is computed as the decomposed uncertainty part of the analysts’ next-period GDP growth
forecasts dispersion. Grey lines indicate periods when MUt is above it historic mean value. Individual
forecasts for real GDP growth are from the Survey of Professional Forecasters at the Federal Reserve Bank
of Philadelphia.
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Table 3.1: Summary statistics
This table reports the summary statistics of the sample. Panel A describes the mean, standard deviation,
and quintiles of the firm and market level variables. Rit is the quarterly return for firm i at quarter t. dEPit,
dEBit, and dEEit are, respectively, the seasonally differenced earnings (dE) scaled by beginning-of-period
market price (P), book value (B), or earnings (E) for firm i at quarter t. FUit is the firm-level uncertainty
for firm i at quarter t, calculated as the decomposed uncertainty part of the analysts’ earnings forecasts
dispersion. MUt is the macroeconomic uncertainty for quarter t, calculated as the decomposed uncertainty
part of the analysts’ next-period GDP growth forecasts dispersion. N is the number of observations in our
sample. Panel B describes the mean and standard deviation of the portfolio variables under 5 levels of firm-
level uncertainty. MVpt is the average market value in millions. Earnings are excluding extraordinary items.
Earnings, book equity, share price, and shares outstanding data are from Compustat. Analysts’ forecasts are
from IBES. Individual forecasts for real GDP growth are from the Survey of Professional Forecasters at the
Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. The firms are subject to the following screening criteria: 1) data are
available for earnings, price, common shares outstanding, book equity this quarter and four quarters prior;
2) dates are aligned with calendar quarters; 3) price is larger than $1; 4) at least two analysts’ forecasts for
EPS; 5) not in the top and bottom 1 percentile of firms ranked by dEP , dEB, or dEE. Our sample includes
all the firms on NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ from 1984 Q1 to 2013 Q4.
Panel A: Firm and market level variables
Mean Std.Dev. Q1 Median Q3
Rit 0.034 0.254 -0.093 0.022 0.139
RMt 0.033 0.108 -0.035 0.039 0.094
dEPit 0.002 0.031 -0.005 0.001 0.007
dEBit 0.003 0.068 -0.011 0.003 0.016
dEEit 0.087 1.870 -0.315 0.095 0.500
FUit 0.141 0.603 0.002 0.009 0.044
MUt 3.069 4.675 0.451 1.046 3.260
N 179,913
Panel B: Portfolio level variables
Low 2 3 4 High
Rpt 0.040 0.046 0.044 0.038 -0.001
0.090 0.103 0.109 0.118 0.130
dEPpt -0.004 -0.002 0.003 0.004 -0.372
0.006 0.008 0.011 0.015 1.559
dEBpt -0.008 -0.003 0.006 0.008 -0.891
0.124 0.019 0.036 0.033 3.114
dEEpt -0.002 -0.001 0.002 0.002 -0.174
0.003 0.004 0.007 0.007 0.667
MVpt(mil) 5785.65 4211.282 3865.363 3600.74 2783.748
3187.11 2076.798 1822.682 1852.623 1615.116
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Table 3.2: Correlations
This table reports the correlations of important variables. Panel A describes the correlations of the firm
level variables. Rit is the quarterly return for firm i at quarter t. dEPit, dEBit, and dEEit are, respectively,
the seasonally differenced earnings (dE) scaled by beginning-of-period market price (P), book value (B), or
earnings (E) for firm i at quarter t. FUit is the firm-level uncertainty for firm i at quarter t, calculated as
the decomposed uncertainty part of the analysts’ earnings forecasts dispersion. Panel B and C describe the
correlations of portfolio and market level variables, respectively.MUt is the macroeconomic uncertainty for
quarter t, calculated as the decomposed uncertainty part of the analysts’ next-period GDP growth forecasts
dispersion. Earnings are excluding extraordinary items. Earnings, book equity, share price, and shares
outstanding data are from Compustat. Analysts’ forecasts are from IBES. Individual forecasts for real GDP
growth are from the Survey of Professional Forecasters at the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. The
firms are subject to the following screening criteria: 1) data are available for earnings, price, common shares
outstanding, book equity this quarter and four quarters prior; 2) dates are aligned with calendar quarters; 3)
price is larger than $1; 4) at least two analysts’ forecasts for EPS; 5) not in the top and bottom 1 percentile
of firms ranked by dEP , dEB, or dEE. Our sample includes all the firms on NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ
from 1984 Q1 to 2013 Q4.
Panel A: Firm level variables
Rit dEPit dEBit dEEit FUit
Rit 1 0.100 0.089 0.100 0.003
dEPit 1 0.667 0.547 0.003
dEBit 1 0.493 0.004
dEEit 1 0.001
FUit 1
Panel B: Portfolio level variables
Rpt dEPpt dEBpt dEEpt FUpt
Rpt 1 -0.036 -0.013 -0.012 -0.006
dEPpt 1 0.970 0.958 -0.104
dEBpt 1 0.958 -0.106
dEEpt 1 -0.105
FUpt 1
Panel C: Market level variables
RMt dEPt dEBt dEEt MUt
RMt 1 -0.046 -0.009 -0.024 -0.066
dEPt 1 0.965 0.975 0.051
dEBt 1 0.961 -0.008
dEEt 1 0.052
MUt 1
93
Table 3.3: Quarterly returns and earnings surprises: firm-level regressions
This table reports the coefficient, t-statistic, and adjusted R2 of contemporaneous relations between quar-
terly returns and earnings surprises, and with the interaction of firm-level and macroeconomic uncertainty:
Rit = α0+
5∑
j=2
αjD
j
it+α6D
M
t +β1dESit+
5∑
j=2
βjdESit×Djit+γ1dESit×DMt +
5∑
j=2
γjdESit×Djit×DMt +it,
where dESit is seasonally differenced earnings scaled by beginning-of-period market price (S = P ), book
value (S = B), or earnings (S = E) for firm i at time t. Rit is the return for firm i at time t. D
M
t is a
dummy variable assigned with 1 if the market-level ambiguity is above its historic mean, and zero otherwise.
The market-level ambiguity is defined as the uncertainty part of the dispersion of forecasts for next-period
real GDP Growth. Djit is the uncertainty part of analyst earnings forecast dispersion measuring firm-specific
uncertainty for uncertainty quintile j at time t. D5it is the quintile with highest uncertainty and so forth.
The first quintile is embedded in the no-dummy variable. Earnings are excluding extraordinary items.
Earnings, book equity, share price, and shares outstanding data are from Compustat. Analysts’ forecasts
are from IBES. Individual forecasts for real GDP growth are from the Survey of Professional Forecasters at
the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. The firms are subject to the following screening criteria: 1) data
are available for earnings, price, common shares outstanding, book equity this quarter and four quarters
prior; 2) dates are aligned with calendar quarters; 3) price is larger than $1; 4) at least two analysts’ forecasts
for EPS; 5) not in the top and bottom 1 percentile of firms ranked by dES. Standard errors are given in
parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Our sample
includes all the firms on NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ from 1984 Q1 to 2013 Q4.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Sit = Pit Sit = Bit Sit = Eit
dESit 0.841
∗∗∗ 0.455∗∗∗ 0.656∗∗∗ 0.367∗∗∗ 0.192∗∗∗ 0.288∗∗∗ 1.543∗∗∗ 0.742∗∗∗ 0.935∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.094) (0.118) (0.013) (0.036) (0.046) (0.153) (0.115) (0.155)
dESit ×D2it 0.236∗ 0.239 0.072 0.025 0.242 0.250
(0.124) (0.163) (0.049) (0.064) (0.155) (0.207)
dESit ×D3it 0.309∗∗∗ 0.188 0.085∗ 0.054 0.451∗∗∗ 0.428∗∗
(0.112) (0.145) (0.046) (0.060) (0.148) (0.195)
dESit ×D4it 0.361∗∗∗ 0.094 0.128∗∗∗ 0.025 0.460∗∗∗ 0.311
(0.111) (0.141) (0.047) (0.062) (0.152) (0.199)
dESit ×D5it 0.406∗∗∗ 0.259∗∗ 0.245∗∗∗ 0.126∗∗ 1.289∗∗∗ 1.637∗
(0.103) (0.130) (0.042) (0.056) (0.457) (0.994)
DMt -0.020
∗∗∗ -0.021∗∗∗ -0.023∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003)
dESit ×DMt -0.486∗∗ -0.217∗∗∗ -0.490∗∗
(0.189) (0.071) (0.232)
dESit ×D2it ×DMt 0.046 0.106 0.002
(0.246) (0.097) (0.303)
dESit ×D3it ×DMt 0.282 0.073 0.085
(0.224) (0.092) (0.290)
dESit ×D4it ×DMt 0.587∗∗∗ 0.219∗∗ 0.360
(0.222) (0.093) (0.299)
dESit ×D5it ×DMt 0.370∗ 0.254∗∗∗ -0.478
(0.207) (0.084) (0.991)
D2it 0.009
∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
D3it 0.005
∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
D4it 0.002 0.004
∗∗ 0.003∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
D5it -0.034
∗∗∗ -0.032∗∗∗ -0.033∗∗∗ -0.031∗∗∗ -0.018∗∗ -0.016∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.008) (0.008)
Const 0.032∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
adj. R2 0.011 0.015 0.017 0.010 0.014 0.017 0.003 0.004 0.005
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Table 3.4: Quarterly returns and earnings surprises: portfolio-level regressions
This table reports the coefficient, t-statistic, and adjusted R2 of contemporaneous relations between quar-
terly portfolio returns and earnings surprises, and with the interaction of firm-level and macroeconomic
uncertainty::
Rpt = α0+
5∑
j=2
αjD
j
pt+α6D
M
t +β1dESpt+
5∑
j=2
βjdESpt×Djpt+γ1dESpt×DMt +
5∑
j=2
γjdESpt×Djpt×DMt +pt,,
where dESpt is aggregate seasonally differenced earnings (dE) scaled by beginning-of-period market price
(S = P ), book value (S = B), or earnings (S = E) for portfolio p at time t. Rpt is the return for portfolio
p at time t. DMt is a dummy variable assigned with 1 if the macroeconomic uncertainty is above its mean,
and zero otherwise. The macroeconomic uncertainty is defined as the uncertainty part of the dispersion
of forecasts for next-period real GDP Growth. Djpt is the uncertainty part of analyst earnings forecast
dispersion measuring firm-specific uncertainty for uncertainty quintile j at time t. D5pt is the quintile with
highest uncertainty and so forth. The first quintile is embedded in the no-dummy variable. Earnings are
excluding extraordinary items. Earnings, book equity, share price, and shares outstanding data are from
Compustat. Analysts’ forecasts are from IBES. Individual forecasts for real GDP growth are from the
Survey of Professional Forecasters at the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. The firms are subject to
the following screening criteria: 1) data are available for earnings, price, common shares outstanding, book
equity this quarter and four quarters prior; 2) dates are aligned with calendar quarters; 3) price is larger
than $1; 4) at least two analysts’ forecasts for EPS; 5) not in the top and bottom 1 percentile of firms ranked
by dES. Standard errors are given in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and
10% level, respectively. Our sample includes all the firms on NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ from 1984 Q1
to 2013 Q4.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Sit = Pit Sit = Bit Sit = Eit
dESpt -0.002 -2.322
∗ 0.156 0.001 -0.711 -0.019 0.005 -3.523 1.035
(0.006) (1.300) (1.568) (0.003) (0.599) (0.639) (0.015) (2.601) (2.793)
dESpt ×D2pt 0.884 -0.093 0.233 -0.136 1.522 0.180
(1.217) (1.524) (0.688) (0.862) (2.615) (2.940)
dESpt ×D3pt 1.851 0.574 0.533 0.040 2.588 0.467
(1.420) (1.694) (0.606) (0.705) (2.714) (3.098)
dESpt ×D4pt 3.085∗∗ 0.858 1.128∗ 0.549 4.649 1.079
(1.480) (1.877) (0.685) (0.810) (3.013) (3.580)
dESpt ×D5pt 2.317∗ -0.160 0.710 0.017 3.520 -1.038
(1.301) (1.568) (0.599) (0.639) (2.601) (2.793)
DMt -0.020 -0.017 -0.018
(0.015) (0.014) (0.015)
dESpt ×DMt -4.556∗∗ -1.425 -9.553∗∗
(2.153) (1.031) (4.393)
dESpt ×D2pt ×DMt 1.604 0.917 3.834
(2.005) (1.216) (4.790)
dESpt ×D3pt ×DMt 2.069 0.956 5.055
(2.587) (1.152) (4.992)
dESpt ×D4pt ×DMt 3.768 1.124 6.781
(2.699) (1.232) (5.487)
dESpt ×D5pt ×DMt 4.558∗∗ 1.429 9.558∗∗
(2.154) (1.031) (4.398)
D2pt 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.009 0.008 0.010
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
D3pt 0.006 0.005 0.003 0.004 0.005 0.004
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009)
D4pt -0.002 -0.003 -0.006 -0.006 -0.003 -0.003
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011)
D5pt -0.021 -0.021 -0.023
∗ -0.022∗ -0.022∗ -0.021
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Const 0.021∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.008) (0.010) (0.007) (0.008) (0.010) (0.007) (0.008) (0.010)
adj. R2 -0.002 0.010 0.028 -0.002 0.007 0.016 -0.001 0.004 0.023
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Table 3.5: Quarterly returns and earnings surprises: market level regressions
This table reports the coefficient, t-statistic, and adjusted R2 of contemporaneous relations between quar-
terly returns and earnings surprises, and with the interaction of macroeconomic forecasts dispersion measure:
RMt = β0 + β1dESt + β2D
M
t + β3dESt ×DMt + t,
where dESt is aggregate seasonally differenced earnings (dE) scaled by beginning-of-period market price
(S = P ), book value (S = B), or earnings (S = E) at time t. RMt is the market return at time t. D
M
t is a
dummy variable assigned with 1 if the macroeconomic uncertainty is above its mean, and zero otherwise. The
macroeconomic uncertainty is defined as the uncertainty part of the dispersion of forecasts for next-period
real GDP Growth. Earnings are excluding extraordinary items. Earnings, book equity, share price, and
shares outstanding data are from Compustat. Analysts’ forecasts are from IBES. Individual forecasts for real
GDP growth are from the Survey of Professional Forecasters at the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
The firms are subject to the following screening criteria: 1) data are available for earnings, price, common
shares outstanding, book equity this quarter and four quarters prior; 2) dates are aligned with calendar
quarters; 3) price is larger than $1; 4) at least two analysts’ forecasts for EPS; 5) not in the top and bottom
1 percentile of firms ranked by dES. Standard errors are given in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Our sample includes all the firms on NYSE, AMEX,
and NASDAQ from 1984 Q1 to 2013 Q4.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Sit = Pit Sit = Bit Sit = Eit
dESit -0.001 0.005 -0.011 0.005 0.006 -0.004 0.013 0.023 -0.004
(0.043) (0.044) (0.022) (0.016) (0.016) (0.008) (0.069) (0.070) (0.035)
DMt -0.016 -0.014 -0.017 -0.013 -0.017 -0.014
(0.018) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.018) (0.016)
dESit ×DMt 0.050 0.024 0.093
(0.112) (0.027) (0.217)
Const 0.022∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.011) (0.011) (0.007) (0.010) (0.011) (0.007) (0.011) (0.011)
adj. R2 -0.009 -0.004 -0.010 -0.007 -0.002 -0.005 -0.008 -0.003 -0.009
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Table 3.6: Quarterly returns and earnings surprises: firm-level regressions with
alternative dummy
This table reports the coefficient, t-statistic, and adjusted R2 of contemporaneous relations between quar-
terly returns and earnings surprises, and with the interaction of firm-level and macroeconomic uncertainty:
Rit = α0+
5∑
j=2
αjD
j
it+α6D
M
t +β1dESit+
5∑
j=2
βjdESit×Djit+γ1dESit×DMt +
5∑
j=2
γjdESit×Djit×DMt +it,
where dESit is seasonally differenced earnings scaled by beginning-of-period market price (S = P ), book
value (S = B), or earnings (S = E) for firm i at time t. Rit is the return for firm i at time t. D
M
t is a dummy
variable assigned with 1 if the market-level ambiguity is historically in the top quintile, and zero otherwise.
The market-level ambiguity is defined as the uncertainty part of the dispersion of forecasts for next-period
real GDP Growth. Djit is the uncertainty part of analyst earnings forecast dispersion measuring firm-specific
uncertainty for uncertainty quintile j at time t. D5it is the quintile with highest uncertainty and so forth.
The first quintile is embedded in the no-dummy variable. Earnings are excluding extraordinary items.
Earnings, book equity, share price, and shares outstanding data are from Compustat. Analysts’ forecasts
are from IBES. Individual forecasts for real GDP growth are from the Survey of Professional Forecasters at
the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. The firms are subject to the following screening criteria: 1) data
are available for earnings, price, common shares outstanding, book equity this quarter and four quarters
prior; 2) dates are aligned with calendar quarters; 3) price is larger than $1; 4) at least two analysts’ forecasts
for EPS; 5) not in the top and bottom 1 percentile of firms ranked by dES. Standard errors are given in
parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Our sample
includes all the firms on NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ from 1984 Q1 to 2013 Q4.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Sit = Pit Sit = Bit Sit = Eit
dESit 0.841
∗∗∗ 0.455∗∗∗ 0.457∗∗∗ 0.367∗∗∗ 0.192∗∗∗ 0.246∗∗∗ 1.543∗∗∗ 0.742∗∗∗ 0.784∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.094) (0.107) (0.013) (0.036) (0.040) (0.153) (0.115) (0.130)
dESit ×D2it 0.236∗ 0.388∗∗∗ 0.072 0.054 0.242 0.267
(0.124) (0.148) (0.049) (0.058) (0.155) (0.180)
dESit ×D3it 0.309∗∗∗ 0.432∗∗∗ 0.085∗ 0.084 0.451∗∗∗ 0.478∗∗∗
(0.112) (0.131) (0.046) (0.053) (0.148) (0.170)
dESit ×D4it 0.361∗∗∗ 0.400∗∗∗ 0.128∗∗∗ 0.099∗ 0.460∗∗∗ 0.474∗∗∗
(0.111) (0.128) (0.047) (0.054) (0.152) (0.177)
dESit ×D5it 0.406∗∗∗ 0.483∗∗∗ 0.245∗∗∗ 0.231∗∗∗ 1.289∗∗∗ 1.587∗∗
(0.103) (0.118) (0.042) (0.049) (0.457) (0.629)
DMt -0.015
∗∗∗ -0.015∗∗∗ -0.019∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003)
dESit ×DMt -0.041 -0.228∗∗∗ -0.221
(0.218) (0.083) (0.269)
dESit ×D2it ×DMt -0.483∗ 0.092 -0.072
(0.270) (0.106) (0.339)
dESit ×D3it ×DMt -0.408 0.030 -0.072
(0.252) (0.103) (0.327)
dESit ×D4it ×DMt -0.118 0.141 0.005
(0.252) (0.104) (0.339)
dESit ×D5it ×DMt -0.248 0.091 -0.930
(0.237) (0.096) (0.673)
D2it 0.009
∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
D3it 0.005
∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
D4it 0.002 0.003 0.003
∗ 0.004∗∗ 0.004∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
D5it -0.034
∗∗∗ -0.033∗∗∗ -0.033∗∗∗ -0.033∗∗∗ -0.018∗∗ -0.017∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.008) (0.008)
Const 0.032∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
adj. R2 0.011 0.015 0.017 0.010 0.014 0.017 0.003 0.004 0.005
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Table 3.7: Quarterly returns and earnings surprises: portfolio-level regressions with
alternative dummy
This table reports the coefficient, t-statistic, and adjusted R2 of contemporaneous relations between quar-
terly portfolio returns and earnings surprises, and with the interaction of firm-level and macroeconomic
uncertainty::
Rpt = α0+
5∑
j=2
αjD
j
pt+α6D
M
t +β1dESpt+
5∑
j=2
βjdESpt×Djpt+γ1dESpt×DMt +
5∑
j=2
γjdESpt×Djpt×DMt +pt,,
where dESpt is aggregate seasonally differenced earnings (dE) scaled by beginning-of-period market price
(S = P ), book value (S = B), or earnings (S = E) for portfolio p at time t. Rpt is the return for portfolio
p at time t. DMt is a dummy variable assigned with 1 if the macroeconomic uncertainty is historically in
the top quintile, and zero otherwise. The macroeconomic uncertainty is defined as the uncertainty part
of the dispersion of forecasts for next-period real GDP Growth. Djpt is the uncertainty part of analyst
earnings forecast dispersion measuring firm-specific uncertainty for uncertainty quintile j at time t. D5pt is
the quintile with highest uncertainty and so forth. The first quintile is embedded in the no-dummy variable.
Earnings are excluding extraordinary items. Earnings, book equity, share price, and shares outstanding data
are from Compustat. Analysts’ forecasts are from IBES. Individual forecasts for real GDP growth are from
the Survey of Professional Forecasters at the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. The firms are subject
to the following screening criteria: 1) data are available for earnings, price, common shares outstanding,
book equity this quarter and four quarters prior; 2) dates are aligned with calendar quarters; 3) price is
larger than $1; 4) at least two analysts’ forecasts for EPS; 5) not in the top and bottom 1 percentile of firms
ranked by dES. Standard errors are given in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%,
5%, and 10% level, respectively. Our sample includes all the firms on NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ from
1984 Q1 to 2013 Q4.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Sit = Pit Sit = Bit Sit = Eit
dESpt -0.002 -2.322
∗ -0.890 0.001 -0.711 -0.111 0.005 -3.523 -0.695
(0.006) (1.300) (1.580) (0.003) (0.599) (0.668) (0.015) (2.601) (2.877)
dESpt ×D2pt 0.884 0.136 0.233 -0.002 1.522 0.240
(1.217) (1.407) (0.688) (0.719) (2.615) (2.694)
dESpt ×D3pt 1.851 1.363 0.533 0.156 2.588 1.605
(1.420) (1.808) (0.606) (0.728) (2.714) (3.199)
dESpt ×D4pt 3.085∗∗ 2.012 1.128 0.718 4.649 2.575
(1.480) (1.761) (0.685) (0.750) (3.013) (3.347)
dESpt ×D5pt 2.317∗ 0.881 0.710 0.107 3.520 0.685
(1.301) (1.580) (0.599) (0.668) (2.601) (2.877)
DMt -0.012 -0.010 -0.011
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
dESpt ×DMt -5.115∗∗ -2.996∗∗∗ -13.10∗∗∗
(2.159) (1.083) (4.612)
dESpt ×D2pt ×DMt 0.956 0.872 3.394
(2.100) (1.221) (5.234)
dESpt ×D3pt ×DMt 1.641 2.097∗ 7.774
(2.595) (1.205) (5.128)
dESpt ×D4pt ×DMt 1.576 1.437 7.163
(2.719) (1.260) (5.472)
dESpt ×D5pt ×DMt 5.153∗∗ 3.010∗∗∗ 13.190∗∗∗
(2.156) (1.082) (4.607)
D2pt 0.008 0.006 0.008 0.007 0.008 0.007
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
D3pt 0.006 0.004 0.003 0.002 0.005 0.002
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010)
D4pt -0.002 -0.005 -0.006 -0.009 -0.003 -0.007
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011)
D5pt -0.021 -0.023
∗ -0.023∗ -0.025∗ -0.022∗ -0.023∗
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Const 0.021∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009)
adj. R2 -0.002 0.010 0.028 -0.002 0.007 0.016 -0.001 0.004 0.023
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Table 3.8: Quarterly returns and earnings surprises: market level regressions with
alternative dummy
This table reports the coefficient, t-statistic, and adjusted R2 of contemporaneous relations between quar-
terly returns and earnings surprises, and with the interaction of firm-level and macroeconomic uncertainty:
Rit = α0+
5∑
j=2
αjD
j
it+α6D
M
t +β1dESit+
5∑
j=2
βjdESit×Djit+γ1dESit×DMt +
5∑
j=2
γjdESit×Djit×DMt +it,
where dESit is seasonally differenced earnings scaled by beginning-of-period market price (S = P ), book
value (S = B), or earnings (S = E) for firm i at time t. Rit is the return for firm i at time t. D
M
t is a dummy
variable assigned with 1 if the market-level ambiguity is historically in the top quintile, and zero otherwise.
The market-level ambiguity is defined as the uncertainty part of the dispersion of forecasts for next-period
real GDP Growth. Djit is the uncertainty part of analyst earnings forecast dispersion measuring firm-specific
uncertainty for uncertainty quintile j at time t. D5it is the quintile with highest uncertainty and so forth.
The first quintile is embedded in the no-dummy variable. Earnings are excluding extraordinary items.
Earnings, book equity, share price, and shares outstanding data are from Compustat. Analysts’ forecasts
are from IBES. Individual forecasts for real GDP growth are from the Survey of Professional Forecasters at
the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. The firms are subject to the following screening criteria: 1) data
are available for earnings, price, common shares outstanding, book equity this quarter and four quarters
prior; 2) dates are aligned with calendar quarters; 3) price is larger than $1; 4) at least two analysts’ forecasts
for EPS; 5) not in the top and bottom 1 percentile of firms ranked by dES. Standard errors are given in
parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Our sample
includes all the firms on NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ from 1984 Q1 to 2013 Q4.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Sit = Pit Sit = Bit Sit = Eit
dESit -0.001 -0.000 -0.029 0.005 0.005 -0.008 0.013 0.016 -0.020
(0.043) (0.041) (0.030) (0.016) (0.016) (0.012) (0.069) (0.066) (0.048)
DMt -0.012 -0.005 -0.011 -0.004 -0.011 -0.005
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
dESit ×DMt 0.168∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗ 0.261∗∗∗
(0.040) (0.013) (0.067)
Const 0.022∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007)
adj. R2 -0.009 -0.004 -0.010 -0.007 -0.002 -0.005 -0.008 -0.003 -0.009
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Table 3.9: Quarterly returns and earnings surprises: firm-level regressions with
Anderson, Ghysels, and Juergens (2009) uncertainty measure
This table reports the coefficient, t-statistic, and adjusted R2 of contemporaneous relations between quar-
terly returns and earnings surprises, and with the interaction of firm-level and macroeconomic uncertainty:
Rit = α0+
5∑
j=2
αjD
j
it+α6D
M
t +β1dESit+
5∑
j=2
βjdESit×Djit+γ1dESit×DMt +
5∑
j=2
γjdESit×Djit×DMt +it,
where dESit is seasonally differenced earnings scaled by beginning-of-period market price (S = P ), book
value (S = B), or earnings (S = E) for firm i at time t. Rit is the return for firm i at time t. D
M
t is a dummy
variable assigned with 1 if the market-level ambiguity is above its historic mean, and zero otherwise. The
market-level ambiguity is calculated following Anderson, Ghysels and Juergens (2009). Djit is the uncertainty
part of analyst earnings forecast dispersion measuring firm-specific uncertainty for uncertainty quintile j at
time t. D5it is the quintile with highest uncertainty and so forth. The first quintile is embedded in the
no-dummy variable. Earnings are excluding extraordinary items. Earnings, book equity, share price, and
shares outstanding data are from Compustat. Analysts’ forecasts are from IBES. Individual forecasts for real
GDP growth are from the Survey of Professional Forecasters at the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
The firms are subject to the following screening criteria: 1) data are available for earnings, price, common
shares outstanding, book equity this quarter and four quarters prior; 2) dates are aligned with calendar
quarters; 3) price is larger than $1; 4) at least two analysts’ forecasts for EPS; 5) not in the top and bottom
1 percentile of firms ranked by dES. Standard errors are given in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Our sample includes all the firms on NYSE, AMEX,
and NASDAQ from 1984 Q1 to 2013 Q4.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Sit = Pit Sit = Bit Sit = Eit
dESit 0.841
∗∗∗ 0.455∗∗∗ 0.642∗∗∗ 0.367∗∗∗ 0.192∗∗∗ 0.239∗∗∗ 1.543∗∗∗ 0.742∗∗∗ 0.912∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.094) (0.114) (0.013) (0.036) (0.041) (0.153) (0.115) (0.141)
dESit ×D2it 0.236∗ 0.198 0.072 0.029 0.242 0.233
(0.124) (0.151) (0.049) (0.056) (0.155) (0.184)
dESit ×D3it 0.309∗∗∗ 0.204 0.085∗ 0.081 0.451∗∗∗ 0.425∗∗
(0.112) (0.139) (0.046) (0.055) (0.148) (0.178)
dESit ×D4it 0.361∗∗∗ 0.387∗∗∗ 0.128∗∗∗ 0.150∗∗∗ 0.460∗∗∗ 0.574∗∗∗
(0.111) (0.136) (0.047) (0.055) (0.152) (0.175)
dESit ×D5it 0.406∗∗∗ 0.351∗∗∗ 0.245∗∗∗ 0.229∗∗∗ 1.289∗∗∗ 0.838∗∗∗
(0.103) (0.126) (0.042) (0.049) (0.457) (0.171)
DMt -0.022
∗∗∗ -0.022∗∗∗ -0.017∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.004)
dESit ×DMt -0.470∗∗ -0.137∗ -0.500∗∗
(0.196) (0.080) (0.244)
dESit ×D2it ×DMt 0.131 0.129 0.023
(0.255) (0.106) (0.325)
dESit ×D3it ×DMt 0.275 0.025 0.113
(0.232) (0.099) (0.304)
dESit ×D4it ×DMt 0.013 -0.018 -0.192
(0.229) (0.100) (0.322)
dESit ×D5it ×DMt 0.207 0.074 1.104
(0.214) (0.091) (0.941)
D2it 0.009
∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
D3it 0.005
∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
D4it 0.002 0.004
∗∗ 0.003∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
D5it -0.034
∗∗∗ -0.032∗∗∗ -0.033∗∗∗ -0.031∗∗∗ -0.018∗∗ -0.016∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.008) (0.007)
Const 0.032∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
adj. R2 0.011 0.015 0.017 0.010 0.014 0.017 0.003 0.004 0.005
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Table 3.10: Quarterly returns and earnings surprises: portfolio-level regressions with
Anderson, Ghysels, and Juergens (2009) uncertainty measure
This table reports the coefficient, t-statistic, and adjusted R2 of contemporaneous relations between quar-
terly portfolio returns and earnings surprises, and with the interaction of firm-level and macroeconomic
uncertainty::
Rpt = α0+
5∑
j=2
αjD
j
pt+α6D
M
t +β1dESpt+
5∑
j=2
βjdESpt×Djpt+γ1dESpt×DMt +
5∑
j=2
γjdESpt×Djpt×DMt +pt,,
where dESpt is aggregate seasonally differenced earnings (dE) scaled by beginning-of-period market price
(S = P ), book value (S = B), or earnings (S = E) for portfolio p at time t. Rpt is the return for
portfolio p at time t. DMt is a dummy variable assigned with 1 if the macroeconomic uncertainty is above
its mean, and zero otherwise. The macroeconomic uncertainty is calculated following Anderson, Ghysels
and Juergens (2009). Djpt is the uncertainty part of analyst earnings forecast dispersion measuring firm-
specific uncertainty for uncertainty quintile j at time t. D5pt is the quintile with highest uncertainty and so
forth. The first quintile is embedded in the no-dummy variable. Earnings are excluding extraordinary items.
Earnings, book equity, share price, and shares outstanding data are from Compustat. Analysts’ forecasts are
from IBES. Individual forecasts for real GDP growth are from the Survey of Professional Forecasters at the
Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. The firms are subject to the following screening criteria: 1) data are
available for earnings, price, common shares outstanding, book equity this quarter and four quarters prior;
2) dates are aligned with calendar quarters; 3) price is larger than $1; 4) at least two analysts’ forecasts
for EPS; 5) not in the top and bottom 1 percentile of firms ranked by dES. Standard errors are given in
parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Our sample
includes all the firms on NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ from 1984 Q1 to 2013 Q4.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Sit = Pit Sit = Bit Sit = Eit
dESpt -0.002 -2.322
∗ -0.354 0.001 -0.711 -0.273 0.005 -3.523 -0.428
(0.006) (1.300) (1.764) (0.003) (0.599) (0.718) (0.015) (2.601) (3.212)
dESpt ×D2pt 0.884 0.085 0.233 0.155 1.522 0.552
(1.217) (1.779) (0.688) (0.811) (2.615) (3.230)
dESpt ×D3pt 1.851 1.063 0.533 0.607 2.588 1.406
(1.420) (1.879) (0.606) (0.783) (2.714) (3.425)
dESpt ×D4pt 3.085∗∗ 1.599 1.128 0.950 4.649 3.336
(1.480) (1.969) (0.685) (0.830) (3.013) (3.738)
dESpt ×D5pt 2.317∗ 0.356 0.710 0.275 3.520 0.434
(1.301) (1.764) (0.599) (0.718) (2.601) (3.212)
DMt -0.027
∗ -0.025 -0.024
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
dESpt ×DMt -3.640 -0.872 -5.858
(2.292) (1.056) (4.638)
dESpt ×D2pt ×DMt 1.038 -0.484 -0.059
(2.101) (1.105) (4.304)
dESpt ×D3pt ×DMt 0.631 -0.091 0.567
(2.801) (1.130) (5.351)
dESpt ×D4pt ×DMt 2.384 0.287 1.777
(2.894) (1.305) (5.783)
dESpt ×D5pt ×DMt 3.628 0.867 5.841
(2.292) (1.056) (4.639)
D2pt 0.008 0.006 0.008 0.005 0.008 0.005
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
D3pt 0.006 0.004 0.003 -0.000 0.005 0.003
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009)
D4pt -0.002 -0.002 -0.006 -0.006 -0.003 -0.004
(0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011)
D5pt -0.021 -0.021 -0.023
∗ -0.023∗ -0.022∗ -0.022∗
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Const 0.021∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
adj. R2 -0.002 0.010 0.028 -0.002 0.007 0.016 -0.001 0.004 0.023
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Table 3.11: Quarterly returns and earnings surprises: market level regressions with
Anderson, Ghysels, and Juergens (2009) uncertainty measure
This table reports the coefficient, t-statistic, and adjusted R2 of contemporaneous relations between quar-
terly returns and earnings surprises, and with the interaction of firm-level and macroeconomic uncertainty:
Rit = α0+
5∑
j=2
αjD
j
it+α6D
M
t +β1dESit+
5∑
j=2
βjdESit×Djit+γ1dESit×DMt +
5∑
j=2
γjdESit×Djit×DMt +it,
where dESit is seasonally differenced earnings scaled by beginning-of-period market price (S = P ), book
value (S = B), or earnings (S = E) for firm i at time t. Rit is the return for firm i at time t. D
M
t is a dummy
variable assigned with 1 if the market-level ambiguity is above its historic mean, and zero otherwise. The
market-level ambiguity is calculated following Anderson, Ghysels and Juergens (2009). Djit is the uncertainty
part of analyst earnings forecast dispersion measuring firm-specific uncertainty for uncertainty quintile j at
time t. D5it is the quintile with highest uncertainty and so forth. The first quintile is embedded in the
no-dummy variable. Earnings are excluding extraordinary items. Earnings, book equity, share price, and
shares outstanding data are from Compustat. Analysts’ forecasts are from IBES. Individual forecasts for real
GDP growth are from the Survey of Professional Forecasters at the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
The firms are subject to the following screening criteria: 1) data are available for earnings, price, common
shares outstanding, book equity this quarter and four quarters prior; 2) dates are aligned with calendar
quarters; 3) price is larger than $1; 4) at least two analysts’ forecasts for EPS; 5) not in the top and bottom
1 percentile of firms ranked by dES. Standard errors are given in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Our sample includes all the firms on NYSE, AMEX,
and NASDAQ from 1984 Q1 to 2013 Q4.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Sit = Pit Sit = Bit Sit = Eit
dESit -0.001 -0.003 0.027 0.005 0.004 0.011 0.013 0.007 0.049
(0.043) (0.044) (0.021) (0.016) (0.016) (0.008) (0.069) (0.069) (0.038)
DMt -0.022 -0.025 -0.022 -0.024 -0.023 -0.025
(0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017)
dESit ×DMt -0.052 -0.013 -0.069
(0.073) (0.025) (0.105)
Const 0.022∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
adj. R2 -0.009 -0.004 -0.010 -0.007 -0.002 -0.005 -0.008 -0.003 -0.009
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Chapter 4
Asymmetric Asset Price
Reaction to Earnings News: the
Roles of Ambiguity and
Difference of Opinion
4.1 Introduction
Market reacts to news in an asymmetric fashion. That is, bad news has a greater im-
pact than good news. The average negative return to negative news is significantly
larger in magnitude than the average positive return to positive news (Conrad, Cor-
nell, and Landsman, 2002; Skinner and Sloan, 2002; Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold,
and Vega, 2003). There are two possible explanations: 1) there is larger amount
of negative news on the market; 2) investors react more strongly to bad news per
se. The former refers to the practice that firms selectively release news to their
own advantages. For example, Aboody and Kasznik (2000) show that managers
accelerate bad news and/or withhold good news in the period immediately preced-
ing option grant dates to lower the exercise price o the options. The latter states
that the information content per unit of news is greater for bad news. Much of
the literature focuses on the latter. Earlier studies, for instance Daniel, Hirshleifer,
and Subrahmanyam (1998) and Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998), interpret the
evidence on the asymmetry in the context of value/glamor effect as a result of in-
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vestors’ psychological behaviour. Specifically, investors expect stocks to continue
on the positive trends following a string of shocks. When good news is announced,
the market response is relatively small since the positive shock is anticipated. Bad
news, however, generates a much larger contemporaneous return since the negative
shock is more of a surprise. This chapter contributes to this strand of literature and
provide explanation by examining the characteristics of investors’ decision making
under uncertainty.
Recent theories, such as Epstein and Schneider (2008) and Kelsey, Kozhan,
and Pang (2011), argues that asymmetric reaction to bad versus good news can
arise due to the presence of Knightian uncertainty. Investors who are ambiguity
averse choose the worst case scenario and consequently overvalue negative news and
undervalue positive news (see Chapter 3 for the definition of ambiguity).
Studies in decision theory indicate that difference of opinion - another im-
portant characteristic of decision making under uncertainty - might also contribute
to the asymmetry (Gajdos and Vergnaud, 2009; Cres, Gilboa, and Vieille, 2011).
Specifically, Cres, Gilboa, and Vieille (2011) consider a setting where experts are
asked to provide their advice in a situation of Knightian uncertainty. The deci-
sion maker exhibits expert uncertainty aversion (EUA) when aggregating divergent
opinions from the ambiguity-averse experts. They axiomatize that in face of differ-
ent opinions the decision maker selects the minimal weighted valuation of experts
valuations, which leads to consequential overvaluation of negative opinions and un-
dervaluation of positive views in a similar vein to the case of ambiguity-aversion.
This chapter contributes to both strands of literature by showing that rational-
ized investors’ behavior when facing ambiguity and difference of opinion generates
asymmetric market response to bad versus good news even after controlling for the
differential amounts (if any) of good and bad news leaked prior to announcement
and the news magnitude.
The differential amounts of ambiguity and difference of opinions for any spe-
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cific case could render their combined effect unclear. Together with risk, ambiguity
and difference of opinion are considered as the sources of uncertainty (Baillon, Ca-
bantous, and Wakker, 2012). Here, uncertainty is in the broadest sense and refers
to any variation that causes forecast errors. In a mode based on experts’ forecasts,
Barron, Kim, Lim, and Stevens (1998) show that overall uncertainty is a linear com-
bination of common uncertainty (for this matter ambiguity) shared by all experts
attributable to their reliance on imprecise common information and idiosyncratic
uncertainty (for this mater difference of opinion) that is due to information asym-
metry among experts. For certain level of uncertainty, more fraction of ambiguity
means less degree of divergence in experts’ opinions. It is a matter of relative domi-
nance between the two to form a combined effect on market reactions to bad versus
good news.
This chapter aims to model and test the combined effect of ambiguity and
difference of opinion on market asymmetric reactions to bad versus good earnings
news and propose justified measures for either. This asymmetry is possibly due to
either larger amount of negative news on the market or that investors react more
strongly to bad news per se (or both). I hypothesize that it is solely the combining
effect of ambiguity and difference of opinion on investors’ reactions that leads to
all the asymmetry. To test, I focus on the association-study framework adopted by
Kothari, Lewellen, and Warner (2006) where the contemporaneous earnings-return
relation is investigated on a quarterly basis before the earnings announcements,
which are typically a couple of months after each fiscal quarter that the earnings
cover1. This methodology is based on the reality of information leakage (Brunner-
meier, 2005) and enables me to control for potentially differential amounts of news
1Most studies use event-study framework which typically focus on limited period around the
actual announcement dates. I do not adopt this framework due to 1) no apparent proxies for
measuring differential amounts of good versus bad earnings news 2) that the announcement data in
IBES is often effectively the date on which the information was recorded by IBES and, therefore,
systematically delayed. Hoechle, Schaub, and Schmid (2013) show that the announcement day
effect is underestimated in IBES while pre-announcement returns are overestimated as they often
include the effective announcement day.
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being leaked before the public announcements.
Uncertainty can be divided into common uncertainty and idiosyncratic uncer-
tainty among experts as shown in Barron, Kim, Lim, and Stevens (1998). Common
uncertainty is the average covariance between the belief of one analyst and the beliefs
of the rest of the experts, while idiosyncratic uncertainty is the expected dispersion
of experts’ beliefs. They further show that the ratio of expected dispersion of ex-
perts’ beliefs to overall uncertainty captures the effect of two sources of information
asymmetry on experts’ beliefs - namely, the relative presence of private information
and differential uncertainty, denoted as 1 − ρ. The ratio of the average pair-wise
covariance among experts’ beliefs to overall uncertainty reflects the imprecision of
common information shared by experts, denoted as ρ. In this chapter, I employ
ρ as a measure for ambiguity and 1 − ρ as a measure for difference of opinion.
The new measures present an advantageous channel to investigate the combined
effect of ambiguity and difference of opinion due to their perfectly negative correla-
tion. The decomposition recognizes the well-established theoretical proposition that
uncertainty consists of idiosyncratic and common components (Doukas, Kim, and
Pantzalis, 2006; Sheng and Thevenot, 2012).
With all the US firms which has more than two analyst’ earnings forecasts,
I start by showing that the stylized fact holds even well before the actual news
announcements due to information leakage. The average negative return to negative
earnings news is around −4.9% over 20 years period, significantly higher than the
3.1% return for positive earnings news at 1% level. When I divide the stock universe
into quintiles according to ρ in ascending order, the return difference for bad versus
good earnings news exhibit a ”yes” tick shape for the five groups. This shows that
whatever the cause of the asymmetry is, its impact has not been linearly reflected
on the market and conforms the motivation to investigate the combined effect of
ambiguity and difference of opinion.
To illustrate the combined effect, I include the size of news and its interaction
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with a directional dummy variable. I find that the differential return between bad
versus good news, −1.8%, completely disappeared. The positivity and high signifi-
cance of the interaction term imply that investors are more surprised by bad earnings
news. When applying to the quintiles, the coefficients of the interaction term exhibit
a ”yes” tick shape matching that of the average returns difference, indicating that
this stronger surprise from bad news could be explained by the combining effect
of ambiguity and difference of opinion. To ensure that the asymmetry is not due
to the differential amounts of news leakage, I further control for proxies for man-
agers’ incentives to release bad news such as Regulation Fair Disclosure (thereafter
RegFD) (Dong, Li, Ramesh, and Shen, 2011), litigation risk modelled by Rogers
and Stocken (2005), information asymmetry following Kothari, Shu, and Wysocki
(2009), and financial distress measured by Zmijewski (1984)’s Z-score. Those proxies
explain away the rest of the negative returns by negative earnings news. Neverthe-
less, the ”yes” tick shape remains for the stronger reactions to negative earnings
news.
Overall, the results suggest that the higher average negative return to neg-
ative news versus that to positive news is solely determined by the larger informa-
tional content of negative news per se. These results have important implications
for understanding the roles of managers and investors in market reaction to financial
news. Starting with the former, even if Kothari, Shu, and Wysocki (2009) results
can be interpreted as causal, they do not suggest that managers should expect their
”tactic” of selective release of news matters for the market overall. Moving to the
latter, it suggests that investors’ assessments of news under uncertainty determine
the market reaction to financial news.
To validate the findings, I build a simple model to capture the dynamics of
earnings-return relation based on one representative agent (i.e. the decision maker),
multiple firms, and multiple experts. Ambiguity-averse experts are asked by the
decision maker to provide advice on the informativeness of each firm’s earnings
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signal and use the same utility function as the decision marker. Due to lack of
information and/or poor quality of information, the ambiguity-averse experts lack
confidence on the distribution of true part of a signal and hence consider a range of
possible priors for the true signal, so does the decision marker. With the presence of
private information, the center of the range of possible priors varies among experts
resulting in their differential assessments of the signals even if the level of ambiguity
is the same. Working independently, the decision maker and the experts maximize
the minimal expected utility with respect to their own sets of priors. They act as
if a positive signal is unreliable and a negative signal is reliable. Consequently, the
price change of each firm triggered by a positive signal is less in magnitude than
the price change triggered by a negative signal. The decision marker is averse to
the uncertainty about the expert who ”has access to truth”, hence exhibits expert
uncertainty aversion in her aggregation of experts’ opinions. She chooses a weighting
function among a set of weight vectors over the experts’ priors such that it maximizes
the minimal combination of experts minimal expected utility with their own sets of
priors, or in a ”maxminmin” way.
I firstly derive the return-earnings relation where the distribution of the sig-
nals is exactly known and there is consensus among all experts. Upon receiving a
set of noise signals, experts form conditional expectations of the signals’ informa-
tiveness about stock returns’ cash flow news and discount rate news components
(Campbell, 1991). By assuming zero-mean normal distributions for all the vari-
ables, I am able to obtain a beta coefficient showing the return-earnings relation as
a function of the noisy signals’ distribution parameters. To incorporate ambiguity,
I then assume that experts do not observe the distribution of the true earnings (i.e.
the variances) and hence assign interval ranges for the distribution. Facing ambigu-
ity, experts minimize the expected market return generating an array of variances
selected within the range. Using Bayesian updating with the chosen variances, I am
able to obtain a new beta as a function of the chosen variances. Finally, I consider
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the difference of opinion by deviating the center of the distribution ranges across
experts. After the experts minimize the expected market return with their own set
of priors, the decision maker obtains an aggregated beta by allocating weights to
the experts’ betas such that 1) the decision maker’s set of priors is precisely the
weighted average of experts’; 2) the decision maker chooses the minimal weighted
valuation of experts’ betas over all possible weights.
Monte Carlo simulation for the model shows that ambiguity and difference
of opinion have contrasted effects on investors’ reactions on earnings surprises mea-
sured by earnings response coefficient (or beta in the model). For positive surprises,
both ambiguity and difference of opinion reduce the beta. For negative news, am-
biguity amplify investors’ reaction while difference of opinion has a muted effect.
Without differentiating the nature of news, high ambiguity leads to more positive
beta consistent with Chapter 3, whereas high difference of opinion leads to less pos-
itive beta. By equating high ambiguity to low difference of opinion, I combine both
effects and produce the differential reaction to negative versus positive news of a
”yes” tick shape that matches the empirical finding.
The striking pattern for the effect of difference of opinion on good versus bad
news can be explained, mathematically speaking, by the functional form of experts’
betas to experts’ priors. For positive news, the betas are a concave function of
experts’ priors. The minimum aggregate valuation is to assign most weights to
experts with extreme priors. Hence the more dispersed experts’ priors are, the
lower is the aggregated beta for positive news. On the contrary for negative news,
the betas are a convex function of the experts’ priors due to the switching sign of
the news. The minimal valuation allocates most weights to experts with priors of
”centrality”. As a result, the dispersion of priors does not matter significantly for
the overall market reaction.
This chapter is related to several strands of literature. Firstly, the asym-
metry in responses to negative versus positive information is well documented in
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various areas. Skinner (1994) studies the stock market reaction to corporate earn-
ings news. Defond and Zhang (2014) examine the bond market reaction to earning
news. Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold, and Vega (2003) investigate the foreign ex-
change market reaction to macroeconomic news. And Soroka (2006) and Barbara
and Lanoue (1991) look into attitudes toward economic news and voting behaviour
in politics. Secondly, the process behind the asymmetric responsiveness has been
explored in both psychology and behavioural economics literature. In psychology,
Ronis and Lipinski (1985) propose a possible explanation named perspective theory
under which impressions are formed based on an expectation, or reference point.
The reference point tends to be slightly positive on average due to generally mildly
optimistic individuals, and this leads to a shift in perspective. Fiske (1980) suggests
that cognitive weighting creates the asymmetry. Individuals give more attention to
extreme information, which tends to be negative. Both perspective and cognitive
weighting theories suggest that individuals have an average expectation of a rea-
sonable state of economy, which leads to very negative reaction to mildly negative
information. In behavioural economics, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) propose an
alternative theory of choice under uncertainty called prospect theory. Under this
theory, the value function is assigned to the gains and losses rather than to the final
wealth, and its shape is normally concave for gains and convex for losses and the
slope is generally larger for losses than for gains. The probabilities of the gains and
losses are replaced by the decision weights. Except in the range of low probabili-
ties, the decision weights are generally beneath the corresponding probabilities. As
a result of the particular designs of the value and weighting functions, individuals
react asymmetrically stronger to the negative information than to the good ones, as
if they are loss-averse.
Prospect theory takes a different conceptual approach to explain the asym-
metry. It is specific to consumption and focuses on the process of reacting differently
to positive and negative perceptions. The value function and decision weights are
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pre-determined by human nature in order to exert more weights on the negative
information. In contrast, the ambiguity approach, notably popularized by Epstein
and Schneider (2008) and adopted by this chapter, is specific to ambiguity or am-
biguous information environment. It focuses on a well-defined investors’ behavioural
trait called ambiguity aversion (Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1989). The asymmetry is
a result of ambiguity-averse investors choosing the worst-case scenario when facing
ambiguous information, which is different from the prospect theory cognitive pro-
cess on perspective or attitude. In each narrative though, reactions to bad news are
greater than reactions to good ones.
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.2 describes the sample. In
particular, I show the constructions of the three earnings surprises, the new proxies
for ambiguity and difference of opinion, and the variables for measuring managers’
incentives to selectively release news. In Section 4.3, I firstly present the empirical
finding of the ”yes” tick shape of differential average returns to bad versus good news.
Then, I move on to test the validity of the measures for ambiguity and difference
of opinion by running pooled panel firm-level regression of quarterly returns on
earnings surprises with dummy variables. Section 4.4 develops and calibrates a
model based on return-earnings relation and presents its predictions. Section 4.5
summarizes and concludes.
4.2 Data and variable definition
The sample includes all the firms on NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ from Q1 1984 to
Q4 2013. The starting date for the study is determined by the availability of data
in the IBES Summary History dataset. Firms are subject to the following screen-
ing criteria: 1) data are available for earnings, price, common shares outstanding,
book equity this quarter and the quarters prior; 2) dates are aligned with calendar
quarters; 3) price is larger than $1; 4) there are at least two experts’ forecasts for
EPS; 5) not in the top and bottom 0.5 percentile of firms ranked by dE/P, dE/B,
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or dE/E for each case.2
Similar to Chapter 3, I define earnings surprises as seasonally differenced
quarterly earnings scaled by lagged market price (P), book equity (B), and earnings
(E), using per share numbers. Scaling by lagged variables eliminates or substan-
tially reduces the cross-sectional and temporal dispersion of earnings differences.
I use earnings per share (basic) - excluding extraordinary items (Compustat item
EPSPXQ).
Stock returns are calculated using adjusted prices (Compustat items PRCCQ
/ AJEXQ). Market values are the multiplication of market closing price and com-
mon shares outstanding (Compustat item CSHOQ). Historical data are adjusted
accordingly to ensure comparisons on the same basis. All accounting data are from
Compustat quarterly files.
4.2.1 Proxies for ambiguity and difference of opinion
Analysts’ earnings forecasts data are from the Institutional Brokers Estimate System
(IBES) U.S. Summary History dataset via WRDS. In this module of IBES the
forecasts of the individual analysts are summarized to create ”snapshots”. The
data is available on a monthly basis; the snapshots are made the Thursday before
the third Friday of the month. I prefer the summary statistics with IBES statistical
period within and close to the end of each fiscal quarter with the aim to balance the
accuracy of forecasts as well as to ensure that they capture the uncertainty within
the fiscal quarter when investors make decisions. I also use individual forecasts
from the IBES U.S. Detail History dataset to mitigate the problematic rounding
procedure and the results are similar.
The ambiguity measure employed here is the same as in the previous chapter.
For the sake of completeness, I reiterate the definition here. Define V as the overall
uncertainty level averaged over N analysts’ individual uncertainty, C as the pair-
2Following Brown, Fazzari, and Petersen (2009) I also tried trimming 0.25% and 1% for each
tail, the results are similar.
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wise covariance among analysts’ beliefs, and D as expected dispersion of analysts’
forecast. Barron, Kim, Lim, and Stevens (1998) show that
V = C +D
which can be interpreted as the overall uncertainty of analysts’ information envi-
ronment V is the sum of common uncertainty C attributable to imprecise common
information and dispersion D reflecting idiosyncratic uncertainty among analysts.
They further show that a consensus measure defined as
ρ =
C
V
captures the extent of how much analysts’ beliefs reflect common versus private
information. In other words, ρ measures the ratio of common uncertainty to the
overall uncertainty.
When analysts’ private information is of equal precision, the consensus mea-
sure can be computed in the following way
ρ =
h
h+ s
where h is the precision of common information and s is the precision of idiosyncratic
information. Both precisions are calculated as
h =
(SE − DN )
(SE − DN +D)2
and
s =
D
(SE − DN +D)2
where SE is the mean squared error (MSE) of the earnings forecasts deflated by the
absolute value of the actual EPS (ACTUAL), D is the variance (STDEV squared)
of forecasts deflated by the absolute value of the actual EPS, and N is the number
of forecasts (NUMEST).
I argue in this chapter that ρ as a better measure of ambiguity than the
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widely used D and 1 − ρ = DV as a valid measure of difference of opinion. Barron,
Kim, Lim, and Stevens (1998) show in Appendix B that 1− ρ captures two sources
of information asymmetry on experts’ belief: the relative presence of private infor-
mation and differential uncertainty due to differential quality of private information,
and ρ captures the sources of forecasting uncertainty that is due to poor quality of
non-private information, or ambiguity.
4.2.2 Proxies for firms’ incentives to leak negative news
In this section I discuss the empirical proxies of the factors that are predicted to
influence firm’s disclosure choices for bad news.
Effective on October 23, 2000, the Securities and Exchange Commission in
the US passed Regulation Fair Disclosure that prohibits selective disclosure of mate-
rial information to experts and other investment professionals. Under the regulation,
any intentional disclosure of material non-public information by firms to experts or
other parties must be simultaneously released to the general public. RegFD reduces
the amount of asymmetric information in the securities markets by forcing firms
to either disclose information to everyone or disclose no information (Eleswarapu,
Thompson, and Venkataraman, 2004). RegFD delays price discovery to quarterly
earnings release by stifling information leakage (Dong, Li, Ramesh, and Shen, 2011).
I argue that passage of RegFD reduces managers’ incentives to leak bad news well
before the mandatory quarterly earnings announcements.
The litigation reduction hypothesis proposed by Skinner (1994) states that
firms reveal bad news to lower the likelihood of litigation. Donlson, McInnis, Mer-
genthaler, and Yu (2012) study bad earnings news and conclude that litigation
risk measured by predicted litigation probability is negatively associated with the
amount of bad news leaked. I argue that firms with low litigation risk benefit from
revealing more bad mandatory earnings news and are thereby more likely to continue
the practice. Despite firms with high litigation risk might have incentive to withhold
114
bad news in relation to discretionary announcements, they may release more bad
earnings news in the run-up to disappointing mandatory earnings announcements.
The measure of litigation risk is calculated using the coefficient estimates obtained
from Rogers and Stocken (2005). The explanatory variables used in their model are
primarily stock return-based variables such as market value, stock turnover, beta,
and volatility (see Rogers and Stocken, 2005 appendix B for more details). Same
as Kothari, Shu, and Wysocki (2009), I only include the independent variables that
are significant into the prediction. All the variables are computed at the end of the
last fiscal quarter.
Information asymmetry between management and investors affects news dis-
closure. In the traditional setting, high information asymmetry tends to provide
incentives for managers to disclose all types of news to avoid market penalties from
investors. Thus, higher information asymmetry corresponds to larger amount of bad
news released. Following Kothari, Shu, and Wysocki (2009), I construct a factor
that potentially measure information asymmetry based on five variables, namely
market-to-book ratio, stock volatility, leverage ratio, membership in high-tech in-
dustries, and regulatory status. The market-to-book ratio is computed by dividing
the market value of equity by the book value of equity. Stock volatility is calcu-
lated as the standard deviation of daily stock returns within a quarter. Leverage is
measured as long-term debt scaled by total assets. High-tech firms are firms with
the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes 2833-2836, 3570-3577, 3600-3674,
7371-7379, and 8731-8734. Regulated industries excluding the financial institutions
are considered with SIC codes 4812-4813, 4833, 4841, 4891-4899, 4922-4924, 4931,
and 4941. The factor analysis is conducted to extract an underlying information
asymmetry factor. I define firms with above-median asymmetry factor score as high
information asymmetry firms and vice versa for low information asymmetry firms.
All the ratios are measured at the end of the previous fiscal quarter.
Finally, managers’ reputation may affect the news release. Managers face an
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asymmetric loss function in choosing their voluntary disclosure policies. That is,
managers behave as if they bear large costs when investors are surprised by large
negative earnings news, but not when other types of news are announced (Skinner,
1994). Both litigation risk and reputation costs possibly create this asymmetric
loss function. The costs borne by managers as a result of large negative earnings
surprises further increase when firms are in distress (Gilson, 1989). I argue that the
career concern incentivizes managers to release more bad news. To capture these
incentives, I classify a firm quarter as being financially distressed if the Zmijewski
(1984) Z-score financial distress rank is in the top decile of all firms in that quarter.
Our predications are the opposite of those of Kothari, Shu, and Wysocki
(2009). The reasons are mainly twofold. Firstly, this chapter investigates the stock
market reaction to mandatory quarterly earnings announcement while Kothari, Shu,
and Wysocki (2009) look at stock price behaviour surrounding discretionary corpo-
ration information including dividend change and voluntary management earnings
forecasts. Secondly, the association study framework is adopted to examine the
stock return-news relation. With this framework, the return calculation windows
are the fiscal quarters for which the mandatory earnings announcements cover, and
the public announcements are typically two to three months after the fiscal quar-
ter. This framework works based on the assumption that earnings news is leaked
well before the actual announcements. Due to these two characteristics, the overall
prediction is that firms may release more bad news in the run-up to disappointment
mandatory earnings announcements even if they have a general incentive to with-
hold bad news in relation to discretionary announcements. The release increases
with lower litigation risk and high information asymmetry, and decreases after the
passage of RegFD.
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4.2.3 Summary statistics
Table 4.1 Panel A reports summary statistics for some of the important variables.
There are 9345 firms in the final sample. The average log return across firms is
around 0.3% per quarter, with a standard deviation 25.6%. The earnings surprise
measure, dEP , has a mean 0.2% and a standard deviation 0.045. the measure for
difference of opinion, DoO, has a average of 0.450 and a standard deviation of 0.467.
Ambiguity which is equal to 1−DoO has a average of 0.550 and the same precision.
From IBES, the number of experts (NUMEST ) following each firm ranges from 2 to
50 with an average around 7. This range is used as a measure of difference of opinion
in the model. The rational is that more experts coverage leads to lower standard
deviation of forecasts. The correlations between those variables are presented in the
Panel B of Table 4.1.
4.3 Empirical analysis
In this section, I firstly show the role of ambiguity and difference of opinion in
explaining the differential reactions to good versus bad news. Then, using quintile
analysis I present a more vigorous explanation on the combining effect of ambiguity
and difference of opinion on earnings news responses.
4.3.1 Asymmetric reactions to bad versus good news
I start by investigating whether there is asymmetry even well before the news being
publicly released.
Asymmetric average returns generated by good versus bad news
Following Kothari, Shu, and Wysocki (2009), I run the following baseline regression:
Rit = α0 + β0Negit + it, (4.1)
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where Rit is the quarterly excess return over Fama and French (1993) market, size,
book-to-market factors and Carhart (2001) momentum factor, or the residuals of
running a Carhart four-factor model in quarter t for firm i. Negit is a dummy
variable for firm i in quarter t that equals one for negative earnings surprises, and
zero otherwise. I also conduct the F-test to examine whether stock market reactions
to negative versus good earnings surprises are the same. Specifically, we test if
2*|α0|=|β0|. Since the magnitude for stock returns to negative earnings surprises
is |α + β| with the β being negative, so testing 2*|α0|=|β0| is equivalent to test
|α+ β|=|α|.
Table 4.2 presents the results. For dE/P , positive earnings surprises generate
average stock return of +3.1% around the fiscal quarter the earnings cover. Negative
surprises capture average return of −4.2% (= 0.031 − 0.073). The F-test confirms
that the market’s reaction to earnings decreases is significantly at 1% level larger
in magnitude than the reaction to earnings increases, with a difference of −1.1%.
When I divide the firms into quintiles according to ascending ρ, the higher average
returns for negative news remain for each of the quintile. The estimates of the
model are presented in panel A columns 3-7. A1/D5 means the lowest quintile for
ambiguity also the fifth quintile for DoO, and so forth. Then, I plot the difference
between the average negative returns by negative news and average positive returns
by positive news. Figure 4.1 shows that the differential returns exhibit a ”yes” tick
shape with respect to ρ, with the lowest point in either second or third quintile. The
results are the same for all three earnings surprises measures.
The market reaction to earnings decreases might be more pronounced be-
cause (1) the amount of total news revealed is greater for bad news disclosures
and/or (2) the information content per unit of news is greater because investors are
more surprised by the bad news disclosures. I firstly examine the former that how
information amount contributes to the asymmetric reaction to bad and good news.
I use the measures for managers’ incentives to release bad news. First, Reg FD
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arguably has limited the ability of managers to informally leak news either good or
bad to experts and institutional investors prior to the announcements of quarterly
earnings. This implies that firms before the passage of Reg FD are more incentivized
to release (bad) news. Second, to mitigate litigation risk, firms are more likely to
disclose bad news before it becomes public. Third, firms with high information
asymmetry tend to release earlier all kinds of news to avoid market penalties from
investors. Fourth, reputation risks limit the ability of managers to withhold bad
news particularly when the firms are in financial distress. I examine the effects of
those factors using the following regression:
Rit = α0 + β0Negit + β1RegFDit + β2RegFDit ∗Negit + β3LitRiskit (4.2)
+ β4LitRiskit ∗Negit + β5InfoAsymmit + β6InfoAsymmit ∗Negit
+ β7FinDistressit + β7FinDistressit ∗Negit + it,
where RegFD is a dummy variable equal to one if the announcement occurs before
the passage of Regulation FD in October 2000, and zero otherwise. LitRisk is a
dummy variable that equals one if the firm has less than median litigation risk cal-
culated using Rogers and Stocken (2005) predictive regression, and zero otherwise.
InfoAsymm is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm is above the median
value of a single information asymmetry factor, and zero otherwise. The informa-
tion asymmetry factor is derived from a factor analysis based on the information
asymmetry proxies: market-to-book ratio, stock volatility, high-tech firms, financial
leverage, and regulatory status. FinDistress is a dummy variable that equals one
if the firm’s Z-score (Zmijewski, 1984) financial distress rank is in the top decile of
all firms in a given year, and zero otherwise. I present the F-tests of whether the
estimated intercept coefficient is equal in magnitude to coefficient for the dummy
variable Neg. Note that this is different from the F-test for equation 4.1, which
is to examine the asymmetric reaction (in magnitude) to good versus bad earnings
surprises. Here, I test whether the identified asymmetry could be explained entirely
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by the information amount of news proxied by the managerial incentives to release
or withheld bad news. If the explanation is in full, then |α0 + β0| should be statis-
tically indifferent from zero, in other words |α0| should be statistically indifferent
from |β0|. Thus, I test |α0|=|β0|.
Panel A Column 2 of table 4.3 reports the estimates of regression model
(4.3) for earnings surprise measure dE/P . RegFD ∗ Neg, InfoAsymm ∗ Neg,
and LitRisk ∗ Neg have the anticipated negative signs and are significant at 1%
level. FinDistress ∗ Neg is indistinguishable from zero. The coefficient for Neg
drops to -0.043 from -0.073 of the baseline regression. The rest is captured by the
interaction terms mentioned above. There is −1.2% of average return for negative
news unaccounted for and significant at 1% level shown by the F-test at the bottom
of column 2. This return is not significantly different from the −1.1% differential
return recorded in table 4.2 (not tabulated).
Secondly, I examine the explanatory power of the informational content of
the news per se by including the size of the news as well as its interaction with the
directional dummy variable in the baseline equation 4.1:
Rit = α0 + β0Negit + δ1sueit + δ2sueit ∗Negit + it, (4.3)
where sueit is the standardised unexpected earnings and refers to one of the three
earnings surprises measures. Panel A of table 4.4 presents the regression results for
model (4.3) with sue = dE/P . As can been seen, the average negative return gen-
erated by negative earnings surprises is around −2.8%, computed as the sum of the
estimated intercept and Negit coefficients. This is indistinguishable in magnitude
from the average positive returns by positive news 2.9%: the p-value for the F-test
of their equal magnitude stands at 0.217. Here, the F-test is the same as in equation
4.1. The interaction variable sueit ∗ Negit is positive and highly significant at 1%
level. It shows that for a given percentage change in earnings, investors’ reaction to
earnings decrease is much more pronounced than to earnings increases. This implies
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that investors are more surprised by bad news. In other words, the informational
content of per unit of bad news is higher than that of good news. The F-test shows
that this surprise explains the differential average firm-level stock returns of bad
versus good news in its entirety. The results are similar for each of quintiles.
Figure 4.2 plots the differential returns of each quintile after controlling the
informational contents of news per se. The ”yes” tick shape disappears and more
importantly those differential returns are insignificant at 5% level. Figure 4.3 plots
the coefficients for interaction term sueit ∗Negit, which generally matches the ”yes”
tick shape. It further enhances the explanation that it is the larger information
content of bad news per se explains the differential average returns generated by
bad versus good news.
Finally, I include both the information content per unit of news and the fthe
proxies for managerial incentives as controls and run the following regression:
Rit = α+ β0Negit + δ1sueit + δ2sueit ∗Negit + β1RegFDit (4.4)
+ β2RegFDit ∗Negit + β3LitRiskit + β4LitRiskit ∗Negit + β5InfoAsymmit
+ β6InfoAsymmit ∗Negit + β7FinDistressit + β7FinDistressit ∗Negit + it,
Panel A of table 4.5 reports the estimates of the model (4.5) for dE/P .
sueit ∗ Neg is significantly positive at 1% level for all firms and for each quintile.
For the regression with all firms, the reaction to per unit of bad news is more than
4.5 times (i.e. 0.4910.108) of that to per unit of good news measured by the coefficient of
sueit. pvalue of 0.299 for the F-test confirms that all the differential average return of
−1.1% of the baseline model comes from the differential reactions to the information
contents of bad versus good news. Figure 4.4 plots the differential earnings response
coefficients for bad versus good news. The ”yes” tick shape remains.
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4.3.2 Quintile analysis
In this subsection, I further the analysis to focus on the role of ambiguity and
difference of opinion of earnings response coefficient, with the aim to provide more
rigorous empirical foundations for the modeling later.
Individual stock returns and earnings surprises
The analysis starts with the replication of the stylized fact that a positive contem-
poraneous relation exists between returns and earnings surprises at firm level (Ball
and Brown, 1968). The contemporaneous relation is examined with pooled panel
data using the following regression:
rit = α+ βsueit + λlsizeit + it (4.5)
where rit is the return for firm i in quarter t. sueit is the individual earnings
surprise for firm i in quarter t. lsizeit is the natural log of beginning-of-period
market capitalization for firm i in quarter t. The size proxy is included to control
for risk differences not already reflected in the return (Fama and French, 1992, 1993)
and for potential scale differences (Barth and Kallapur, 1996).
Table 4.6 column 2 confirms that individual stock prices react positively to
earnings news measured by dE/P . The ERC is around 0.711 with standard error
0.020. The size control variable, lsize, is significantly negative at 1%, consistent
with Conrad, Cornell, and Landsman (2002). Both variables explain 1.64% of total
variation of the returns. The results of using alternative surprises measures including
dE/B and dE/E are similar.
As a robustness check, I run both time series and cross section regressions
as in Sadka and Sadka (2009). The untabulated results are similar for all measures
of earnings surprises. The interpretations for the time series and cross sectional
results are different. A positive time series return-earnings relation suggests that
a firm with better-than-expected (firm-level expected) earnings figures has higher
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concurrent stock prices. A cross sectional relation indicates that a firm with better-
than-expected (cross-section average expected) earnings has positive stock returns.
Time series analysis does not take into account the correlation between firms; while
cross sectional analysis implicitly assumes either the firm-level ERCs or the variances
of earnings surprises are the same for all firms Teets and Wasley (1996).
Firm-level ERC with ascending ambiguity
Now I interact the earnings surprises with the ambiguity measure. I run the following
regression:
rit = α+ α1A
2
it + α2A
3
it + α3A
4
it + α4A
5
it + βsueit + δ1sueitA
2
it (4.6)
+ δ2sueitA
3
it + δ3sueitA
4
it + δ4sueitA
5
it + λlsizeit + it
where rit is the return for firm i in quarter t. sueit is the individual earnings surprise
for firm i in quarter t. As are dummy variables indicating each quintile level of
ambiguity. In descending order, A5 is the top quintile with highest ambiguity, while
A1 is the bottom quintile with the lowest level, which is reflected in the constant
term. lsizeit is the natural log of beginning-of-period market capitalization for firm
i in quarter t. ERCs of the second to fifth quintile are split into two parts. For
example, for the fifth quintile, the coefficient is equal to (β + δ4D
5
it), which is a
function of the level of ambiguity. The same calculation works for ERCs of other
quintiles.
Table 4.6 column 3 shows that the ERC is monotonically increasing with the
level of ambiguity for dE/P . ERC for the bottom quintile is 0.467 with standard
error 0.043. For the second quintile, the ERC increases by 0.016 albeit insignificant
at 10% level. For the middle quintile, the ERC increases an insignificant (at 10%)
0.105 over the first quintile. For the fourth quintile, a significant increase of 0.377
from the non-interacting term achieves a ERC of 0.844 (i.e. 0.377+0.467). The
trend remains for the the top quintile with a ERC of 0.908 (i.e. 0.377+0.531). This
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strictly monotonically increasing trend is consistent with model generated figure
4.10. The results are similar with/out the size control variable. All variables explain
a total of 1.84% of the variation of returns. The results of using alternative surprises
measures including dE/B and dE/E are consistent. Note that although I focus the
explanation of the results using ascending ambiguity, the measure ρ also has the
effect of descending level of difference of opinion.
Differential reactions of quarterly returns to positive and negative earn-
ings surprises under ambiguity and difference of opinion
I firstly run the regression 4.5 on positive and negative earnings surprises, respec-
tively. Table 4.7 show the average earnings response coefficients for positive and
negative earnings news for each of the three surprise measures. Column (2) shows
that for given 1% earnings increase measured by dE/P , the quarterly return in-
creases 0.126%. Column (3) shows that if the earnings decrease by 1%, the quarterly
return drops by 0.814% which is significantly larger in magnitude. This asymmetry
also appears evidently for the other two surprise measures.
Then, I run the equation 4.7 for positive and negative news separately. Table
4.8 presents the differential effects that the ascending ambiguity has on positive and
negative news. There is a strictly monotonically positive contemporaneous relation
between ambiguity and ERCs for negative surprises as shown in column 3, consistent
with the model prediction shown on the right panel of figure 4.11. Nevertheless, the
effects on positive news in column 2 present a picture with no discernible pattern.
For example, ERC for dE/P in the first quintile is 0.087 insignificant at 10% level.
Then, it increases by 0.162 for the second quintile, increase 0.059 for the third albeit
decrease from the second quintile, increase 0.193 for the fourth, and increases 0.066
for the fifth quintile albeit decrease from the fourth quintile, although the changes
are insignificant at 10% level. These results for positive news are consistent with
the model prediction presented in figure 4.11. Note that these results are in fact the
combined effect of both ambiguity and difference of opinion due to the proxies.
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4.4 The model
In this section I construct a simple model which captures the main intuition on how
ambiguous information and difference of opinion among experts affect the responses
of returns to earnings announcements. I will start with the baseline model setup
similar in nature to that of Chapter 3 and add a layer of experts in the decision
making process following Cres, Gilboa, and Vieille (2011). Ambiguity is then in-
troduced into the signals. Finally, I introduce the role of experts with difference
of opinion into the setting. Assume there are N experts and n firms that together
make up the market portfolio. Experts are asked by the decision maker to provide
assessment of the informativeness of the signals. Each experts makes judgment of
the probability distribution of the signals independently, so does the decision maker.
When aggregating experts’ opinions, the decision maker exhibits expert uncertainty
aversion towards different opinions.
For simplicity, I assume all firms are equal in size. At the end of period t, the
decision maker and experts observe earnings announcements eit of each of the firm i.
Firm’s earnings consist of two components: eit = cit+mt, where cit is a firm-specific
”cash-flow” component of the earnings and mt is a market-wide component common
for all firms. I assume that cov[cit, cjt] = 0 for i 6= j, cov[cit,mt] = 0 for any i. At
the end of period t, the decision maker and experts can observe the realization of
some market wide shock to returns (“discount rate news”) dt which is common for
all stocks. I assume that the discount rate news correlates with the market-wide
component of earnings news: dt = mt + ηt with cov[cit, ηt] = 0 for any i.
At the end of period t − 1, the decision maker and experts observe noisy
signals sit about the future cash flow and discount news
sit = eit + uit,
where uit is idiosyncratic noise with cov[uit, cjt] = 0 and cov[uit, ηjt] = 0 for all i, j
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and t. Denote by s = {s1, ..., sn}.
Firm i’s period t return is given by
Rit = Et−1[Rit] + εit − ωt,
where εit is the revision to expected earnings of firm i and ωt is an additional shock
to firm i’s return associated with common for each firm discount rate news. The
negative sign captures the idea Campbell (1991).
4.4.1 Case of no uncertainty
In order to establish benchmark, I start by considering the case with no ambiguity
in information and signals and no difference of opinion among experts. Since all
experts and the decision maker have exactly the same opinion regarding the signals,
I remove the layer of experts without loss of generality. Hence, cit ∼ N(0, σ2ci) for
any i and t, mt ∼ N(0, σ2m), ηt ∼ N(0, σ2η) and uit ∼ N(0, σ2u).
Denote in matrix form,
Z =

e1t
e2t
...
ent

, X =

s1t
s2t
...
snt

where Z ∼ N(0,∑Z), X ∼ N(0,∑X), ∑ZX = Cov(Z,X), and ∑dX = Cov(d,X).
I am only interested in computing the responses of individual firms’ returns
to earnings announcements. Given the set of signals sit, the decision maker’s expec-
tations about the realization of variables eit and dt are:
E(Z|X) = ΣZXΣ−1X X
E(d|X) = ΣdXΣ−1X X
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Specifically (see Appendix A.1 for detailed derivation),
Et−1[eit|s] =
n∑
j=1
γji sjt
Et−1[dt|s] = δs¯t,
where
γji =
∆
σ2c + σ
2
u
for i 6= j
γii =
σ2c + ∆
σ2c + σ
2
u
,
δ =
nσ2m
σ2c + nσ
2
m + σ
2
u
.
Hence, the announcement surprises εit and ωt are
εit = eit − Et−1[eit|s] = eit −
n∑
j=1
γji sjt,
ωt = dt − Et−1[dt|s] = dt − δs¯t.
The covariance between the returns of the stock and the changes in the
earnings announcements,
cov[Rit,∆eit] = cov[εit, eit]− cov[ωt, eit].
Given that
cov[εit, eit] = var[eit]−
n∑
j=1
γji cov[sjt, eit] = (σ
2
c + σ
2
m)(1− γii)− (n− 1)γji σ2m,
cov[ωt, eit] = cov[dt, eit]− δcov[s¯t, eit] = σ2m −
δ
n
(σ2c + nσ
2
m)
I get
cov[Rit,∆eit] = (σ
2
c + σ
2
m)
(
1− γii +
δ
n
)
− σ2m
(
1 + (n− 1)γji − δ +
δ
n
)
.
The response coefficient of the return if firm i to its earnings surprise is equal
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to the beta coefficient:
βi =
cov[Rit,∆eit]
var[∆eit]
= 1− γii +
δ
n
−
(
1 + (n− 1)γji − δ +
δ
n
)
σ2m
σ2c + σ
2
m
. (4.7)
4.4.2 Case of ambiguous information
Let us consider now an extension of the model where the experts and decision maker
face ambiguity regarding the variance of firm-specific and market-wide cash flow
components. The ambiguity of the firm specific component is purely idiosyncratic.
I will call it firm-specific ambiguity hereafter. The ambiguity about the market
represents the overall ambiguity about the market as whole. I will call it market-
wide ambiguity. I consider both level of ambiguity altogether as a whole.
I model both types of ambiguity using the multiple prior model of Gilboa and
Schmeidler (1989). More specifically, the experts and decision maker do not observe
the variances of cit and mt and know only their interval ranges: σ
2
ci ∈ [σ2c , σ2c ] and
σ2m ∈ [σ2m, σ2m]. Similar approach has been adopted by Epstein and Schneider (2008)
and Kelsey, Kozhan, and Pang (2011). In this case, there is no difference of opinion.
Hence the variance ranges will be the same for experts and the decision maker.
without loss of generality, the layer of experts in the modelling setup is omitted in
this subsection.
Following similar steps as in previous section (refer to Appendix A.2 for
detailed derivation), we have
Et−1[eit|s] =
n∑
j=1
γji sjt
Et−1[dt|s] =
n∑
i=1
δisit,
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where
γii =
1
Γ
[
[Γ(σ2ci + σ
2
u)− σ2m](σ2ci + σ2m)
(σ2ci + σ
2
u)
2
−
n∑
k=1,k 6=i
σ2mσ
2
m
(σ2ck + σ
2
u)(σ
2
ci + σ
2
u)
] for i = j
γji =
1
Γ
[
[Γ(σ2cj + σ
2
u)− σ2m]σ2m
(σ2cj + σ
2
u)
2
− (σ
2
ci + σ
2
m)σ
2
m
(σ2ci + σ
2
u)(σ
2
cj + σ
2
u)
−
n∑
k=1,k 6=i,j
σ2mσ
2
m
(σ2ck + σ
2
u)(σ
2
cj + σ
2
u)
] for i 6= j,
δi =
σ2m
Γ
[
Γ
σ2ci + σ
2
u
−
n∑
k=1
σ2m
(σ2ck + σ
2
u)(σ
2
ci + σ
2
u)
].
Hence, the announcement surprises εit and ωt are
εit = eit − Et−1[eit|s] = eit −
n∑
j=1
γji sjt,
ωt = dt − Et−1[dt|s] = dt −
n∑
i=1
δisit.
The decision maker’s preferences exhibit ambiguity aversion and are de-
scribed by the max-min expected utility model (see Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989)
for the preference specification of the model). I assume that the decision maker
chooses parameters σ2ci and σ
2
m through the minimization problem
min
σ2ci ∈ [σ2c , σ2c ]
σ2m ∈ [σ2m, σ2m]
E
[
Rmt(σ
2
c1, ..., σ
2
cn, σ
2
m)|s
]
, (4.8)
where
E
[
Rmt(σ
2
c1, ..., σ
2
cn, σ
2
m)|s
]
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
γji (s)sjt −
n∑
i=1
δi(s)sit
with γii(s), γ
j
i (s), and δi(s) defined the same way as above.
Next, I compute individual firms’ returns responses to earnings surprises.
Given the realizations of signals s and the choice of parameters determined by the
decision maker’s preferences, the return of asset i is given by
Rit = Et−1[Rit] + εit − ωt = Et−1[Rit] + (eit −
n∑
j=1
γji (s) sjt)− (dt −
n∑
i=1
δi(s)sit).
The covariance between the returns of the stock and the changes in the earnings
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announcements is
cov[Rit,∆eit] = cov[εit, eit]− cov[ωt, eit],
where
cov[εit, eit] = var[eit]−
n∑
j=1
cov[γji (s)sjt, eit] = σ
2
c + σ
2
m −
n∑
j=1
E[γji (s)sjteit]
= σ2c + σ
2
m −
n∑
j=1
E[γji (s)sjtE[eit|s]] = σ2c + σ2m −
n∑
j=1
n∑
ι=1
γιiE[γ
j
i (s) sjtsιt]
and
cov[ωt, eit] = cov[dt, eit]−
n∑
j=1
cov[δj(s)sjt, eit] = σ
2
m −
n∑
j=1
E[δj(s)sjteit]
= σ2m −
n∑
j=1
E[δj(s)sjtE[eit|s]] = σ2m −
n∑
j=1
n∑
ι=1
γιiE[δj(s)sjtsιt].
The beta coefficient is
βi =
cov[Rit,∆eit]
var[∆eit]
(4.9)
= 1− 1
σ2c + σ
2
m
 n∑
j=1
n∑
ι=1
γιiE[γ
j
i (s) sjtsιt]− σ2m −
n∑
j=1
n∑
ι=1
γιiE[δj(s)sjtsιt]

− σ
2
m
σ2c + σ
2
m
.
4.4.3 Case of difference of opinion among experts
Let us consider now an extension of the model where the investors face only differ-
ence of opinion. There are N experts, each of whom observes signals of all firms.
Each expert has different but precise judgment of the probability distribution of
the signals. There is a decision maker who aggregates experts’ observations of the
signals. In essence, this extension is N replications of the baseline model with ex-
perts possessing distinct priors and then the decision maker aggregates the signal
assessments of the N experts within a maxmin framework.
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Individual firms responses
Under difference of opinion, for each expert denoted as e, σ
2(e)
c1 = σ
2(e)
c2 = . . . =
σ
2(e)
cn = σ
2(e)
c , e = 1 . . . N . Given the set of signals sit, the expert’s expectation
about the realization of variables eit and dt are:
E
(e)
t−1[eit|s] =
n∑
j=1
γ
j(e)
i sjt
E
(e)
t−1[dt|s] = δ(e)s¯t,
where
γ
j(e)
i =
∆
σ
2(e)
c + σ2u
for i 6= j
γ
i(e)
i =
σ
2(e)
c + ∆
σ
2(e)
c + σ2u
,
δ(e) =
nσ
2(e)
m
σ
2(e)
c + nσ
2(e)
m + σ2u
.
Hence, the announcement surprises ε
(e)
it and ω
(e)
t are
ε
(e)
it = eit − E(e)t−1[eit|s] = eit −
n∑
j=1
γ
j(e)
i sjt,
ω
(e)
t = dt − E(e)t−1[dt|s] = dt − δ(e)s¯t.
The decision maker’s (DM) preferences exhibit aversion to expert uncertainty
and are described by the ”maxminmin” expected utility model (see Cres, Gilboa, and
Vieille (2011) for the preference specification of the model). The weights allocated
to each of the experts are determined as following two sets of rules:
1. the decision maker’s set of priors is the weighted averages of experts’ priors;
2. the decision maker’s valuation is the the minimum of all weighted valuations
of the experts’ independent valuations.
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min
λ ∈ Λ
E
[
Rmt(σ
2
c1, ..., σ
2
cn, σ
2
m)|s
]
, (4.10)
where
E
[
Rmt(σ
2
c1, ..., σ
2
cn, σ
2
m)|s
]
=
N∑
e=1
λe(s)(
1
n
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
γ
j(e)
i sjt − δ(e)s¯t)
subject to
σ2(DM)c =
N∑
e = 1
λ ∈ Λ
λe(s)σ
2(e)
c
σ2(DM)m =
N∑
e = 1
λ ∈ Λ
λe(s)σ
2(e)
m
N∑
e=1
λe(s) = 1
with
γ
j(e)
i =
∆
σ
2(e)
c + σ2u
for i 6= j
γ
i(e)
i =
σ
2(e)
c + ∆
σ
2(e)
c + σ2u
,
δ(e) =
nσ
2(e)
m
σ
2(e)
c + nσ
2(e)
m + σ2u
.
Hence, the announcement surprises εit and ωt are
ε
(DM)
it = eit −
N∑
e=1
λe(s)(E
(e)
t−1[eit|s]) = eit −
N∑
e=1
λe(s)(
n∑
j=1
γ
j(e)
i sjt),
ω
(DM)
t = dt −
N∑
e=1
λe(s)(E
(e)
t−1[dt|s]) = dt − δ(e)s¯t.
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The covariance between the returns of the stock and the changes in the
earnings announcements,
cov[Rit,∆eit] = cov[ε
(DM)
it , eit]− cov[ω(DM)t , eit].
Given that
cov[ε
(DM)
it , eit] = var[eit]−
N∑
e=1
λe(s)
n∑
j=1
γ
j(e)
i cov[sjt, eit]
= σ2c + σ
2
m −
N∑
e=1
λe(s)
(
(σ2c + σ
2
m)γ
i(e)
i + (n− 1)γj(e)i σ2m
)
,
=
N∑
e=1
λe(s)
(
(σ2c + σ
2
m)(1− γi(e)i )− (n− 1)γj(e)i σ2m
)
,
cov[ω
(DM)
t , eit] = cov[dt, eit]−
N∑
e=1
λe(s)
(
δ(e)cov[s¯t, eit]
)
=
N∑
e=1
λe(s)
(
σ2m −
δ(e)
n
(σ2c + nσ
2
m)
)
I get
cov[Rit,∆eit] =
N∑
e=1
λe(s)
(
(σ2c + σ
2
m)
(
1− γi(e)i +
δ(e)
n
)
− σ2m
(
1 + (n− 1)γj(e)i − δ(e) +
δ(e)
n
))
.
The response coefficient of the return if firm i to its earnings surprise is equal
to the beta coefficient:
βi =
cov[Rit,∆eit]
var[∆eit]
=
N∑
e=1
λe(s)
(
1− γi(e)i +
δ(e)
n
−
(
1 + (n− 1)γj(e)i − δ(e) +
δ(e)
n
)
σ2m
σ2c + σ
2
m
)
. (4.11)
4.4.4 Case of both ambiguity and difference of opinion
Now I consider the case when experts face both ambiguity and difference of opinion.
A range of priors reflect ambiguity and different levels of the midpoints of the range
reflect difference of opinion. The assessment of the signals by the decision maker
proceed in two steps. Firstly, Experts choose the worst-case scenario under ambi-
guity. Secondly, decision maker aggregates experts’ observations under difference of
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opinion.
Under both ambiguity and difference of opinion, σ
2(e)
c1 6= σ2(e)c2 6= . . . 6= σ2(e)cn .
As a result,
E
(e)
t−1[eit|s] =
n∑
j=1
γ
j(e)
i sjt
E
(e)
t−1[dt|s] =
n∑
i=1
δ
(e)
i sit,
with γ
j(e)
i , and δ
(e)
i defined in the same manner as in the section with only ambiguous
information.
Hence, the announcement surprises ε
(e)
it and ω
(e)
t are
ε
(e)
it = eit − E(e)t−1[eit|s] = eit −
n∑
j=1
γ
j(e)
i sjt,
ω
(e)
t = dt − E(e)t−1[dt|s] = dt −
n∑
i=1
δ
(e)
i sit.
Experts’ preferences exhibit ambiguity aversion and are described by the
max-min expected utility model (see Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) for the preference
specification of the model). The decision maker’s preferences exhibit aversion to
expert uncertainty and are described by the ”maxminmin” expected utility model
(see Cres, Gilboa, and Vieille (2011) for the preference specification of the model).
The weights allocated to each of the experts are determined following two sets of
rules:
1. the decision maker’s set of priors is the weighted averages of experts’ priors;
2. the decision maker’s valuation is the the minimum of all weighted valuations
of the experts’ independent valuations.
I assume that the investor chooses parameters σ2ci and σ
2
m through the double
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minimization problem
min
λ ∈ Λ
N∑
e=1
λe(s)

min
σ
2(e)
ci ∈ [σ2(e)c , σ2(e)c ]
σ
2(e)
m ∈ [σ2(e)m , σ2(e)m ]
E
[
Rmt(σ
2(e)
c1 , ..., σ
2(e)
cn , σ
2(e)
m )|s
]

, (4.12)
where
E
[
Rmt(σ
2(e)
c1 , ..., σ
2(e)
cn , σ
2(e)
m )|s
]
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
γ
j(e)
i (s)sjt −
n∑
i=1
δ
(e)
i (s)sit
subject to
σ
2(DM)
ci =
N∑
e = 1
λ ∈ Λ
λe(s)σ
2(e)
ci , i = 1 . . . n
σ2(DM)m =
N∑
e = 1
λ ∈ Λ
λe(s)σ
2
m
N∑
e=1
λe(s) = 1
Given the realizations of signals s and the choice of parameters determined
by the representative investor preferences, the return of asset i is given by
R
(DM)
it = Et−1[Rit] +
N∑
e=1
λe(s)
(
ε
(e)
it − ω(e)t
)
= Et−1[Rit] +
eit − N∑
e=1
λe(s)
 n∑
j=1
γ
j(e)
i (s) sjt
−(dt − N∑
e=1
λe(s)
(
n∑
i=1
δi(e)(s)sit
))
.
The covariance between the returns of the stock and the changes in the
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earnings announcements is
cov[R
(DM)
it ,∆eit] =
N∑
e=1
λe(s)
(
cov[ε
(e)
it , eit]− cov[ω(e)t , eit]
)
,
where
cov[ε
(e)
it , eit] = var[eit]−
n∑
j=1
cov[γ
j(e)
i (s)sjt, eit] = σ
2
c + σ
2
m −
n∑
j=1
E[γ
j(e)
i (s)sjteit]
= σ2c + σ
2
m −
n∑
j=1
E[γ
j(e)
i (s)sjtE
(e)[eit|s]]
= σ2c + σ
2
m −
n∑
j=1
n∑
ι=1
γ
ι(e)
i E[γ
j(e)
i (s) sjtsιt]
and
cov[ω
(e)
t , eit] = cov[dt, eit]−
n∑
i=1
cov[δi(s)sit, eit] = σ
2
m −
n∑
i=1
E[δ
(e)
i (s)siteit]
= σ2m −
n∑
i=1
E[δ
(e)
i (s)sitE
(e)[eit|s]] = σ2m −
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
γ
j(e)
i E[δ
(e)
i (s)sitsjt].
The beta coefficient is
βi =
cov[Rit,∆eit]
var[∆eit]
(4.13)
=
N∑
e=1
λe(s)
1− 1
σ2c + σ
2
m
 n∑
j=1
n∑
ι=1
γ
ι(e)
i E[γ
j(e)
i (s) sjtsιt]−
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
γ
j(e)
i E[δ
(e)
i (s)sitsjt]
− σ2m
σ2c + σ
2
m
 .
4.4.5 Calibration and simulations
In order to quantify the effects of ambiguity and difference of opinion on earnings
response coefficients I perform a comparative statics analysis. However, the earnings
response coefficients cannot be computed in the closed form. To circumvent this
difficulty I fixed the values of σ2u, σ
2
c , σ
2
m and n and use Monte Carlo simulations
to estimate the earnings response coefficients for different values of the ambiguity
parameters ∆c = σ¯
2
c −σ2c and ∆d = σ¯2d−σ2d. I consider five different degrees of firm-
level ambiguity: ∆c = 0.2σ
2
c , 0.4σ
2
c , 0.6σ
2
c , 0.8σ
2
c , 0.99σ
2
c and six different degrees of
market-level ambiguity: ∆m = 0.2σ
2
m, 0.4σ
2
m, 0.6σ
2
m, 0.8σ
2
m, 0.99σ
2
m. To do this I
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simulate 10,000 repetitions of signals for each of n firms with n = 50. Signals are
generated following a normal probability distribution with N(0, σ2c + σ
2
m + σ
2
u).
Parameter Values
I now parameterize and calibrate a version of the model framework with ambiguity
and difference of opinion to quantitatively match the empirical earnings response
coefficients which can be found in empirical results section.
For computing variance of m - the market-wide component of firms’ earnings,
I firstly take the cross-sectional average for earnings and then calculate the variance
of of the time series for EP, EB, and EE, respectively. The rational is that firms’
idiosyncratic components of earnings cancel out during cross-sectional averaging
thus leaving only the common market-wide component.
For computing variance of c - the firm-specific ”cash flow” component of
firms’ earnings, I firstly divide data into quintiles in terms of uncertainty (V ) and
then calculate the variance of the pooled data for each earnings surprise measure
for each quintile. Subtraction of σ2m from the calculated variances gives σ
2
c for each
quintile. The ”aggregate” σ2c is computed in the same way without splitting the
data into quintiles.
For computing variance of u - the idiosyncratic noise of signals, I put σ2c and
σ2m back to beta equation under no uncertainty with beta equal to 0.7 from table
4.2. σ2u is around 0.00053.
Difference of opinion is measured by the number of experts following each
firm. The correlation between the measure of difference of opinion (i.e. 1− ρ) and
the number of experts is -0.010 significant at 1% level. I use five level of difference
of opinion where the number of experts ranges from 2 to 10 with equal intervals.
Table 4.9 lists the calibrated parameter values that I employ in producing
the results below.
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Simulation results
ERCs are estimated using calibrated variable values and five levels of ambiguity
and difference of opinions indicated above. The simulations results are exhibited
via graphs. Figure 4.8 illustrates the effects of ambiguity and difference of opinion
on reactions to positive signals. Panel A shows that as ambiguity level increases,
the ERC decreases. The decreases are more pronounced for high levels of difference
of opinion. Panel B shows that high difference of opinion similarly decreases ERC
for positive news. The negative relation is more pronounced for high levels of am-
biguity. Note that the slope of the ERC curve is much steeper as DoO increases.
Hence, both ambiguity and difference of opinion decrease the positive signals’ re-
sponse coefficients in a largely similar magnitude. Figure 4.9 illustrates the effects
of ambiguity and difference of opinion on reactions to negative signals. Panel A
shows that ambiguity increases ERC in a linear manner. The ERC for 0.99 level
of ambiguity is 60% larger than that of 0.2 level of ambiguity. The level of DoO
shows little impact on the slope of ERC curve, which means the effect of ambiguity
dominates that of DoO for negative signals. Panel B confirms that DoO has no dis-
cernible impact on ERC, while there is clear differences of ERCs for various levels
of ambiguity. Hence, ambiguity increases the negative signals’ response coefficients
while DoO has a muted effect. These results correspond to the predictions 6 and 7.
I argue in this chapter that ambiguity is negatively correlated to DoO. There-
fore, it is empirically informational to look at the combined effects of ambiguity and
DoO on firstly signals without differentiating their nature and secondly positive and
negative signals separately. Figure 4.10 shows the signal response coefficients with
ascending ambiguity. Ascending ambiguity is equivalent to descending DoO for this
case. It is evident that ambiguity (DoO) amplifies (reduces) the response to signals.
These results correspond to the predictions 4 and 5. Next, I look at positive and
negative signals separately. I add up the ERCs of high ambiguity and corresponding
low DoO and plot the aggregated ERC. To be more precise, I aggregate the ERCs of
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the fifth ambiguity quintile and the first DoO quintile, the ERCs of fourth ambiguity
quintile and second DoO quintile, and so forth. Figure 4.11 panel A shows the ag-
gregate effect on positive signals. There is no clear trend and the ERC varies mostly
between 1.330 and 1.346, around 1% interval. The variation of ERCs for different
quintiles is insignificant. Figure 4.11 panel B shows the aggregate effect on negative
signals. There is an unambiguous increasing trend and the ERC ranges between
1.33 to 1.61, around 20% interval and much significant. These results correspond to
the predictions 8.
Lastly, I look at the differential reactions of negative versus positive signals
under the combined effect of ambiguity and DoO. I generate the ERCs in two steps.
Firstly, I add up the ERCs for positive and negative signals under ambiguity and
the ERCs for positive and negative signals under DoO. Essentially, I compute the
aggregate of data from panel As of figure 4.8 and 4.9 for ambiguity and the aggregate
of data from panel Bs of figure 4.8 and 4.9 for DoO. Secondly, I add up the aggregated
ERCs from the first step according to high ambiguity and low DoO order. Figure
4.12 shows a ”yes” tick shape. Specifically, the ERC of the second ambiguity (fourth
DoO) quintile has the lowest ERC. This particular shape is precisely captured in
the empirical results.
4.4.6 Model predictions
H 4. Higher firm-level ambiguity leads to more positive firm-level ERC.
H 5. Higher difference of opinion leads to less positive firm-level ERC.
H 6. For positive news, higher firm-level ambiguity leads to less positive firm-level
ERC. For negative news, higher firm-level ambiguity leads to more positive firm-level
ERC.
H 7. For positive news, higher difference of opinion leads to less positive firm-level
ERC. For negative news, difference of opinion has an indiscernible effect on the
firm-level ERC.
H 8. Ambiguity and DoO are negatively correlated. For ascending ambiguity (or
descending DoO) quintiles, there is indiscernible trend of market reaction to positive
news since the effect of ambiguity cancel out that of difference of opinion. There
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is strictly increasing trend of ERC for negative news since the effect of ambiguity
dominates that of difference of opinion.
4.5 Conclusions
The average negative return generated by bad news is larger in magnitude than the
average positive return generated by good news. The asymmetric reaction could be
due to either larger amount of negative news on the market or stronger reaction to
bad news per se. This chapter shows that it is the latter that causes the differential
average return between good and bad news. Literature provides two channels for
explaining this asymmetric reaction. Firstly, Epstein and Schneider (2008) show in
their model that Knightian uncertainty or ambiguity can lead to stronger reaction
to bad news versus good news. Kelsey, Kozhan, and Pang (2011) show that this
asymmetric reaction to bad versus good news causes asymmetric profitability of
momentum strategy. Secondly, recent studies in decision theory raise the question
that difference of opinion among experts could contribute to the decision maker’s
asymmetric assessment of the good versus bad news. Cres, Gilboa, and Vieille
(2011), for instance, develop an axiomatized framework of incorporate ambiguity
and difference of opinion altogether in the decision maker’s assessment of signals.
Based on those two strands of literature, this chapter sets out to empirically test
and model the effects of both ambiguity and difference of opinion on firm-level
return-earnings relation.
The results are striking. I show empirically that both ambiguity and differ-
ence of opinion are related to the differential reactions to bad versus good news and
their combining effects generate a ”yes” tick shape of differential earnings response
coefficients in quintile portfolios. To verify the finding, I build a model to capture
the return-earnings relation with one decision maker, multiple experts, and multiple
firms. Due to lack of information, the ambiguity-averse experts and decision maker
lack confidence on the distribution of firms’ signals and hence assign a variance in-
140
ternal for the distributions of the signals. In the presence of private information, the
gravity center of experts’ set of priors differs, resulting in differential assessments
of the signals even if the level of ambiguity is the same. Experts’s preference ex-
hibit ambiguity aversion and are described by the maxmin expected utility model
proposed by Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989). The decision maker exhibits aversion
to expert uncertainty and her preferences follow the ”maxminmin” expected utility
model axiomatized by Cres, Gilboa, and Vieille (2011). Monte Carlo simulation of
the model shows that ambiguity and difference of opinion have contrasted effects on
investors’ reactions on earnings surprises measured by earnings response coefficient.
Ambiguity increases the ERC for negative news. Difference of opinion, however, has
a muted effect. For positive news, both decrease the response coefficients. By com-
bining ambiguity with difference of opinion, the model generates a ”yes” tick shape
of differential reactions to negative versus positive news that matches the empirical
finding.
The results support our hypothesis that both ambiguity and difference of
opinion contribute to the asymmetric market reaction to bad versus good news.
The implication for investors is clear. When designing trading strategies based
on news, it is important to consider the quality of information environment and
the extent of private information on the market. Since ambiguity and difference
of opinion generates asymmetric reactions to news, it is interesting to explore for
future research that whether both could contribute to other asymmetric phenomena
found on the financial markets. There are no independent proxies for ambiguity and
difference of opinion available in the literature according to my knowledge, although
a clearly separate measure for each will be ideal for the existing research design. The
proposed consensus measure employed in this chapter thereby is the next best thing
that I can find to disentangle those two concepts to a certain degree. I suggest that it
would be instructive if future research can produce separate measures for ambiguity
and difference of opinion that better capture the intuition of my mathematical model
141
and would allow me to identify the separate empirical effects of the two variables
on the return-earnings relation.
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Figure 4.1: Asymmetric market reaction of bad versus good earnings surprises
This figure exhibits the difference between the average negative return generated by negative earnings
surprises and the average positive return generated by positive earnings surprises:
Diff.Ret = ‖Neg‖ − 2× ‖Const‖
where ‖Neg‖ and ‖Const‖ are the second and first rows of each panel from table 4.2. The vertical axis
refers to the differential return. The horizontal axis refers to the quintile groups according to level of the
ambiguity measure ρ. Quintile 1 indicates the group with the lowest level of ρ. Quintile 5 indicates the
group with the highest level of ρ. dE/P , dE/B, and dE/E are the seasonally differenced earnings (dE)
scaled by beginning-of-period market price (P), book equity (B), and earnings (E).
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Figure 4.2: Asymmetric market reaction to bad versus good earnings surprises after
controlling for the informational content of news
This figure exhibits the difference between the average negative return generated by negative earnings
surprises and the average positive return generated by positive earnings surprises:
Diff.Ret = ‖Neg‖ − 2× ‖Const‖
where ‖Neg‖ and ‖Const‖ are the second and first rows of each panel from table 4.3. The vertical axis
refers to the differential return. The horizontal axis refers to the quintile groups according to level of the
ambiguity measure ρ. Quintile 1 indicates the group with the lowest level of ρ. Quintile 5 indicates the
group with the highest level of ρ. dE/P , dE/B, and dE/E are the seasonally differenced earnings (dE)
scaled by beginning-of-period market price (P), book equity (B), and earnings (E).
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Figure 4.3: Asymmetric investors’ reaction to bad versus good earnings surprises
per se
This figure exhibits the differential investors’ reaction to bad versus good news per se. The numbers are
obtained from the fourth rows of each panel of table 4.3. The vertical axis refers to the investor’s stronger
reaction to bad news versus good news measured by the coefficient of the interaction term between news and
dummy variable Neg. The horizontal axis refers to the quintile groups according to level of the ambiguity
measure ρ. Quintile 1 indicates the group with the lowest level of ρ. Quintile 5 indicates the group with
the highest level of ρ. dE/P , dE/B, and dE/E are the seasonally differenced earnings (dE) scaled by
beginning-of-period market price (P), book equity (B), and earnings (E).
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Figure 4.4: Asymmetric investors’ reaction to bad versus good earnings surprises
per se after controlling for managers’ incentives
This figure exhibits the differential investors’ reaction to bad versus good news per se after controlling for
managers’ incentives to selectively release relevant information about news. The numbers are obtained from
the fourth rows of each panel of table 4.5. The vertical axis refers to the investor’s stronger reaction to
bad news versus good news measured by the coefficient of the interaction term between news and dummy
variable Neg. The horizontal axis refers to the quintile groups according to level of the ambiguity measure ρ.
Quintile 1 indicates the group with the lowest level of ρ. Quintile 5 indicates the group with the highest level
of ρ. dE/P , dE/B, and dE/E are the seasonally differenced earnings (dE) scaled by beginning-of-period
market price (P), book equity (B), and earnings (E).
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Figure 4.5: Reaction of quarterly returns to earnings surprises under different levels
of ambiguity and difference of opinion
This figure exhibits investors’ reaction to earnings surprises under different levels of ambiguity and difference
of opinion, including both positive and negative surprises. The numbers are obtained from the sixth to tenth
rows of each panel of table 4.6. The vertical axis refers to the investor’s reaction to earnings news measured
by the earnings response coefficient. The horizontal axis refers to the quintile groups according to level of
the ambiguity measure ρ. Quintile 1 indicates the group with the lowest level of ρ. Quintile 5 indicates the
group with the highest level of ρ. For quintile 1, the earnings response coefficients are shown in the 3, 5,
7 columns of the sixth row. For quintile 2, the earnings response coefficients are calculated as sum of the
coefficient for sue and the coefficient for the the second interaction term sue × A2, and so forth. dE/P ,
dE/B, and dE/E are the seasonally differenced earnings (dE) scaled by beginning-of-period market price
(P), book equity (B), and earnings (E).
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Figure 4.6: Reaction of quarterly returns to positive and negative earnings surprises
under different levels of ambiguity and difference of opinion
This figure exhibits investors’ reaction to, respectively, the positive and negative earnings surprises under
different levels of ambiguity and difference of opinion. The figures on the left panel are based on positive
surprises, while the ones on the right panel are based on negative surprises. The numbers are obtained
from the sixth to tenth rows of each panel of table 4.8. The vertical axis refers to the investor’s reaction
to earnings news measured by the earnings response coefficient. The horizontal axis refers to the quintile
groups according to level of the ambiguity measure ρ. Quintile 1 indicates the group with the lowest level of
ρ. Quintile 5 indicates the group with the highest level of ρ. For quintile 1, the earnings response coefficients
for positive earnings surprises are shown in the 2, 4, 6 columns of the sixth row. The earnings response
coefficients for negative earnings surprises are shown in the 3, 5, 7 columns of the sixth row. For quintile 2,
the earnings response coefficients are calculated as sum of the coefficient for sue and the coefficient for the
the second interaction term sue×A2, and so forth. dE/P , dE/B, and dE/E are the seasonally differenced
earnings (dE) scaled by beginning-of-period market price (P), book equity (B), and earnings (E).
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Figure 4.7: Difference in magnitude of investors’ reaction of quarterly returns to
negative versus positive earnings surprises under different levels of ambiguity and
difference of opinion
This figure exhibits the difference in magnitude of investors’ reaction to, respectively, the positive and
negative earnings surprises under different levels of ambiguity and difference of opinion. The figures on the
left panel are based on positive surprises, while the ones on the right panel are based on negative surprises.
The numbers are obtained from the sixth to tenth rows of each panel of table 4.8. The vertical axis refers
to the investor’s differential reaction to bad versus good earnings news calculated as the subtraction of the
earnings response coefficient for positive news from that for negative news. The horizontal axis refers to the
quintile groups according to level of the ambiguity measure ρ. Quintile 1 indicates the group with the lowest
level of ρ. Quintile 5 indicates the group with the highest level of ρ. For quintile 1, the differential earnings
response coefficients are calculate using the numbers on the right panel of figure 4.6 minus those on the left
panel. dE/P , dE/B, and dE/E are the seasonally differenced earnings (dE) scaled by beginning-of-period
market price (P), book equity (B), and earnings (E).
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Figure 4.8: The effects of ambiguity and difference of opinion on response to positive
signals
This figure exhibits the model generated effects of ambiguity and difference of opinion on positive signals
reaction. Panel A shows the effect of ambiguity on positive signals under different layers of difference
of opinion. Panel B shows the effect of difference of opinion on positive signals under different layers of
ambiguity. D = 1 refers to the lowest level of difference of opinion while D = 5 refers the highest level. The
range indicator 0.2 indicates the lowest level of ambiguity while 0.99 refers to the highest ambiguity. The
vertical axis is the signal response coefficient.
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Figure 4.9: The effects of ambiguity and difference of opinion on response to negative
signals
This figure exhibits the model generated effects of ambiguity and difference of opinion on negative signals
reaction. Panel A shows the effect of ambiguity on negative signals under different layers of difference
of opinion. Panel B shows the effect of difference of opinion on negative signals under different layers of
ambiguity. D = 1 refers to the lowest level of difference of opinion while D = 5 refers the highest level. 0.2
indicates the lowest level of ambiguity while 0.99 refers to the highest ambiguity. The vertical axis is the
signal response coefficient.
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Figure 4.10: The aggregate effect of ambiguity and difference of opinion on signals
response
This figure exhibits the model generated effect of ambiguity on signals reaction. The horizontal axis indicates
the quintile groups with the combination of increasing ambiguity level and decreasing difference of opinion
level. Quintile 1 indicates the lowest level of ambiguity at the same time the highest level of difference of
opinion while Quintile 5 refers to the highest level of ambiguity while the lowest level of difference of opinion.
The vertical axis is the signals response coefficient.
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Figure 4.11: Aggregate reactions to positive versus bad signals
This figure exhibits the model generated aggregate effects of ambiguity and difference of opinion on the
responses to positive versus negative news. The left panel shows the response to positive signals. I recalibrate
the parameters only using the firm-quarter observations with only positive surprises and run the same
simulations as before. The aggregate response for bad news shown on the right panel is conducted similarly.
The horizontal axis indicates the quintile groups with the combination of increasing ambiguity level and
decreasing difference of opinion level. Quintile 1 indicates that the coefficient is calculated using the data
from the lowest level of ambiguity and highest level of difference of opinion, and so forth.
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Figure 4.12: Differential reactions to bad versus good signals
This figure exhibits the model generated effect of the differential reactions to bad versus good news. The
graph is generated by subtracting the response coefficients of the top panel of figure 4.11 from those from
the bottom panel of figure 4.11. The horizontal axis indicates the quintile groups with the combination of
increasing ambiguity level and decreasing difference of opinion level. Quintile 1 indicates that the coefficient
is calculated using the data from the lowest level of ambiguity and highest level of difference of opinion, and
so forth.
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Table 4.1: Summary statistics
This table reports the summary statistics of the pooled panel individual firm data. Return is the quar-
terly return. dEP , dEP , and dEE are, respectively, the seasonally differenced earnings (dE) scaled by
beginning-of-period market price (P), book equity (B), and earnings (E). Log size is the natural log of
beginning-of-period market capitalization (in millions). Analyst no. is the number of experts following
each firm. Dispersion is the dispersion of experts’ earnings forecasts calculated by IBES. Total unc is the
total uncertainty defined by Barron, Kim, Lim, and Stevens (1998) that equals to the sum of idiosyncratic
uncertainty - Idiosy unc, and common uncertainty - Common unc. Ambiguity is refers to the version of
ambiguity measured by 1 − ρ equal to common uncertainty divided by total uncertainty. DoO is the ver-
sion of difference of opinion measured by ρ equal to idiosyncratic uncertainty divided by total uncertainty.
Earnings are before extraordinary items. Earnings, book equity, share price, and shares outstanding data
are from Compustat. experts’ earnings forecasts are from IBES Summary History - Summary Statistics.
Firms are subject to the following screening criteria: 1) data are available for earnings, price, common shares
outstanding, book equity this quarter and fthe quarters prior; 2) dates are aligned with calendar quarters;
3) price is larger than $1; 4) not in the top and bottom 0.5 percentile of firms ranked by dE/P, dE/B, or
dE/E for each case; 5) there are at least two experts’ forecasts for EPS. The sample period is from Q4/1983
to Q4/2013. The sample period is from Q4/1983 to Q4/2013.
Panel A: Summary statistics
Mean Std. Dev. Minimum P25 Median P75 Maximum
Return (qtr) 0.003 0.256 −3.098 −0.102 0.022 0.134 2.487
Log size 0.067 0.017 −0.024 0.055 0.066 0.077 0.133
dEP 0.002 0.045 −0.395 −0.005 0.002 0.007 0.531
dEB 0.002 0.109 −1.125 −0.011 0.003 0.016 1.274
dEE 0.013 2.643 −27.667 −0.316 0.105 0.500 18.667
Analyst no. 7.076 5.473 2.000 3.000 5.000 9.000 50.000
Dispersion 28.416 3793.732 0.000 0.010 0.020 0.040 1060660.200
Total unc 49.934 6304.870 0.000 0.002 0.010 0.050 2178125.002
Idiosy unc 11.630 2064.058 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.008 785454.291
Common unc 36.827 5783.835 −349090.781 0.000 0.004 0.031 2100000.000
Ambiguity 0.550 0.467 −1.000 0.231 0.733 0.952 1.000
DoO 0.450 0.467 0.000 0.048 0.267 0.769 2.000
Firm no. 9345
N 227095
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Table 4.2: Asymmetric stock price reaction to good vs. bad earnings news
This table reports the coefficient, t-statistic, the number of observations used, and adjusted R2 of contempo-
raneous relations between quarterly returns and earnings surprises, and within each quintile group regarding
the level of rho:
Rit = α0 + β0Negit + it,
where Rit is the quarterly excess return over Fama and French (1993) market, size, book-to-market factors
and Carhart (2001) momentum factor for firm i in quarter t. Neg is a categorical variable that equals one
for negative earnings surprises, and zero otherwise. A1/D5 refers to the lowest level of ambiguity yet the
highest level of difference of opinion, and so forth. dE/P , dE/B, and dE/E are the seasonally differenced
earnings (dE) scaled by beginning-of-period market price (P), book equity (B), or earnings (E) for firm i at
time t. Earnings are before extraordinary items. Earnings, book equity, share price, and shares outstanding
data are from Compustat. experts’ forecasts are from IBES. Firms are subject to the following screening
criteria: 1) data are available for earnings, price, common shares outstanding, book equity this quarter and
fthe quarters prior; 2) dates are aligned with calendar quarters; 3) price is larger than $1; 4) not in the top
and bottom 0.5 percentile of firms ranked by dE/P, dE/B, or dE/E for each case; 5) there are at least two
experts’ forecasts for EPS. Standard errors are given in parentheses. The standard errors are corrected for
both heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation (Newey and West, 1987). I present the F-tests of whether twice
the estimated intercept coefficient is equal in magnitude to coefficient for the dummy variable Neg. The
sample period is from Q4/1983 to Q4/2013.
Panel A: dE/P
All A1/D5 A2/D4 A3/D3 A4/D2 A5/D1
Const 0.031∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Negit −0.073∗∗∗ −0.047∗∗∗ −0.047∗∗∗ −0.065∗∗∗ −0.084∗∗∗ −0.124∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
N 227612 45609 45427 45533 45527 45516
adj. R2 0.025 0.012 0.012 0.021 0.032 0.056
F-test:
2 ∗ |Const| = |Neg| 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.015 0.000 0.000
Panel B: dE/B
All A1/D5 A2/D4 A3/D3 A4/D2 A5/D1
Const 0.030∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Negit −0.072∗∗∗ −0.045∗∗∗ −0.046∗∗∗ −0.062∗∗∗ −0.082∗∗∗ −0.123∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
N 227438 45507 45449 45523 45485 45474
adj. R2 0.024 0.011 0.011 0.019 0.031 0.056
F-test:
2 ∗ |Const| = |Neg| 0.000 0.000 0.015 0.027 0.000 0.000
Panel C: dE/E
All A1/D5 A2/D4 A3/D3 A4/D2 A5/D1
Const 0.030∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Negit −0.072∗∗∗ −0.046∗∗∗ −0.047∗∗∗ −0.064∗∗∗ −0.082∗∗∗ −0.121∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
N 226774 45479 45225 45371 45348 45351
adj. R2 0.024 0.011 0.012 0.020 0.031 0.054
F-test:
2 ∗ |Const| = |Neg| 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.005 0.000 0.000
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 4.3: Cross-sectional variations in market reactions to earnings news after
controlling for news leakage
This table reports the coefficient, t-statistic, the number of observations used, and adjusted R2 of contem-
poraneous relations between quarterly returns and earnings surprises, and with the interaction of either
difference of opinion or ambiguity:
Rit = α0 + β0Negit + β1RegFDit + β2RegFDit ∗ Negit + β3LitRiskit + β4LitRiskit ∗ Negit +
β5InfoAsymmit + β6InfoAsymmit ∗Negit + β7FinDistressit + β7FinDistressit ∗Negit + it,
where Rit is the quarterly excess return over Fama and French (1993) market, size, book-to-market factors
and Carhart (2001) momentum factor for firm i in quarter t. A1/D5 refers to the lowest level of ambiguity
yet the highest level of difference of opinion, and so forth. Negit is a categorical variable that equals
one for Negative earnings surprises, and zero otherwise. RegFDit is a dummy variable equal to one if the
announcement occurs before the passage of Regulation FD in October 2000, and zero otherwise. LitRiskit is
a dummy variable that equals one if the firm has less than median litigation risk calculated using Rogers and
Stocken (2005) predictive regression, and zero otherwise. InfoAsymmit is a dummy variable that equals
one if the firm is above the median value of a single information asymmetry factor, and zero otherwise.
The information asymmetry factor is derived from a factor analysis based on the information asymmetry
proxies: market-to-book ratio, stock volatility, high-tech firms, financial leverage, and regulatory status.
FinDistressit is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm’s Z-score (Zmijewski, 1984) financial distress
rank is in the top decile of all firms in a given year, and zero otherwise. dE/P , dE/B, and dE/E are the
seasonally differenced earnings (dE) scaled by beginning-of-period market price (P), book equity (B), or
earnings (E) for firm i at time t. Earnings are before extraordinary items. Earnings, book equity, share
price, and shares outstanding data are from Compustat. experts’ forecasts are from IBES. Firms are subject
to the following screening criteria: 1) data are available for earnings, price, common shares outstanding,
book equity this quarter and fthe quarters prior; 2) dates are aligned with calendar quarters; 3) price is
larger than $1; 4) not in the top and bottom 0.5 percentile of firms ranked by dE/P, dE/B, or dE/E for
each case; 5) there are at least two experts’ forecasts for EPS. Standard errors are given in parentheses.
The standard errors are corrected for both heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation (Newey and West, 1987).
I present the F-tests of whether the estimated intercept coefficient is equal in magnitude to coefficient for
the dummy variable Negit. The sample period is from Q4/1983 to Q4/2013.
Panel A: dE/P
All A1/D5 A2/D4 A3/D3 A4/D2 A5/D1
Const 0.031∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Negit −0.043∗∗∗ −0.028∗∗∗ −0.032∗∗∗ −0.042∗∗∗ −0.053∗∗∗ −0.070∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.007)
RegFDit 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.001 0.002 −0.001
(0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
RegFDit ×Negit −0.023∗∗∗ −0.008 −0.014∗∗ −0.020∗∗∗ −0.038∗∗∗ −0.029∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008)
LitRiskit 0.009
∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗ 0.009 −0.003 0.011∗ 0.010∗
(0.003) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
LitRiskit ×Negit −0.026∗∗∗ −0.031∗∗∗ −0.038∗∗∗ −0.014 −0.014 −0.027∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010)
InfoAsymm −0.004∗∗ −0.010∗∗ −0.006 −0.012∗∗∗ −0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
InfoAsymm×Negit −0.014∗∗∗ −0.008 −0.004 −0.013∗ −0.014∗∗ −0.023∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.008)
FinDistress 0.000 −0.006 −0.011 0.001 0.000 0.010
(0.004) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
FinDistress×Negit 0.001 0.021∗ 0.016 −0.019 −0.005 −0.001
(0.006) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.014)
N 99084 19404 21097 20855 21001 16727
adj. R2 0.022 0.010 0.013 0.020 0.031 0.046
F-test:
|Const| = |Neg| 0.000 0.006 0.009 0.024 0.000 0.000
158
Table 4.3 continued.
Panel B: dE/B
All A1/D5 A2/D4 A3/D3 A4/D2 A5/D1
Const 0.030∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Negit −0.041∗∗∗ −0.026∗∗∗ −0.031∗∗∗ −0.037∗∗∗ −0.051∗∗∗ −0.071∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006)
RegFDit 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.002 0.002 −0.003
(0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
RegFDit ×Negit −0.022∗∗∗ −0.008 −0.012∗∗ −0.020∗∗∗ −0.038∗∗∗ −0.024∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008)
LitRiskit 0.008
∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗ 0.006 −0.004 0.012∗ 0.010
(0.003) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
LitRiskit ×Negit −0.026∗∗∗ −0.029∗∗∗ −0.032∗∗∗ −0.012 −0.018∗ −0.030∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010)
InfoAsymm −0.003 −0.009∗∗ −0.004 −0.008∗ −0.001 0.002
(0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
InfoAsymm×Negit −0.017∗∗∗ −0.009 −0.009 −0.020∗∗∗ −0.013∗∗ −0.023∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.008)
FinDistress 0.001 −0.007 −0.010 0.002 0.001 0.011
(0.004) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
FinDistress×Negit 0.001 0.020∗ 0.016 −0.018 −0.007 0.000
(0.006) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.014)
N 98976 19360 21103 20853 20995 16665
adj. R2 0.021 0.010 0.012 0.019 0.030 0.047
F-test:
|Const| = |Neg| 0.000 0.014 0.018 0.127 0.000 0.000
Panel C: dE/E
All A1/D5 A2/D4 A3/D3 A4/D2 A5/D1
Const 0.031∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Negit −0.043∗∗∗ −0.027∗∗∗ −0.033∗∗∗ −0.042∗∗∗ −0.054∗∗∗ −0.069∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.007)
RegFDit 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.002 0.000 −0.003
(0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
RegFDit ×Negit −0.022∗∗∗ −0.008 −0.013∗∗ −0.020∗∗∗ −0.035∗∗∗ −0.028∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008)
LitRiskit0 0.008
∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗ 0.008 −0.003 0.010∗ 0.006
(0.003) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
LitRiskit ×Negit −0.026∗∗∗ −0.031∗∗∗ −0.039∗∗∗ −0.013 −0.015 −0.023∗∗
(0.004) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010)
InfoAsymm −0.004∗∗ −0.010∗∗ −0.006 −0.012∗∗∗ −0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
InfoAsymm×Negit −0.013∗∗∗ −0.007 −0.004 −0.012∗ −0.012∗ −0.022∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.008)
FinDistress −0.001 −0.007 −0.013 0.001 −0.001 0.007
(0.004) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
FinDistress×Negit 0.002 0.020∗ 0.019 −0.021 −0.004 0.000
(0.006) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.014)
N 98669 19358 20988 20745 20908 16670
adj. R2 0.021 0.010 0.013 0.020 0.030 0.045
F-test:
|Const| = |Neg| 0.000 0.009 0.009 0.019 0.000 0.000
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 4.4: Asymmetric stock price reaction to good vs. bad earnings news
This table reports the coefficient, t-statistic, the number of observations used, and adjusted R2 of contem-
poraneous relations between quarterly returns and earnings surprises, and with the interaction of either
difference of opinion or ambiguity:
Rit = α0 + β0Negit + δ1sueit + δ2sueit ∗Negit + it,
where Rit is the quarterly excess return over Fama and French (1993) market, size, book-to-market factors
and Carhart (2001) momentum factor for firm i in quarter t. Neg is a categorical variable that equals one
for negative earnings surprises, and zero otherwise. A1/D5 refers to the lowest level of ambiguity yet the
highest level of difference of opinion, and so forth. dE/P , dE/B, and dE/E are the seasonally differenced
earnings (dE) scaled by beginning-of-period market price (P), book equity (B), or earnings (E) for firm i at
time t. Earnings are before extraordinary items. Earnings, book equity, share price, and shares outstanding
data are from Compustat. experts’ forecasts are from IBES. Firms are subject to the following screening
criteria: 1) data are available for earnings, price, common shares outstanding, book equity this quarter and
fthe quarters prior; 2) dates are aligned with calendar quarters; 3) price is larger than $1; 4) not in the top
and bottom 0.5 percentile of firms ranked by dE/P, dE/B, or dE/E for each case; 5) there are at least two
experts’ forecasts for EPS. Standard errors are given in parentheses. The standard errors are corrected for
both heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation (Newey and West, 1987). I present the F-tests of whether twice
the estimated intercept coefficient is equal in magnitude to coefficient for the dummy variable Neg. The
sample period is from Q4/1983 to Q4/2013.
Panel A: dE/P
All A1/D5 A2/D4 A3/D3 A4/D2 A5/D1
Const 0.029∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Negit −0.057∗∗∗ −0.039∗∗∗ −0.038∗∗∗ −0.053∗∗∗ −0.063∗∗∗ −0.095∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
sueit 0.097
∗∗∗ 0.062 0.097∗∗ 0.063 0.186∗∗∗ 0.041
(0.021) (0.045) (0.044) (0.041) (0.045) (0.053)
sueit ×Negit 0.642∗∗∗ 0.384∗∗∗ 0.369∗∗∗ 0.476∗∗∗ 0.596∗∗∗ 0.884∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.087) (0.093) (0.083) (0.078) (0.079)
N 227612 45609 45427 45533 45527 45516
adj. R2 0.032 0.014 0.014 0.024 0.041 0.071
F-test:
2 ∗ |Const| = |Neg| 0.217 0.096 0.951 0.098 0.849 0.546
Panel B: dE/B
All A1/D5 A2/D4 A3/D3 A4/D2 A5/D1
Const 0.031∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Negit −0.058∗∗∗ −0.040∗∗∗ −0.037∗∗∗ −0.055∗∗∗ −0.070∗∗∗ −0.090∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
sueit −0.020∗∗ −0.043∗∗ 0.002 −0.075∗∗∗ −0.010 0.009
(0.010) (0.022) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.025)
sueit ×Negit 0.321∗∗∗ 0.199∗∗∗ 0.213∗∗∗ 0.278∗∗∗ 0.276∗∗∗ 0.492∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.036) (0.038) (0.038) (0.036) (0.041)
N 227438 45507 45449 45523 45485 45474
adj. R2 0.032 0.013 0.015 0.023 0.037 0.078
F-test:
2 ∗ |Const| = |Neg| 0.000 0.871 0.090 0.001 0.422 0.003
Panel C: dE/E
All A1/D5 A2/D4 A3/D3 A4/D2 A5/D1
Const 0.026∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Negit −0.054∗∗∗ −0.037∗∗∗ −0.038∗∗∗ −0.051∗∗∗ −0.064∗∗∗ −0.086∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
sueit 0.372
∗∗∗ 0.154∗∗ 0.158∗∗ 0.369∗∗∗ 0.458∗∗∗ 0.620∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.071) (0.079) (0.075) (0.079) (0.105)
sueit ×Negit 0.698∗∗∗ 0.624∗∗∗ 0.618∗∗∗ 0.399∗∗∗ 0.498∗∗∗ 0.760∗∗∗
(0.057) (0.125) (0.141) (0.127) (0.118) (0.133)
N 226774 45479 45225 45371 45348 45351
adj. R2 0.033 0.014 0.015 0.025 0.038 0.072
F-test:
2 ∗ |Const| = |Neg| 0.334 0.147 0.781 0.875 0.044 0.578
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 4.5: Cross-sectional variations in market reactions to earnings news after
controlling for both news leakage and informational content of news per se
This table reports the coefficient, t-statistic, the number of observations used, and adjusted R2 of contem-
poraneous relations between quarterly returns and earnings surprises, and with the interaction of either
difference of opinion or ambiguity:
Rit = α+β0Negit+δ1sueit+δ2sueit∗Negit+β1RegFDit+β2RegFDit∗Negit+β3LitRiskit+β4LitRiskit∗
Negit + β5InfoAsymmit + β6InfoAsymmit ∗Negit + β7FinDistressit + β7FinDistressit ∗Negit + it,
where Rit is the quarterly excess return over Fama and French (1993) market, size, book-to-market factors
and Carhart (2001) momentum factor for firm i in quarter t. A1/D5 refers to the lowest level of ambiguity
yet the highest level of difference of opinion, and so forth. Negit is a categorical variable that equals
one for Negative earnings surprises, and zero otherwise. sueit are the seasonally differenced earnings (dE)
scaled by beginning-of-period market price (P), book equity (B), or earnings (E) for firm i at time t.
RegFDit is a dummy variable equal to one if the announcement occurs before the passage of Regulation
FD in October 2000, and zero otherwise. LitRiskit is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm has
less than median litigation risk calculated using Rogers and Stocken (2005) predictive regression, and zero
otherwise. InfoAsymmit is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm is above the median value of
a single information asymmetry factor, and zero otherwise. The information asymmetry factor is derived
from a factor analysis based on the information asymmetry proxies: market-to-book ratio, stock volatility,
high-tech firms, financial leverage, and regulatory status. FinDistressit is a dummy variable that equals
one if the firm’s Z-score (Zmijewski, 1984) financial distress rank is in the top decile of all firms in a given
year, and zero otherwise. Earnings are before extraordinary items. Earnings, book equity, share price, and
shares outstanding data are from Compustat. experts’ forecasts are from IBES. Firms are subject to the
following screening criteria: 1) data are available for earnings, price, common shares outstanding, book
equity this quarter and fthe quarters prior; 2) dates are aligned with calendar quarters; 3) price is larger
than $1; 4) not in the top and bottom 0.5 percentile of firms ranked by dE/P, dE/B, or dE/E for each
case; 5) there are at least two experts’ forecasts for EPS. The sample period is from Q4/1983 to Q4/2013.
Standard errors are given in parentheses. The standard errors are corrected for both heteroscedasticity and
autocorrelation (Newey and West, 1987). I present the F-tests of whether the estimated intercept coefficient
is equal in magnitude to coefficient for the dummy variable Negit. The sample period is from Q4/1983 to
Q4/2013.
Panel A: dE/P
All A1/D5 A2/D4 A3/D3 A4/D2 A5/D1
Const 0.029∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Negit −0.030∗∗∗ −0.019∗∗∗ −0.026∗∗∗ −0.034∗∗∗ −0.034∗∗∗ −0.050∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
sueit 0.108
∗∗∗ 0.076 0.135∗∗ 0.040 0.243∗∗∗ 0.007
(0.028) (0.064) (0.065) (0.057) (0.058) (0.071)
sueit ×Negit 0.491∗∗∗ 0.380∗∗∗ 0.155 0.363∗∗∗ 0.558∗∗∗ 0.816∗∗∗
(0.053) (0.130) (0.124) (0.111) (0.108) (0.120)
RegFDit 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.001 0.001 −0.001
(0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
RegFDit ×Negit −0.025∗∗∗ −0.011∗ −0.015∗∗ −0.021∗∗∗ −0.038∗∗∗ −0.031∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008)
LitRiskit 0.007
∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗ 0.007 −0.003 0.008 0.010
(0.003) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
LitRiskit ×Negit −0.021∗∗∗ −0.028∗∗∗ −0.036∗∗∗ −0.010 −0.008 −0.019∗
(0.004) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010)
InfoAsymm −0.005∗∗∗ −0.010∗∗ −0.006∗ −0.012∗∗∗ −0.002 0.001
(0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
InfoAsymm×Negit −0.012∗∗∗ −0.007 −0.003 −0.012∗ −0.011∗ −0.020∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.008)
FinDistress 0.001 −0.005 −0.010 0.001 0.001 0.010
(0.004) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
FinDistress×Negit −0.007 0.015 0.013 −0.024∗ −0.017 −0.016
(0.006) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.014)
N 99084 19404 21097 20855 21001 16727
adj. R2 0.028 0.013 0.014 0.023 0.042 0.058
F-test:
|Const| = |Neg| 0.299 0.175 0.406 0.642 0.359 0.203
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Table 4.5 continued.
Panel B: dE/B
All A1/D5 A2/D4 A3/D3 A4/D2 A5/D1
Const 0.030∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Negit −0.032∗∗∗ −0.023∗∗∗ −0.025∗∗∗ −0.032∗∗∗ −0.040∗∗∗ −0.051∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007)
sueit −0.009 −0.012 0.015 −0.073∗∗∗ 0.008 0.003
(0.011) (0.028) (0.022) (0.023) (0.022) (0.032)
sueit ×Negit 0.199∗∗∗ 0.093∗∗ 0.104∗∗ 0.224∗∗∗ 0.217∗∗∗ 0.323∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.047) (0.042) (0.045) (0.044) (0.057)
RegFDit 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.002 −0.002
(0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
RegFDit ×Negit −0.024∗∗∗ −0.009 −0.013∗∗ −0.021∗∗∗ −0.040∗∗∗ −0.029∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008)
LitRiskit 0.008
∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗ 0.006 −0.003 0.011∗ 0.010
(0.003) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
LitRiskit ×Negit −0.025∗∗∗ −0.029∗∗∗ −0.032∗∗∗ −0.012 −0.016∗ −0.027∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010)
InfoAsymm −0.003 −0.009∗∗ −0.004 −0.007∗ −0.001 0.002
(0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
InfoAsymm×Negit −0.015∗∗∗ −0.008 −0.007 −0.020∗∗∗ −0.011∗ −0.019∗∗
(0.003) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.008)
FinDistress 0.001 −0.007 −0.010 0.001 0.001 0.011
(0.004) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
FinDistress×Negit −0.006 0.018 0.012 −0.023∗ −0.015 −0.014
(0.006) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.014)
N 98976 19360 21103 20853 20995 16665
adj. R2 0.025 0.010 0.013 0.022 0.035 0.058
F-test:
|Const| = |Neg| 0.814 0.115 0.816 0.476 0.739 0.441
Panel C: dE/E
All A1/D5 A2/D4 A3/D3 A4/D2 A5/D1
cons 0.028∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Negit −0.032∗∗∗ −0.020∗∗∗ −0.027∗∗∗ −0.034∗∗∗ −0.041∗∗∗ −0.051∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.007)
sueit 0.210
∗∗∗ 0.084 −0.004 0.179∗ 0.418∗∗∗ 0.227
(0.048) (0.101) (0.092) (0.101) (0.101) (0.150)
sueit ×Negit 0.533∗∗∗ 0.527∗∗∗ 0.562∗∗∗ 0.387∗∗ 0.310∗∗ 0.753∗∗∗
(0.075) (0.164) (0.180) (0.167) (0.149) (0.190)
RegFDit 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.002 0.000 −0.001
(0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
RegFDit ×Negit −0.023∗∗∗ −0.009 −0.014∗∗ −0.021∗∗∗ −0.034∗∗∗ −0.030∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008)
LitRiskit 0.007
∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗ 0.008 −0.003 0.009 0.006
(0.003) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
LitRiskit ×Negit −0.022∗∗∗ −0.029∗∗∗ −0.038∗∗∗ −0.011 −0.011 −0.017∗
(0.004) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010)
InfoAsymm −0.004∗∗ −0.010∗∗ −0.006 −0.012∗∗∗ −0.002 0.001
(0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
InfoAsymm×Negit −0.011∗∗∗ −0.006 −0.002 −0.011 −0.009 −0.017∗∗
(0.003) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.008)
FinDistress −0.002 −0.007 −0.013 0.000 −0.002 0.006
(0.004) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
FinDistress×Negit −0.003 0.018 0.017 −0.024∗ −0.009 −0.010
(0.006) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.014)
N 98669 19358 20988 20745 20908 16670
adj. R2 0.025 0.010 0.013 0.022 0.035 0.058
F-test:
|Const| = |Neg| 0.087 0.350 0.152 0.875 0.059 0.286
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 4.6: Reaction of quarterly returns to earnings surprises under ambiguity and
difference of opinion
This table reports the coefficient, t-statistic, the number of observations used, and adjusted R2 of contem-
poraneous relations between quarterly returns and earnings surprises, and with the interaction of either
difference of opinion or ambiguity:
Rit = α0 +
5∑
j=2
αjA
j
it + β0sueit +
5∑
j=2
βjsueitA
j
it + λlsizeit + it,
where sueit is the seasonally differenced earnings (dE) scaled by beginning-of-period market price (P), book
equity (B), or earnings (E) for firm i at time t. Rit is the return for firm i in quarter t. A is calculated as ρ
measuring ambiguity. A5 is the quintile with highest ambiguity and so forth. The first quintile is embedded
in the no-dummy variable. lsizeit is the natural log of beginning-of-period market capitalization for firm
i in quarter t. Earnings are before extraordinary items. Earnings, book equity, share price, and shares
outstanding data are from Compustat. experts’ forecasts are from IBES. Firms are subject to the following
screening criteria: 1) data are available for earnings, price, common shares outstanding, book equity this
quarter and fthe quarters prior; 2) dates are aligned with calendar quarters; 3) price is larger than $1; 4)
not in the top and bottom 0.5 percentile of firms ranked by dE/P, dE/B, or dE/E for each case; 5) there are
at least two experts’ forecasts for EPS. The sample period is from Q4/1983 to Q4/2013. Standard errors
are given in parentheses. The standard errors are corrected for both heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation
(Newey and West, 1987). The sample period is from Q4/1983 to Q4/2013.
dE/P dE/B dE/E
Const 0.002∗∗ 0.005 0.002∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003)
A2it 0.002 0.001 0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
A3it 0.003 0.003 0.004
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
A4it −0.009∗∗∗ −0.009∗∗∗ −0.006∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
A5it 0.009
∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
sueit 0.711
∗∗∗ 0.467∗∗∗ 0.268∗∗∗ 0.160∗∗∗ 1.391∗∗∗ 0.973∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.043) (0.009) (0.019) (0.033) (0.074)
sueit ×A2it 0.016 0.026 −0.061
(0.062) (0.027) (0.106)
sueit ×A3it 0.105∗ 0.022 0.230∗∗
(0.060) (0.027) (0.104)
sueit ×A4it 0.377∗∗∗ 0.141∗∗∗ 0.573∗∗∗
(0.059) (0.026) (0.100)
sueit ×A5it 0.531∗∗∗ 0.288∗∗∗ 0.921∗∗∗
(0.062) (0.029) (0.101)
lsizeit −0.059∗ −0.056 −0.085∗∗ −0.083∗∗ −0.181∗∗∗ −0.171∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.035) (0.034) (0.035)
N 227095 227095 226922 226922 226260 226260
adj. R2 0.016 0.018 0.013 0.016 0.021 0.023
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 4.7: Differential reactions of quarterly returns to positive and negative earnings
surprises under ambiguity and difference of opinion
This table reports the coefficient, t-statistic, the number of observations used, and adjusted R2 of contem-
poraneous relations between quarterly returns and earnings surprises, and with the interaction of either
difference of opinion or ambiguity:
Rit = α0 +
5∑
j=2
αjD
j
it(A
j
it) + β0sueit +
5∑
j=2
βjsueitD
j
it(A
j
it) + λlsizeit + it,
where sueit is the seasonally differenced earnings (dE) scaled by beginning-of-period market price (P),
book equity (B), or earnings (E) for firm i at time t. Rit is the return for firm i in quarter t. lsizeit is
the natural log of beginning-of-period market capitalization for firm i in quarter t. Earnings are before
extraordinary items. Earnings, book equity, share price, and shares outstanding data are from Compustat.
experts’ forecasts are from IBES. Firms are subject to the following screening criteria: 1) data are available
for earnings, price, common shares outstanding, book equity this quarter and fthe quarters prior; 2) dates
are aligned with calendar quarters; 3) price is larger than $1; 4) not in the top and bottom 0.5 percentile
of firms ranked by dE/P, dE/B, or dE/E for each case; 5) there are at least two experts’ forecasts for EPS.
The sample period is from Q4/1983 to Q4/2013. Standard errors are given in parentheses. The standard
errors are corrected for both heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation (Newey and West, 1987). The sample
period is from Q4/1983 to Q4/2013.
dE/P dE/B dE/E
Positive Negative Positive Negative Positive Negative
Const 0.072∗∗∗ −0.052∗∗∗ 0.079∗∗∗ −0.059∗∗∗ 0.071∗∗∗ −0.055∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005)
sueit 0.126
∗∗∗ 0.814∗∗∗ −0.021∗∗ 0.340∗∗∗ 0.412∗∗∗ 1.189∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.037) (0.011) (0.017) (0.041) (0.052)
lsize −0.588∗∗∗ 0.364∗∗∗ −0.655∗∗∗ 0.486∗∗∗ −0.603∗∗∗ 0.414∗∗∗
(0.039) (0.065) (0.039) (0.064) (0.040) (0.064)
N 137549 89546 136233 90689 137157 89103
adj. R2 0.001 0.014 0.000 0.016 0.001 0.016
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 4.8: Differential reactions of quarterly returns to positive and negative earnings
surprises under ambiguity and difference of opinion
This table reports the coefficient, t-statistic, the number of observations used, and adjusted R2 of contem-
poraneous relations between quarterly returns and earnings surprises, and with the interaction of either
difference of opinion or ambiguity:
Rit = α0 +
5∑
j=2
αjA
j
it + β0sueit +
5∑
j=2
βjsueitA
j
it + λlsizeit + it,
where sueit is the seasonally differenced earnings (dE) scaled by beginning-of-period market price (P), book
equity (B), or earnings (E) for firm i at time t. Rit is the return for firm i in quarter t. A is calculated as ρ
measuring ambiguity. A5 is the quintile with highest ambiguity and so forth. The first quintile is embedded
in the no-dummy variable. lsizeit is the natural log of beginning-of-period market capitalization for firm
i in quarter t. Earnings are before extraordinary items. Earnings, book equity, share price, and shares
outstanding data are from Compustat. experts’ forecasts are from IBES. Firms are subject to the following
screening criteria: 1) data are available for earnings, price, common shares outstanding, book equity this
quarter and fthe quarters prior; 2) dates are aligned with calendar quarters; 3) price is larger than $1; 4)
not in the top and bottom 0.5 percentile of firms ranked by dE/P, dE/B, or dE/E for each case; 5) there are
at least two experts’ forecasts for EPS. The sample period is from Q4/1983 to Q4/2013. Standard errors
are given in parentheses. The standard errors are corrected for both heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation
(Newey and West, 1987). The sample period is from Q4/1983 to Q4/2013.
dE/P dE/B dE/E
Positive Negative Positive Negative Positive Negative
Const 0.056∗∗∗ −0.035∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗ −0.035∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗ −0.031∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005)
A2it 0.000 0.002 −0.000 0.003 0.002 −0.000
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
A3it 0.012
∗∗∗ −0.004 0.013∗∗∗ −0.006∗ 0.010∗∗∗ −0.006∗
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
A4it 0.016
∗∗∗ −0.011∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ −0.014∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ −0.014∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
A5it 0.029
∗∗∗ −0.032∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ −0.024∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ −0.028∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
sueit 0.087 0.513
∗∗∗ −0.053∗ 0.317∗∗∗ 0.295∗∗∗ 1.202∗∗∗
(0.067) (0.098) (0.031) (0.043) (0.105) (0.157)
sueit ×A2it 0.162∗ 0.111 0.081∗ 0.070 0.033 −0.154
(0.095) (0.146) (0.043) (0.061) (0.158) (0.215)
sueit ×A3it 0.059 0.129 −0.025 0.024 0.186 0.073
(0.089) (0.140) (0.042) (0.060) (0.145) (0.220)
sueit ×A4it 0.193∗∗ 0.498∗∗∗ 0.075∗ 0.168∗∗∗ 0.613∗∗∗ 0.349∗
(0.094) (0.133) (0.043) (0.060) (0.149) (0.208)
sueit ×A5it 0.066 0.625∗∗∗ 0.080 0.420∗∗∗ 0.637∗∗∗ 0.829∗∗∗
(0.100) (0.125) (0.050) (0.057) (0.172) (0.202)
lsize −0.536∗∗∗ 0.247∗∗∗ −0.604∗∗∗ 0.332∗∗∗ −0.543∗∗∗ 0.252∗∗∗
(0.038) (0.060) (0.038) (0.059) (0.039) (0.060)
N 137549 89546 136233 90689 137157 89103
adj. R2 0.005 0.017 0.005 0.020 0.006 0.018
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 4.9: Calibration of the model parameters
This table reports the calibrated values for model parameters. For computing σ2m, I firstly take the cross-
sectional average for earnings and then calculate the variance of of the time series for EP, EB, and EE,
respectively. For computing σ2c , I firstly divide data into quintiles in terms of uncertainty (V ) and then
calculate the variance of the pooled data for each earnings surprise measure for each quintile. Subtraction
of σ2m from the calculated variances gives σ
2
c for each quintile. The ”aggregate” σ
2
c is computed in the same
way without splitting the data into quintiles. For computing σ2u, I put σ
2
c and σ
2
m back to beta equation
under no uncertainty with beta equal to 0.7.
EP(%%) EB(%%) EE
σ2m 0.122 0.177 0.022
σ2c 3.059 17.92 3.125
σ2(1)c 1.119 11.47 1.531
σ2(2)c 1.736 13.21 2.104
σ2(3)c 2.502 16.21 2.684
σ2(4)c 3.459 19.06 3.749
σ2(5)c 5.785 23.64 5.289
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Chapter 5
Concluding Remarks
Financial information can be broadly categorized into tangible and intangible in-
formation. In this paper, tangible information refers to information related to
firms’ fundamental accounting-performance, for instance quarterly corporate earn-
ings news. Intangible information refers to information that can not be measured to
current accounting system, for example employee satisfaction. Market reacts to tan-
gible information more efficiently, while it often fails to incorporate value-relevant
intangible news. This thesis sets out to firstly examine the efficiency of market re-
actions to intangible news and secondly investigate how characteristics of investors’
decision making process affect market reactions to tangible news.
Chapter 2 studies how the relationship between employee satisfaction and
stock returns depends critically on the level of a country’s labor market flexibility.
The alphas documented by Edmans (2011, 2012) for the U.S. are not anomalous
in a global context, in terms of economic significance, and do extend to several
other countries. However, they do not automatically generalize to every country
- being listed as a Best Company to Work For is associated with superior returns
only in countries with high labor market flexibility. These results are consistent
with the idea that the recruitment, retention, and motivational benefits of employee
satisfaction are most valuable in countries in which firms face fewer constraints on
hiring and firing. These benefits are lower in countries with inflexible labor markets,
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leading to a downward shift in the marginal benefit of expenditure on employee
welfare. Moreover, in such countries, regulations already provide a floor for worker
welfare, leading to a movement down the marginal benefit curve. Both forces reduce
the marginal benefit of investing in worker satisfaction, and thus being listed as a
Best Company may reflect an agency problem.
The results emphasize the importance of the institutional context for both
managers and investors. Edmans (2011, 2012) uses long-run stock returns as the
dependent variable to mitigate concerns about reverse causality from firm perfor-
mance to employee satisfaction - any publicly-available performance measure should
be incorporated into the stock price at the start of the return compounding win-
dow. However, these papers do not make strong claims about causality, as it may be
that a third, unobservable variable (e.g. management quality) drives both employee
satisfaction and stock returns. Even if their results are interpreted as causal, it is
not the case that managers can hope to increase stock returns by investing in em-
ployee satisfaction, as a positive link only exists in countries with high labor market
flexibility. Turning to investors, a strategy of investing in firms with high employee
satisfaction will only generate superior returns in countries with high labor mar-
ket flexibility. Given that the vast majority of empirical asset pricing studies that
uncover alpha are based on U.S. data, the results emphasize caution in applying
these strategies overseas. This caution is especially warranted for strategies that are
likely to be dependent on the institutional or cultural environment, such as socially
responsible investing strategies. Just as the value of employee satisfaction depends
on the flexibility of labor markets and existing regulations on worker welfare, the
value of other SRI screens such as gender diversity, animal rights, environmental
protection, and operating in an ethical industry also likely depend on the context.
In the third chapter, we investigate how ambiguity affects return-earnings
relation on both firm- and aggregate-level. Literature shows that positive firm-level
earnings news is informative about a firm’s future cash flows, thereby increases its
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contemporaneous stock price. However, this positive return-earnings relation does
not translate into aggregate level. In fact, a negative contemporaneous relationship
between market returns and aggregate earnings surprises has been documented in
recent literature (see for instance, Kothari, Lewellen, and Warner (2006) and Sadka
and Sadka (2009)). The puzzling finding could be explained by either the diver-
sification of firm-specific earnings surprises or the high predictability of aggregate
earnings. To shed some lights on the puzzle, we interact two levels of ambigu-
ity with the return-earnings relation on both firm- and aggregate-level. Firm-level
ambiguity distorts diversification effect while macroeconomic ambiguity affects the
predictability. We provide a model explaining the phenomenon and empirical evi-
dence supporting the hypothesis.
Our results show that individual response coefficient increases with firm-
level ambiguity. Firm-level ambiguity increases the aggregate earnings response
coefficient. Moreover, this increase is more pronounced when the degree of market-
level ambiguity is high. High degree of market-level ambiguity leads to an increase
in the earnings response coefficient of high-ambiguity stocks and to a decrease in the
earnings response coefficient of the low-ambiguity stocks. Intuitively, when the firm-
level ambiguity is high, the response to negative news is particularly amplified due to
investor’s aversion to ambiguity. This leads to an overall larger reaction to earnings
news. Market-wide ambiguity amplifies the negative contribution of the discount
rate news. Hence, for earnings response coefficient with low firm-level ambiguity,
we observe that high macroeconomic ambiguity decrease the coefficients, and vice
versa for coefficient with high firm-level ambiguity. We conclude that the negative
aggregate relation comes from the diversification effect as well as an amplifying effect
of macroeconomic ambiguity on discount rate news and market-wide cash flow news.
Chapter 4 examines the market asymmetric reaction to good versus bad news
and investigates the roles of ambiguity and difference of opinion on the stylized
fact. The average negative return generated by bad news is larger in magnitude
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than the average positive return generated by good news. The asymmetric reaction
could be due to either larger amount of negative news on the market or stronger
reaction to bad news per se. This chapter shows that it is the latter that causes
the differential average return between good and bad news. Literature offers two
perspectives for this asymmetric reaction. Firstly, Epstein and Schneider (2008)
show in their model that Knightian uncertainty or ambiguity can lead to stronger
reaction to bad news versus good news. Kelsey, Kozhan, and Pang (2011) show that
this asymmetric reaction to bad versus good news causes asymmetric profitability of
momentum strategy. Secondly, recent studies in decision theory raise the question
that difference of opinion among experts could contribute to the decision maker’s
asymmetric assessment of the good versus bad news. Cres, Gilboa, and Vieille
(2011), for instance, develop an axiomatized framework of incorporate ambiguity
and difference of opinion altogether in the decision maker’s assessment of signals.
Based on those two strands of literature, this chapter sets out to empirically test
and model the effects of both ambiguity and difference of opinion on firm-level
return-earnings relation.
The results are striking. I show empirically that both ambiguity and differ-
ence of opinion are related to the differential reactions to bad versus good news and
their combining effects generate a ”yes” tick shape of differential earnings response
coefficients in quintile portfolios. To verify the finding, I build a model to capture
the return-earnings relation with one decision maker, multiple experts, and multiple
firms. Due to lack of information, the ambiguity-averse experts and decision maker
lack confidence on the distribution of firms’ signals and hence assign a variance in-
ternal for the distributions of the signals. In the presence of private information, the
gravity center of experts’ set of priors differs, resulting in differential assessments
of the signals even if the level of ambiguity is the same. Experts’s preference ex-
hibit ambiguity aversion and are described by the maxmin expected utility model
proposed by Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989). The decision maker exhibits aversion
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to expert uncertainty and her preferences follow the ”maxminmin” expected utility
model axiomatized by Cres, Gilboa, and Vieille (2011). Monte Carlo simulation of
the model shows that ambiguity and difference of opinion have contrasted effects on
investors’ reactions on earnings surprises measured by earnings response coefficient.
Ambiguity increases the ERC for negative news. Difference of opinion, however, has
a muted effect. For positive news, both decrease the response coefficients. By com-
bining ambiguity with difference of opinion, the model generates a ”yes” tick shape
of differential reactions to negative versus positive news that matches the empirical
finding.
The results support our hypothesis that both ambiguity and difference of
opinion contribute to the asymmetric market reaction to bad versus good news.
The implication for investors is clear. When designing trading strategies based
on news, it is important to consider the quality of information environment and
the extent of private information on the market. Since ambiguity and difference
of opinion generates asymmetric reactions to news, it is interesting to explore for
future research that whether both could contribute to other asymmetric phenomena
found on the financial markets.
To end, I suggest several areas for future research. The second chapter stud-
ies the relation between employee satisfaction and stock returns across the world.
It will be interesting to see whether the link exists between asset returns and other
aspects of CSR - employee welfare, gender diversity, animal rights, environmental
protection, and whether the firm is in a ”sin” industry (such as tobacco, alcohol,
and gambling). If there are links, whether the heterogeneity of these links across
countries is likely to depend on the institutional context, such as regulations and
cultural norms. The third chapter assumes high predictability of future expected
returns and a negative correlation between earnings surprises and future expected
returns. Empirical evidence on these points is weak due to the difficulty of find-
ing appropriate discount rate proxies and lack of consistent methodologies to test
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them. It will be a good contribution to provide further robust evidence to support
this assumption. In addition, the results of chapter three preclude the explanation
based on high predictability of aggregate earnings changes. In particular, the study
assumes high level macroeconomic ambiguity reduces the predictability of aggregate
earnings changes. Although this is intuitive, the rigour of this subject requires a
thorough investigation in this matter.
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Appendix A
Proof of Conditional
Expectations under Ambiguity
A.1 Case of no uncertainty
In order to establish benchmark, I start by considering the case with no ambiguity
in information and signals and no difference of opinion among experts. Since all
experts and the decision maker have exactly the same opinion regarding the signals,
I remove the layer of experts without loss of generality. Hence, cit ∼ N(0, σ2ci) for
any i and t, mt ∼ N(0, σ2m), ηt ∼ N(0, σ2η) and uit ∼ N(0, σ2u).
Denote in matrix form,
Z =

e1t
e2t
...
ent

, X =

s1t
s2t
...
snt

where Z ∼ N(0,∑Z), X ∼ N(0,∑X), ∑ZX = Cov(Z,X), and ∑dX = Cov(d,X).
I am only interested in computing the responses of individual firms’ returns
to earnings announcements. Given the set of signals sit, the decision maker’s expec-
tations about the realization of variables eit and dt are:
E(Z|X) = ΣZXΣ−1X X
E(d|X) = ΣdXΣ−1X X
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where
ΣX =

σ2c1 + σ
2
m + σ
2
u σ
2
m . . . σ
2
m
σ2m σ
2
c2 + σ
2
m + σ
2
u . . . σ
2
m
...
...
...
...
σ2m σ
2
m . . . σ
2
cn + σ
2
m + σ
2
u

ΣZX =

σ2c1 + σ
2
m σ
2
m . . . σ
2
m
σ2m σ
2
c2 + σ
2
m . . . σ
2
m
...
...
...
...
σ2m σ
2
m . . . σ
2
cn + σ
2
m

ΣdX = σ
2
m
(
1 1 . . . 1
)
Under no uncertainty, σ2c1 = σ
2
c2 = . . . = σ
2
cn =: σ
2
c . As a result,
ΣZXΣ
−1
X =

σ2c+∆
σ2c+σ
2
u
∆
σ2c+σ
2
u
. . . ∆
σ2c+σ
2
u
∆
σ2c+σ
2
u
σ2c+∆
σ2c+σ
2
u
. . . ∆
σ2c+σ
2
u
...
...
...
...
∆
σ2c+σ
2
u
∆
σ2c+σ
2
u
. . . σ
2
c+∆
σ2c+σ
2
u

where ∆ =
σ2mσ
2
u
σ2c + nσ
2
m + σ
2
u
ΣdXΣ
−1
X =
σ2m
σ2c + nσ
2
m + σ
2
u
(
1 1 . . . 1
)
Specifically,
Et−1[eit|s] =
n∑
j=1
γji sjt
Et−1[dt|s] = δs¯t,
where
γji =
∆
σ2c + σ
2
u
for i 6= j
γii =
σ2c + ∆
σ2c + σ
2
u
,
δ =
nσ2m
σ2c + nσ
2
m + σ
2
u
.
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Hence, the announcement surprises εit and ωt are
εit = eit − Et−1[eit|s] = eit −
n∑
j=1
γji sjt,
ωt = dt − Et−1[dt|s] = dt − δs¯t.
A.2 Case of ambiguous information
Let us consider now an extension of the model where the experts and decision maker
face ambiguity regarding the variance of firm-specific and market-wide cash flow
components. The ambiguity of the firm specific component is purely idiosyncratic.
I will call it firm-specific ambiguity hereafter. The ambiguity about the market
represents the overall ambiguity about the market as whole. I will call it market-
wide ambiguity. I consider both level of ambiguity altogether as a whole.
I model both types of ambiguity using the multiple prior model of Gilboa and
Schmeidler (1989). More specifically, the experts and decision maker do not observe
the variances of cit and mt and know only their interval ranges: σ
2
ci ∈ [σ2c , σ2c ] and
σ2m ∈ [σ2m, σ2m]. Similar approach has been adopted by Epstein and Schneider (2008)
and Kelsey, Kozhan, and Pang (2011). In this case, there is no difference of opin-
ion. Hence the variance ranges will be the same for experts and the decision maker.
without loss of generality, the layer of experts in the modeling setup is omitted in
this subsection.
Under ambiguity only, σ2c1 6= σ2c2 6= . . . 6= σ2cn. As a result,
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Specifically,
Et−1[eit|s] =
n∑
j=1
γji sjt
Et−1[dt|s] =
n∑
i=1
δisit,
where
γii =
1
Γ
[
[Γ(σ2ci + σ
2
u)− σ2m](σ2ci + σ2m)
(σ2ci + σ
2
u)
2
−
n∑
k=1,k 6=i
σ2mσ
2
m
(σ2ck + σ
2
u)(σ
2
ci + σ
2
u)
] for i = j
γji =
1
Γ
[
[Γ(σ2cj + σ
2
u)− σ2m]σ2m
(σ2cj + σ
2
u)
2
− (σ
2
ci + σ
2
m)σ
2
m
(σ2ci + σ
2
u)(σ
2
cj + σ
2
u)
−
n∑
k=1,k 6=i,j
σ2mσ
2
m
(σ2ck + σ
2
u)(σ
2
cj + σ
2
u)
] for i 6= j,
δi =
σ2m
Γ
[
Γ
σ2ci + σ
2
u
−
n∑
k=1
σ2m
(σ2ck + σ
2
u)(σ
2
ci + σ
2
u)
].
Hence, the announcement surprises εit and ωt are
εit = eit − Et−1[eit|s] = eit −
n∑
j=1
γji sjt,
ωt = dt − Et−1[dt|s] = dt −
n∑
i=1
δisit.
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